Opinion, per JONES, J. And the same remark is true when different offenses of the same kind occur under the same circumstances on different days. This rule has, therefore, always been subject to a fundamental rule, equally ancient, that the plea 'must be upon a prosecution for the same identical act and crime.' Complaint is now made by plaintiff in error that the trial court erred in not limiting the evidence relating to the theft of the other cars solely to the purpose of showing the criminal conspiracy or plan entered into by the accused. It is one of our fundamental rules of procedure that when the competency of evidence is challenged the attention of the court should be called to the error committed, a ruling obtained thereon, and an exception taken thereto. This rule has been repeatedly enforced since the early decision in the case of Geauga Iron Co. v. Street, 19 Ohio, 300. Our code defines an exception as an objection to the decision of the court, and requires the exception to be taken at the time the decision is made. This method of procedure has been adhered to by this court, save in exceptional instances of misconduct of counsel, and in cases where the statute provides that a general exception to the charge of the court is sufficient to challenge any prejudicial error therein without specification. The evidence of the state relating to the plan or conspiracy in question was very voluminous, and throughout its entirety may be found reference to the theft of cars other than that included in the indictment. This testimony was competent not only as tending to prove the criminal scheme, but Opinion, per JONES, J. as corroborative of the witness Wood who testified thereto. The record discloses that counsel for the accused objected to the testimony solely because of the fact that accused had been acquitted of the theft of the Clock car, and made no other objection, or any suggestion that the testimony should be limited as now claimed. The duty devolved upon counsel to request or apprise the court that the testimony should be thus limited, and to obtain the decision of the court upon the legal question presented. Since the evidence was competent, it was just as important that they should indicate the particular feature of their objection, as it was in the case of The State of Ohio v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St., 10. Counsel should not be allowed in a court of error to avail themselves of an exception of which the court was not apprised. An opportunity should be given the court to avoid the commission of error upon trial. The reason therefor is well stated in the case of Adams v. The State of Ohio, 25 Ohio St., 584, 587, as follows: "These rules, it is said, have their foundation in a just regard to the fair administration of justice, which requires that when an error is supposed to have been committed there should be an opportunity to correct it at once, before it has had any consequences; and does not permit the party to lie by, without stating the ground of his objection, and take the chances of success on the grounds on which the judge has placed the cause, and then, if he fails to succeed, avail himself of an objection which, if it had been stated, might have been removed.” It would be a sufficient compliance by the court Opinion, per JONES, J. if during its admission it admonished the jury as to the effect of evidence relating to similar offenses, or if it later so limited such evidence in its general charge. In The State of Ohio v. Davis, 90 Ohio St., 100, the record disclosed that there was a misdirection in the charge of the court in limiting the testimony relating to other similar offenses; and an exception was properly taken. In Baxter v. The State of Ohio, 91 Ohio St., 167, it appears that when evidence of other offenses was received, it was received over the objection of the defendant, whose counsel stated in open court, in the hearing of the jury, that such evidence could not be received for any other purpose than to prove the specific criminal intent alleged in the indictment; and this was held a sufficient objection to the competency of that evidence save for the purpose claimed. Counsel for plaintiff in error urge that the court committed error in its general charge, and furthermore that the case should be reversed because of misconduct of one of counsel for the state in his argument to the jury. From an examination of the record in respect to these alleged errors we are unable to find that any error committed was so prejudicial to the defendant below as to require a reversal of this case. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. NEWMAN, MATTHIAS and DONAHUE, JJ., con cur. Statement of the Case. MILLER, RECEIVER, V. EAGLE. Dayton municipal court-Taxing and securing costs of jurorsIn civil actions-Validity of Section 1579-61, General Code. Section 1579-61, General Code, being Section 16 of the Dayton municipal court act (103 Ohio Laws, 390), providing that in all civil actions and proceedings the cost of summoning jurors and the fees of jurors shall be taxed as part of the costs, and such costs must be secured in advance by the party demanding jury, is constitutional and valid. (No. 15375-Decided March 20, 1917.) ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Montgomery county. Plaintiff in error, William Miller, as receiver of The Dayton Automobile Company, filed his statement of claim in the municipal court of Dayton in which he asked judgment against the defendant in error, D. A. Eagle, on an account for labor performed and material furnished. Defendant answered denying each and every allegation contained in the statement of claim. Before the court proceeded to inquire into the merits of the cause, defendant in error filed a motion in which he demanded a jury of twelve men in said cause. This motion was overruled upon the ground that defendant in error refused to secure in advance the costs of summoning jurors and their fees. An exception was taken to the overruling of this motion. The cause was thereupon tried to the court, and the court found on the issues joined in favor of plaintiff in error. A motion for a new trial was over Opinion, per NEWMAN, J. ruled, and judgment rendered against defendant in error in the amount claimed in the statement of claim. The court of common pleas affirmed the judgment of the municipal court. This judgment of affirmance rendered by the court of common pleas was reversed by the court of appeals and the cause was remanded to the municipal court for a new trial and for such further proceedings as are provided by law. Plaintiff in error is asking this court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Messrs. D. W. & A. S. Iddings; Mr. John C. Shea, assistant city attorney; Mr. A. W. Schulman and Messrs. Nevin & Kalbfus, for plaintiff in error. Mr. John Egan; Mr. Irvin C. Delscamp and Mr. George F. Holland, for defendant in error. NEWMAN, J. The motion of defendant in error demanding a jury of twelve men was overruled by the municipal court for the reason that he refused to secure in advance the costs of summoning the jurors and their fees. Authority for such action on the part of that court is found in Section 157961, General Code, being Section 16 of the Dayton municipal court act (103 Ohio Laws, 390), as follows: "In all civil actions and proceedings the cost of summoning jurors and the fees of jurors shall be taxed as part of the costs, and such costs must be secured in advance by the party demanding jury.” This section was held unconstitutional by the court of appeals. The defendant in error contending for |