Opinion Per Curiam. not justify himself for killing or injuring his adversary on the ground that he, the assailant, was in danger of injury or serious bodily harm." There can be no question as to the competency of the testimony relative to the prior altercation, for the purpose of showing the enmity then existing and the feeling of Szalkai toward Demecs, and presumably it was offered for that purpose. The competency of this evidence is not challenged, but counsel for plaintiff in error urge that the portion of the charge just quoted, though a correct statement of the law, by reason of the testimony with reference to a former altercation, probably caused the jury to understand that if the defendant committed an assault upon a previous occasion he would not be entitled to the benefit of the defense of self-defense in this case. The record shows an irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of the various witnesses as to which one of the parties to the actual affray made the first assault, and it was therefore the duty of the court to instruct the jury substantially as stated above. (Stoffer v. The State of Ohio, 15 Ohio St., 47.) It is not apparent from the language used by the court that reference was thereby made to the previous occurrence testified to by Demecs. If there was any question about that, counsel for defendant should have availed themselves of the opportunity to secure a further instruction limiting the effect and application of the evidence as to the prior assault, and a further instruction, if it seemed necessary, that even if an assault had been made by the defendant upon a previous occasion that fact would not deprive him. Opinion Per Curiam. of the right of defending himself against a subsequent assault by the prosecuting witness. The instruction given was not only not prejudicial but was free from error. The accused admitted having shot Demecs and sought to justify the act upon the ground of selfdefense. That was the real issue upon which the case went to the jury. The burden of proving that the shooting was excusable upon such ground rests upon the defendant and must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (Silvus v. The State, 22 Ohio St., 90; Weaver v. The State, 24 Ohio St., 584; The State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St., 63, 71, and The State v. Vancak, 90 Ohio St., 211, 214.) The charge of the court on the subject of self-defense follows the rule laid down in those cases. The language employed, though in some respects unhappily chosen, does not appear, when considered with the remainder of the charge and the entire record of the case, to have placed upon the defendant any improper burden or resulted to his prejudice. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed. Judgment affirmed. NICHOLS, C. J., WANAMAKER, NEWMAN, JONES, MATTHIAS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. Opinion Per Curiam. THE NEAVE BUILDING Co. v. ROUDEBUSH, Admr. Death caused by alleged negligence of employer-Fall of window washer from sill-Question of negligence per se- - Violation of municipal ordinance-Weight of evidence-Proximate cause of accident — Instructions to jury. (No. 15387- Decided March 6, 1917.) CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county. Messrs. Robertson, Buchwalter & Oppenheimer, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Louis B. Sawyer; Mr. William A. Roudebush and Mr. George W. Welch, for defendant in error. BY THE COURT. Defendant in error, William A. Roudebush, as administrator, brought an action in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county to recover damages on account of the death of Clarence Henson, alleged to have been caused through the negligence of the plaintiff in error. The cause was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict for the defendant in error. A motion for new trial was overruled, judgment was rendered on the verdict, and this judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. The record of the case was certified to this court for review and final determination for the reason that the judgment upon which the court of appeals of Hamilton county had agreed was in conflict with the judgment pronounced upon the same question by another court of appeals of this state. Plaintiff in error owned, managed and controlled Opinion Per Curiam. an eleven-story office building in the city of Cincinnati, known as the Neave Building. Defendant in error's intestate, Clarence Henson, was employed by plaintiff in error as a window washer. In the performance of his duties, according to the allegations of the petition, it became necessary to wash and clean the windows of the building on the outside, and on the 6th day of January, 1911, while washing a window on the third floor of the building, Henson fell from the window to the sidewalk below receiving injuries from the effects of which he died a few hours later. It was alleged in the petition that at the time of the injury the window sills of the building were covered with snow, which made the cleaning of the windows very difficult and dangerous, and that notwithstanding said condition Henson was ordered to wash them. It was alleged in the petition that plaintiff in error negligently failed to comply with the provisions of Section 505 of the ordinances of the city of Cincinnati, as follows: "In every fireproof or semi-fireproof building now in existence or hereafter erected every window above the second story thereof shall be equipped with a suitable device which will permit the cleaning of the exterior of such windows without endangering life and limb. Provided, however, that such device need not be placed on any window that can be easily cleaned from within." It was further alleged that plaintiff in error failed to provide in any manner for the safety of defendant in error's intestate while engaged in said dangerous occupation, or to provide any safety device whatever to prevent injury to him, and, fur Opinion Per Curiam. ther, that it failed to employ a sufficient number of men to clean its windows and elevator so as to give defendant in error's intestate sufficient time to carefully clean its windows on the outside. Plaintiff in error in its answer denied that it failed to comply with the provisions of the ordinance referred to and denied further all carelessness and negligence on its part. It is claimed by plaintiff in error that there was no evidence as to the cause of the mishap or the manner in which Henson met his death. It is unquestionably true that the death was due to a fall. The jury in answer to an interrogatory given at the request of plaintiff in error found specially that Henson fell from the window in attempting to clean the window while standing on the outside. We have examined the record and there was evidence tending to show that Henson met his death in the manner found by the jury. Whether this finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence was a question properly before the lower courts for determination. Both the common pleas and court of appeals refused to disturb the verdict and judgment, and this court does not determine as to the weight of the evidence. It is urged that the trial court erred in charging that failure to comply with Section 505 of the ordinance of Cincinnati constituted negligence per se. At the request of the defendant in error, the trial court, before argument, charged the jury that if it found from the evidence that the defendant (plaintiff in error) did not comply with the provisions of the ordinance introduced in evidence, and that the |