« PreviousContinue »
Dissenting Opinion, per Jones, J.
children or both.” (103 O. L., 992.)
(103 0. L., 992.) And since this provision is a later pronouncement by the people than the provisions of the home-rule amendment, adopted in 1912, due regard should be given to its effect because of that fact.
The provisions of the East Cleveland charter, in granting to the female sex the right to vote for municipal elective officers, also provide that they shall be eligible for appointment or election to any municipal office therein. By this adoption the charter flew in the teeth of the 1913 amendment and is in flagrant defiance thereof. This recent amendment provides generally that women cannot be elected to any office in this state, unless possessed of the qualifications of an elector. To ascertain what such qualifications are recourse must be had of course to Section 1, Article V, which attaches them to the male sex alone. It follows that under the new amendment they can not be elected to any office, but may be “appointed” only. And the provision limits the right of women citizens to hold appointive offices to those departments or institutions established by the state or any political subdivision thereof involving the interests or care of women or children. The city of East Cleveland is a political subdivision of the state, and this section of the constitution in effect denies women the right of election but permits them merely to be appointed to positions in the special class of institutions named; and this includes such institutions established by a municipality, which is a political subdivision of the state. This clearly
This clearly negatives the idea that they may be elected to or hold city offices
Dissenting Opinion, per Jones, J.
in the city of East Cleveland, as proposed by the charter; and I submit that if power to grant elective franchise is conferred by the words “local selfgovernment” in the home-rule section, that this latest act of the people by the constitutional route, adopted by them since the adoption of the homerule amendment, has effectively destroyed that power if it ever existed. A fortiori, in view of this recent amendment, and without the cloak of the home-rule amendment, it is impossible to sustain any construction that endows the legislature with authority to confer upon women the qualifications of an elector, or which empowers them to hold office in any institutions other than those specifically mentioned in this recent amendment. The fatuous position a woman would occupy as mayor of East Cleveland is disclosed in the closing paragraph of the majority opinion—a woman shorn of official functions—a queen with a tarnished crown!
The duty of the court here is to uphold and maintain the plain and explicit terms of the constitution. It is not a question of public policy, nor a question whether the action of the people by its adoption in the manner stated was wise or unwise. Under the trend of modern events, and having in view the commanding position that the female sex is taking in the current affairs of the nation, the electorate of this great state may determine the unwisdom of the Constitutions of 1802 and 1851 in denying suffrage to the female sex; but it seems to me that this appeal for the enjoyment of limited or full suffrage should be met by an amendment to the constitution of the state, the source from which it was obtained
Statement of the Case.
by the other sex. And when that measure of enjoyment is secured, under the phrase "at all elections” now employed in the present constitution, I shall consistently uphold their right to full suffrage at all elections held in this state, and shall not limit them to the right to vote at a part of them only. I shall give them the full loaf which they have always demanded, and not the half-loaf doled out by the judicial mandate in this case.
HEININGER v. Davis, MAYOR.
Courts of appeals—Jurisdiction in error—To review finding by
mayor-Section 6152, General Code-Intoxicating liquors, Constitutionality of Section 6164, General Code – Proceedings in error.
1. The constitution of the state vests in the courts of appeals juris
diction to review, affirm, modify or reverse the judgment of a mayor of a municipal corporation, in the exercise of the judicial power conferred upon mayors of municipalities by Sec
tion 6152, General Code of Ohio. 2. Section 6164, General Code, is a valid and constitutional exercise
of the power of the general assembly to provide by law the procedure to invoke the jurisdiction in error conferred by the Constitution of Ohio upon courts of appeals.
(No. 15365 — Decided April 17, 1917.)
Error to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.
On the 20th day of March, A. D. 1916, a petition was filed, under the provisions of Section 6142, General Code, with the mayor of the city of Cleve
Statement of the Case.
land, Ohio, against prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, which petition was duly examined by the mayor at a public hearing, and on the 17th day of April, 1916, found by said mayor to be sufficient, and a copy of this decision filed with the clerk of the city of Cleveland.
Upon leave granted, J. W. Heininger, the plaintiff in error, on the 27th day of April, 1916, filed a petition in error, together with a bill of exceptions taken at the hearing before said mayor, and all the original papers in the case, in the court of appeals of Cuyahoga county.
On the 13th day of June, 1916, the plaintiff in error filed in the error proceedings in the court of appeals a transcript of the mayor's docket.
On the 18th of May, 1916, the defendant in error filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings in error, for the reason that plaintiff in error had not complied with Section 12263, General Code, requiring him to file either the transcript of the final record, or a transcript of the docket or journal entries, with such original papers or transcripts thereof as are necessary to exhibit the error complained of.
On the 4th of June, 1916, this cause came on to be heard upon the motion of the defendant in error to dismiss the proceedings, and on the 3d of July, 1916, the following judgment was entered of record:
“This cause came on to be heard upon the pleadings, and the transcript of the record in the court of H. L. Davis, Mayor, and was argued by counsel; and on consideration of all the assigned errors, the court dismisses the petition in error for want of
Opinion, per DONAHUE, J.
jurisdiction, without record, at the plaintiff in error's costs, for which judgment is rendered against him."
This proceeding in error is filed in this court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing plaintiff's petition in error.
Ņr. George A. Phillips and Mr. J. A. White, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. George W. Shaw, for defendant in error.
DONAHUE, J. It appears from the record in this case, and the briefs and argument of counsel, that the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing the petition in error was based solely upon the conclusion reached by that court that it had no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the mayor of Cleveland, for the reason that the mayor's court is not a court of record.
Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution provides among other things that the court of appeals shall have jurisdiction “to review, affirm, modify or reverse the judgments of the courts of common pleas, superior courts and other courts of record within the district as may be provided by law.”
If, therefore, the mayor's court is not a court of record, the general assembly could not confer upon the court of appeals jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify or reverse the mayor's decision in this case. The Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St., 415.
In view of the conflicting decisions upon the subject, it is not easy to define a court of record. Chief Justice Holt defined a court of record as a court