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Opinion Per Curiam.
And the court further find, in reference to the further allegations in relator's petition, that it has no jurisdiction, in an action in quo warranto, to grant relief by way of injunction, other than as incident to and necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of Sections 12303 and 12304, General Code, authorizing an action in quo warranto, and that the further averments of said petition do not bring this cause within the provisions of either of said sections, and that the sole and only relief sought in plaintiff's petition is an injunction restraining acts not corporate in their character, and that this court has no original jurisdiction in an action where injunction is the sole relief prayed for and not merely incident to a suit in quo warranto.
The court further find that the nonanswering defendants Robert Grant and Harris Brothers are mere nominal defendants, and for the reasons aforesaid, the petition of relator is dismissed and defendants discharged without day.
NEWMAN, JONES, MATTHIAS, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur.
NICHOLS, C. J., and WANAMAKER, J., dissent.
CASES DECIDED AND REPORTED WITHOUT OPINION, DURING THE PERIOD EM
BRACED IN THIS VOLUME.
No. 15325. JOHN A. ROEBLING's Sons Co. v. THE TROY TRUST Co. ET AL. Decided March 20, 1917. ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Marion county. Messrs. Wilkın, Cross & Daoust and Messrs. Tolles, Hogsett, Ginn & Morley, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Finley & Gallinger; Mr. Paul Bonynge; Mr. George B. Scofield and Mr. D. R. Crissinger, for defendants in error. Judgment affirmed. WANAMAKER, NEWMAN, JONES and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
No. 15398. MOTON ET AL. v. KESSENS, and No. 15399. MOTON ET AL. v. DEWELL ET AL. Decided March 20, 1917. ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Mercer county. Mr. William E. Henderson and Mr. L. H. Shipman, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. John W. Loree; Mr. P. E. Kenney and Mr. John G. Romer, for defendants in error. Judgments affirmed. See journal entry. (Same journal entry in both cases.-REPORTER.)
Journal entry: It is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said court of
appeals be, and the same is hereby, affirmed; for the reasons:
First. That the will of John Randolph, deceased, vested in William Leigh, as executor, full power, authority and discretion to determine the location, plans, methods and means of transporting and settling the manumitted slaves of John Randolph in some state or territory of the United States, other than the State of Virginia, in which state the testator resided at the time of his death, all of which not only appears by the direct terms of the will, but by the further provision therein, that “no inventory or appraisement be made of my estate, and no security shall be required of my
said executor for the faithful discharge of the trust imposed in him, — his own character being the best security, and when that is wanting, all other is unavailing.” That in the exercise of the absolute and unlimited discretion so vested in him, the said William Leigh, as such executor, purchased after the death of John Randolph, the lands described in the petition, together with a large amount of other land adjoining and surrounding the same, for the evident purpose of settling the manumitted slaves of John Randolph upon this land, and in pursuance of such purpose undertook to transport them and settle them upon it, but that the people then living in the locality of these lands, with force and arms and by menaces and threats of violence, interrupted the transportation of these former slaves while en route to these lands and before they had reached the same, and compelled the said W 1liam Leigh, as executor, in the interest and safety
of these people to abandon these lands for the purposes for which he had purchased the same, and seek another locality, in which they might be settled in peace and safety. That the said William Leigh, executor, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him by the will of John Randolph, deceased, had the right and authority at any time before putting these former slaves in possession of these lands, for reasons which might be satisfactory to him, to abandon this location and select another in which to settle these former slaves, and that the conditions that confronted him at that time and the necessity of making such change in location were so apparent, that he not only exercised a sound discretion in doing so, but in the interest of the peace and safety of these former slaves, he was absolutely compelled to make such change in his original plans, and seek another location for their homes. That the lands he had so purchased, and taken the title in his own name, having thereby become absolutely useless to him for the purposes for which he had purchased the same, he had full power and authority to sell and dispose of these lands, and apply the proceeds arising from such sale, to the cost of transporting and settling these former slaves in homes in other localities, and that in the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption obtains that the funds were properly expended in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will, in so far as the amount received therefrom was sufficient for these purposes, and that these beneficiaries of the will of John Randolph received
in full the benefits of all the funds arising from the sale of these lands.
Second. That said manumitted slaves of John Randolph never were put in possession or occupation of these lands, nor were the same or any part thereof ever allotted to any individual in such manner as to vest in any one of these individuals, any right, title, or interest in any specific part or parcel of this land. That but few of these manumitted slaves were entitled under the will of John Randolph, to receive land, and they could acquire no right or title in law or equity to any particular land until the same was specifically aparted or allotted to them. That the rights of those entitled to land were not rights in common, but individual and specific rights to particular lands after the same had been allotted to each in severalty, and after such allotment their rights thereto either at law or in equity must be established in a separate and individual action and not as a class.
Third. That John Randolph was never seized of these lands in his lifetime; that the title was taken in the name of William Leigh, executor, who was vested with full right and authority by the will of John Randolph, to dispose of the same before putting these manumitted slaves in occupation thereof and devote the proceeds of such sale to the same purposes for which he had acquired the land, and that if any trust arose in these lands by reason of the purchase of the same with trust funds, that trust was divested by their sale occasioned by the necessity of the conditions that confronted the trustee in his efforts to administer this trust prop