Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. True, the language of the statute does not clearly indicate that death must be the proximate result of the unlawful act, since the word "in" seems to indicate "at the time thereof" rather than "thereby." Yet the safer and sounder doctrine seems to be recognized in most of the states that the unlawful act must be a proximate cause of the killing. So obvious and so manifest did this appear throughout the case that the defendant in error's counsel did not even suggest any further charge by the court upon the question of proximate cause. Upon a careful examination of the entire record of this case, and all the evidence before the court and jury, we are convinced to a moral certainty that the defendant was rightly convicted by the jury, and that any technical error of the court, or any error in the charge with reference to proximate cause, was, in this case, in no wise prejudicial. Substantial justice has been done. The witnesses for the state furnished overwhelming testimony of the truth of the charge of the indictment. No one denied it but the defendant himself. His testimony that he was going but eight miles an hour at the time he struck this child, and that he never saw the child, and didn't know he had struck it, and his subsequent conduct upon his return home, abundantly warranted the jury in returning the verdict they did. To have done anything else would have been the grossest miscarriage of justice. This three-year-old boy, the testimony all shows, was crossing the street at a regular street crossing, Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. was at the time occupied in playing with a large number of other children who were there upon the street, which the defendant says was customary; and he admits that he saw a large number of them on the street at the time he was making the fatal trip. His conduct in the operation of this car, not only as to speed, but in being on the left side instead. of the right side of the street, was wholly inexcusable and shows a reckless and wanton disregard of all thought for the safety and lives of these children and the public generally. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and that of the common pleas court affirmed. Judgment reversed. NICHOLS, C. J., NEWMAN, JONES, MATTHIAS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. Opinion Per Curiam. SCHIER V. THE STATE OF OHIO. Manslaughter-Killing by automobile - Words "motor vehicle" -And "public road or highway"-Charge to jury — Unlawful act - Proximate cause of death. ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Wood county. Mr. Benjamin F. James, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Earl K. Solether, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. N. R. Harrington, for defendant in error. BY THE COURT. The plaintiff in error, William Schier, was tried and convicted on the charge of manslaughter in the common pleas court of Wood county, Ohio. That judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. Error is prosecuted here to reverse that judgment. ' Most of the errors claimed in the court below, particularly the unconstitutionality of Section 12603, General Code, are fully considered and determined in The State of Ohio v. Schaeffer, ante, 215. As to the remaining questions raised by plaintiff in error, we hold: 1. That the words "motor vehicle" are sufficiently broad and comprehensive to include automobiles. 2. That under the statutes involved in this case the words "public road or highway" are synonymous with, or at least include, a public street. Opinion Per Curiam. 3. That as to the matters complained of by plaintiff in error, the charge of the court was unusually fair and considerate of all the rights of plaintiff in error, and he has no right or cause to complain. 4. That the charge of manslaughter was based upon the commission of an act made unlawful by three several statutes, as to any one of which the jury, upon the whole record, were abundantly warranted in finding the defendant guilty; but under a long line of decisions of this court proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the unlawful act under any one statute, which unlawful act was the proximate cause of the death of the person named in the indictment, would be legally sufficient to sustain the conviction. 5. That the defendant has had a fair trial and the record discloses his guilt overwhelmingly. There being no error, the judgment should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Judgment affirmed. NICHOLS, C. J., WANAMAKER, NEWMAN, JONES, MATTHIAS, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur. Opinion Per Curiam. THE STATE, EX REL. BRYANT, v. DONAHEY, AUDITOR OF STATE. Pay of colonel - Ohio National Guard - Assistant adjutant general-State military officers-Entitled to federal pay rate, when-Sections 5190, 5292, 5293 and 5296, General Code. (No. 15466-Decided April 17, 1917.) IN MANDAMUS. Messrs. Turney, Olds & Sipe and Mr. Hubert A. Turney, judge advocate general of Ohio, for relator. Mr. Edward C. Turner, attorney general; Mr. Henry S. Ballard and Mr. Charles Follett, for respondent. BY THE COURT. This proceeding in mandamus is instituted by Edward S. Bryant, the relator, to secure a writ of mandamus requiring the respondent, as auditor of state, to issue a voucher for the payment of the sum of $1400, claimed to be due him as the balance of salary as colonel of the Ohio National Guard upon active duty from June 18 to November 15, 1916. Upon the hearing it was disclosed that on June 18, 1916, the President of the United States, proceeding under authority of an act passed and approved May 27, 1908, called into service of the United States the National Guard organizations of various states, including Ohio. The Secretary of War on that day sent telegraphic orders to the Governor of Ohio, calling into the service of the |