Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. DONAHUE, J. The charter of the city of Cleveland does not divest its mayor of any of the authority conferred upon him by the laws of the state of Ohio. On the contrary, it is specifically provided, in Section 72 of the charter, that the mayor shall "exercise such powers and perform such duties as are conferred or required by this charter or by the laws of the state." This language is certainly clear and unambiguous, but this is supplemented by Section 2, which provides that "the enumeration of particular powers by this charter shall not be held or deemed to be exclusive but, in addition to the powers enumerated herein, implied thereby or appropriate to the exercise thereof, the city shall have, and may exercise all other powers which, under the constitution and laws of Ohio, it would be competent for this charter specifically to enumerate." The title of the office of mayor is not changed by the charter. Even if it were, Section 191 of the charter provides that the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon any officer, commission, board or department of the city under the laws of the state, shall, if such office or department is abolished by this charter, be thereafter exercised and discharged by the officer, board or department upon whom are imposed corresponding functions, powers and duties thereunder. Under this provision, even if the office of mayor had been abolished, and another office created having corresponding functions, powers and duties of a mayor, the incumbent of such office would have the powers conferred and Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. the duties imposed by the laws of the state upon the mayors of other cities of the state not having adopted a charter. Flotron v. Barringer, 94 Ohio St., 185, and Ide v. State of Ohio, 95 Ohio St., 224. The further questions presented by the pleadings and the evidence are fully disposed of in Heininger v. Davis, Mayor, ante, 205, submitted prior to but considered by this court in connection with this case. Under the provisions of Section 6142, General Code, the defendant has full jurisdiction to hear and determine the question of the sufficiency of the petition filed with him, and the writ of prohibition prayed for in the relator's petition must be refused. Writ refused. NICHOLS, C. J., NEWMAN, JONES, MATTHIAS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. Syllabus. THE AMERICAN WOODENWARE MANUFACTURING COMPANY V. SCHORLING. Construction of amendments to constitution or statutes - Workmen's Compensation and Industrial Commission Acts — Health and safety of employes-Purpose and intent of Sections 15 and 16 of act - Meaning of "lawful requirement" in Section 35, Article II, Constitution, 1912- And Section 29, Workmen's Compensation Act-Liability of employer within provisions of Section 25, Industrial Commission Act-Right of employe to maintain action. 1. In the construction of amendments to the constitution or to statutes, the body enacting the amendment will be presumed to have had in mind existing constitutional or statutory provisions and their judicial construction touching the subject dealt with. 2. The Industrial Commission Act (103 O. L., 95) provides for the creation of an administrative board with power to supervise all places of employment, to prescribe general rules and requirements concerning all employments and places of employment and particular orders and requirements for particular employers and places of employment, to secure the lives, health, safety and welfare of every employe in such employments, and every frequenter of such places of employment. The purpose and intent of Sections 15 and 16 of the act was to bring ali employers within the scope of the jurisdiction and authority of the commission and to impose on them the obligation to comply with the orders and requirements of the commission when duly made. The provisions of Sections 15 and 16 are not the lawful requirements referred to by, and within the meaning of, Section 35, Article II of the Constitution. 3. The term "lawful requirement," as used in Section 35, Article II of the Constitution, and Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (103 O. L., 84), does not include a general course of conduct, or those general duties and obligations of care and caution which rest upon employers and employes, and all other members of the community, for the protection of life, health and safety. 4. By the provisions of Section 25 of the Industrial Commission Act an order made by the industrial commission to employers Statement of the Case. generally or to a particular employer, with reference to safe employment or place of employment, is a lawful requirement (until altered in the manner provided for in the act), for failure to comply with which, or with any statute or municipal ordinance prescribing means or methods required to be used to protect the lives, health, safety and welfare of employes, the employer under the proviso contained in Section 35, Article II of the Constitution, and Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, is liable to an employe injured by reason of such failure. (No. 15134- Decided May 22, 1917.) ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Lucas county. Fred W. Schorling was an employe of The American Woodenware Manufacturing Company, and on January 7, 1914, sustained an injury in the course of his employment. It is shown by the pleadings that the company, prior to that date, as an employer of more than five men, had paid the premium to the state insurance fund provided for by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Schorling began an action against the company in the court of common pleas of Lucas county to recover for the damages sustained. In his petition the plaintiff alleges that he was employed by the defendant a short time prior to the 7th day of January, 1914, as an operator on a ripsaw in one of the rooms of its factory; that on said 7th day of January, 1914, he was ordered by the foreman of the defendant, who had authority over him, and whose name is to plaintiff unknown, to leave his place of employment at the ripsaw and go to another part of said factory and assist other employes in pushing a load of lumber which was upon Statement of the Case. a small car operated upon tracks in said factory; that plaintiff endeavored to obey said order and did go to the place where said loaded car of lumber was, and as plaintiff arrived at said place, and was about to take the position directed by said foreman for him to take, said car of lumber was thrown or fell over upon plaintiff, burying plaintiff beneath said lumber; and that plaintiff was beneath said lumber for about one-half hour before he could be extricated therefrom. Plaintiff says that defendant negligently and carelessly required, and permitted, and ordered, and suffered said plaintiff to go into the place of employment above mentioned, and that said place of employment, as defendant well knew, was not safe; that defendant negligently and carelessly failed to furnish, provide and use safety devices and safeguards for the purpose of preventing said lumber falling; and negligently and carelessly failed and neglected to use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render said employment, and the place of employment above mentioned, safe; and negligently and carelessly failed to do other things reasonably necessary to protect the safety and welfare of plaintiff; and carelessly and negligently maintained said place of employment in a condition that was not safe; and carelessly and negligently furnished employment to plaintiff and required plaintiff to enter upon work which was not safe for plaintiff; and carelessly and negligently furnished said place of employment, and said place of employment was not safe for the plaintiff; and carelessly and negligently failed to |