Opinion, per NEWMAN, J. been consented to without those limitations and restrictions, and it may be that in the absence of such an arrangement plaintiff in error would be unable to connect the disconnected portions of its railroad, as the business between the two points named may not be sufficient to warrant the building of a connecting line. No doubt the failure of plaintiff in error to have a continuous line of railroad would be to the disadvantage of the patrons on its own line and of the public generally. As was said in Alford v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 3 I. C. C. R., 519, 533: "Running arrangements like the one in question, and with like restrictions, exist in many other parts of the country, and are of great service in transportation. In some instances in large cities several companies run their trains over the tracks of one company for through business, but take no local business from the company that gives the privilege. It has never been shown that this practice injures any one, or that it is not in the public interest. It certainly saves a large expenditure for parallel lines and for terminal rights in cities. A decision adjudging such arrangements unlawful could only demoralize transportation to a large extent and prove prejudicial to carriers as well as to the public." We see no valid legal objection to this agreement. Similar agreements have met the approval of the supreme court of the United States in a number of cases, among which are Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 U. S., 564, and Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co., 143 U. S., 596. Opinion, per NEWMAN, J. While the instant case was pending in this court, the Interstate Commerce Commission dismissed a complaint filed by The Hocking Domestic Coal Company against plaintiff in error here, in which the Coal Company was asking the commission for an order to require plaintiff in error to serve its mine as an initial carrier and furnish cars for the movement of the output of the mine to interstate destinations and to place the cars for loading over the switch track connecting the mine track of the Coal Company with the main track of The Hocking Valley Railway Company. The agreement under consideration here was before the Interstate Commerce Commission and it was held that plaintiff in error might, under the restraint of this agreement, lawfully decline to serve the Coal Company. In that proceeding, as in this case, the contention was made that the reservation of The Hocking Valley Railway Company to itself of the exclusive use of the private switch tracks was void as against public policy. The Interstate Commerce Commission in disposing of that contention used this language: "It is, of course, the wellsettled law that a railroad may not render itself incapable of performing its duties to the public or absolve itself from those obligations without the consent of the state. It will serve no useful purpose, however, to enter upon any discussion of the cases. It will suffice to say that the authorities. clearly establish the doctrine that an owning and operating railroad may give trackage rights to another carrier over a part of its line, where such a Opinion, per NEWMAN, J. grant does not impair the performance of its own duties to the public as a common carrier, and, in the absence of a controlling statute, that the owning carrier may, by the terms of the agreement, prohibit the grantee from exercising its functions as a common carrier with respect to traffic upon the line of track so granted. Such provisions do not impair the common carrier obligations of the grantee on its own line, and the grant may indeed enlarge the ability of the grantee carrier to serve patrons on its own line. The general principles will be found stated at some length in Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 163 U. S., 564, 593, 594, 595. Speaking of a similar limitation in Alford v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 3 I. C. C., 519, 531, this Commission said that the rights of the lessee with respect to the leased line 'are not the general rights of a common carrier upon its own road, but are limited and qualified by the agreement. They are simple contract rights which the law does not and can not enlarge.' (44 I. C. C. R., 400.) 999 But it is urged, finally, and it was so held by the Public Utilities Commission, that there is a statute in Ohio which controls the situation before us, Section 8983, General Code, reading as follows: "A company whose road forms part of a line of railway between points common to another line, shall not contract or agree with any person, or other railroad company or companies, having a road or line of roads, or forming a part of a line of roads, between the same points, not to carry freight or passengers to or from such common points, nor shall it refuse to receive or Opinion, per NEWMAN, J. carry freight or passengers brought to it to be so carried." The Public Utilities Commission says that the duty of a common carrier operating a line of railroad in common with another is defined in this section and that the agreement upon which plaintiff in error relies is thereby rendered void. We do not think that this statute has any application to the situation presented here. As we view it, it contemplates the existence of two actual lines of railroad between points common to each other parallel lines, so-called. The owners of such lines are prohibited from contracting or agreeing not to carry freight or passengers to or from such common points. Plaintiff in error owns no right of way or tracks between Hobson and Kanauga. It has no line, in the sense that term is used in the statute. It is only by reason of the trackage agreement that it operates at all between those points. We do not think that such an agreement was intended to be disturbed by the statute we have quoted. For the reasons we have given, The Hocking Domestic Coal Company is not entitled to the relief it sought. The order of the Commission is therefore reversed and the complaint dismissed. Order reversed and complaint dismissed. NICHOLS, C. J., JONES, MATTHIAS, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur. Statement of the Case. THE RENNER BREWING COMPANY V. ROLLAND. Constitutional law-Registration of bottles, etc.-Section 13169 et seq., General Code - Injunction Writ available although acts punishable as crime. 1. Sections 13169, 13169-1, 13169-2 and 13169-3, General Code, are a valid and constitutional exercise of the police power vested in the general assembly of the state. 2. Where the averments of a petition would, if proven, entitle the plaintiff to an injunction, a writ will not be refused merely because the acts sought to be enjoined are punishable under the criminal statutes of this state. (No. 15448 Decided May 15, 1917.) ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Mahoning county. On the 21st day of June, 1916, The Renner Brewing Company, a corporation, filed in the common pleas court of Mahoning county a petition praying that Henry W. Rolland be perpetually enjoined from gathering, purchasing, trafficking in, selling, or otherwise taking possession of and disposing of bottles owned and used by the plaintiff in the operation of its business. The petition averred among other things that the plaintiff is engaged in the manufacturing, bottling, and selling of beer, using in the delivery of same a large number of bottles; that its name and trademark are blown and embossed upon each and every bottle used by it; and that on the 18th day of January, A. D. 1916, it duly registered and filed in the office of the secretary of state in the city of Columbus, Ohio, and on the 19th day |