Statement of the Case.

them by reason of no executions being issued thereon until the 15th day of September, 1914. That said affidavit of W. J. Weirick does not present a claim arising upon contract', within the purview of section 11819, G. C., nor does it show the ground of an attachment, to-wit: 'Fraudulently incurred the obligation for which suit is about to be brought,' within the purview of paragraph 10, of said section 11819, and said attachment is of no virtue or force in law by reason of such insufficiency of said affidavit."

"7. That said W. M. Hahn, by reason of the lien obtained by him in attachment perfected August 17, 1912, and the judgment thereafter obtained, has the sixth best lien upon said monies and funds in the sum of $1573.25, which sum is ordered paid, provided there be money sufficient in the hands of said receiver partially or wholly to pay the same.

"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that said receiver shall pay out and distribute said funds, to-wit:

1. To payment of costs, receiver's and
attorney's fees, and compensa-

tion as above set forth, and
found, taxed and to be taxed at $..

2. To the Charles Hoffman Company,

8. To W. M. Hahn, the sum of.....

1,573.25"

Plaintiffs in error are in this court to reverse this judgment.

Mr. C. H. Workman; Mr. W. J. Weirick; Messrs. Brucker, Voegele & Henkel and Mr. James W. Galbraith, for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. J. E. La Dow; Messrs. Douglass & Hutchison; Messrs. Semple & Sherrick; Mr. W. S. Kerr; Mr. C. H. Workman and Mr. C. H. Huston, for defendants in error.

WANAMAKER, J. The questions arising in this case grew out of attempted attachments by William M. Hahn and W. J. Weirick, the plaintiffs in error, and the one question that is common to both claims, as considered and determined by the courts below, relates to the sheriff's return upon the writ of attachment. Did the attachment date from the amendment of the return or from the date of the original return?

An examination of the record herein, together with the statutes applicable thereto, discloses the fact that there is a prior and paramount question this return which this court must consider and

upon

Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J.

determine; and that is, Was or was not the amendment essential to the validity of the return?

The amendment in both returns relates solely to a report of the fact that "a certified copy of the order of attachment was left with the occupant of the residence."

Under the statute was the amendment necessary to the validity of the attachment?

It is a familiar and elementary rule that remedial statutes shall be liberally construed. In some states statutes of attachment have received such liberal construction, but in other states the policy of strict construction has obtained.

The general assembly of Ohio, however, has settled this question for the people and courts of this state in the following words, Section 10214, General Code:

"The provisions of part third and all proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed, in order to promote its object, and assist the parties in obtaining justice."

It should be observed here that the statutes relating to attachment, and the proceedings thereunder, are embraced within said "Part Third." And hence the polestar in their construction shall be to "assist the parties in obtaining justice."

What must be stated in a return upon a writ of attachment?

This question is one not to be answered by the court; but one already answered by the general assembly of Ohio, by virtue of Section 11836, General Code:

Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J.

"The officer shall return upon every order of at tachment what he has done under it. The return must show the property attached and the time it was attached. When garnishees are served, their names, and the time each was served, must be stated. The officer shall return with the order all bonds given under it."

Clearly there is nothing specifically said in this statute requiring the return to show that "a copy of the order" was served on the owner or occupant of the premises.

But it is urged that the first sentence of this statute is so general and comprehensive, and so imperative, as to make that duty mandatory. This answer would have much force but for the language following, which expressly specifies certain things which the return "must" show, to-wit: 1. The property attached. 2. The time it was attached. Here is the meat of the cocoanut. Return made upon these two facts completes the attachment and brings the property within the custody of the court, unless there are garnishees, when that fact must also appear in the return, agreeable to the statute. It should also be noted that this same section requires that there shall be returned with the order the bonds given under it. So that we have here another specific thing to be done.

Further reference as to the return is made in Section 11826:

"Then with the freeholders, who must be first sworn by him, he shall make a true inventory and appraisement of all the property attached, which shall be signed by the officer and freeholders, and

Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J.

returned with the order. When the property attached is real property, the officer shall leave with the occupant thereof, or, if there is no occupant, in a conspicuous place thereon, a copy of the order. Nothing here is said about the return showing that "a copy of the order" was so left.

It is an old rule of construction that where a statute specifically and expressly mentions certain things, other things belonging to the same class, or occurring at the same time, are excluded. In short, when a statute makes certain definite things mandatory, the presumption is that the other things associated therewith are not mandatory.

The old Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius has become a primary and well-settled rule of statutory construction.

In support of this contention it should be further cbserved that the copy of the order so served on the occupant of the premises is clearly for the sole benefit of the owner. The public have no interest in it. It is like a summons issued upon a petition. It is to advise the owner, through the occupant, that the court has seized his property awaiting the determination of a cause of action now pending in court, or to be brought in court.

The returns made by the sheriff in both the Hahn and the Weirick writs were originally sufficient in law under the statute, and, therefore, all matters pertaining to the amendments thereto become unimportant by reason of such amendments being merely so much surplusage.

A court cannot add to the requirements of a return specifically provided by the general assembly