the plaintiff was allowed to give his conclusion that McNeil had exclusive control of the electrical department of defendant's works, and thereby to determine the principal fact in dispute. If the statement of the witness was in the nature of a conclusion it worked no harm to the defendant, for the reason that the fact was conclusively proved. The witness had already stated, without objection, that McNeil was in charge of and the boss of the electrical works. McNeil testified that he was in charge of the electrical equipment, consisting of motors, generators, wiring, lighting, etc.; that plaintiff had been assisting him five or six months, and that he gave orders and directions to the plaintiff. If plaintiff had not been permitted to give his conclusions the jury could not have found differently on the question to which the conclusion related. Plaintiff was permitted to give a conversation between himself and McNeil in regard to a motor that got out of condition about a week before, in which McNeil told him that whenever he saw a motor in that condition he wanted him to stop it and fix it at once. The objection is that the conversation referred to another motor, and while that is true, the conversation contained a general direction from McNeil to the plaintiff, which it was proper to prove.

It is next claimed that the court erred in refusing to admit proper evidence offered by the defendant. McNeil, on his direct examination, testified that he did not tell the plaintiff to stay there a few minutes and shut the motor off and he would see that nobody would start the motor or interfere with plaintiff. On cross-examination he was quite uncertain whether he gave plaintiff such an order or not, and on re-direct examination the same question asked on the direct examination was repeated to him. The court sustained an objection to the question but allowed the plaintiff to again take up the same subject and go into the same matter again. After counsel for the plaintiff had examined. the witness again on the subject, defendant's counsel took

up the examination again and went over the same matter. Whether the ruling was strictly correct or not, the outcome was that the witness made a full explanation and all the corrections that he desired.

It is urged that the remarks and conduct of the counsel for plaintiff were so improper as to prejudice the jury and require a reversal of the judgment. There were, perhaps, some lapses from the conduct which is regarded as proper and is usually observed in courts of record, but we do not think that anything that was said or done would justify us in reversing the judgment.

The court gave a great many instructions at the request of the defendant but refused three on the subject of fellowservants, and it is insisted that the court erred in such refusal. The first of those instructions stated that McNeil and plaintiff were fellow-servants, and the court was right in refusing to give it, for the reason that as to the transaction involved in the suit they were not fellow-servants. Plaintiff and McNeil may have had duties and performed services which brought them into that relation, but in this transaction they did not sustain that relation. The second instruction advised the jury that if plaintiff and McNeil were co-operating in the business in hand they were fellowservants, and it was properly refused because there was no evidence to which it could be applied. The third instruction stated the rules which have been adopted for determining when the relation of fellow-servants exists. While correct as a statement of the law, it would have been misleading in this case. McNeil was a superior servant, clothed with and exercising authority as to the shutting down and repair of the motor, and although he and the plaintiff at times may have been fellow-servants, that fact would not have authorized a finding for defendant, as directed by the instruction. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

1

JOSEPH I. SHERIDAN, Admr.

V.

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA.

Opinion filed October 23, 1907.

APPEALS AND ERRORS-Supreme Court will affirm if no question is presented for review. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, entered upon an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, if there was no objection to the evidence in the trial court and no propositions of law submitted, the trial being had upon agreed facts without a jury, there is no question presented for review by the Supreme Court and the judgment will be affirmed.

APPEAL from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. AXEL CHYTRAUS, Judge, presiding.

JOHN F. MAHON, for appellant.

HOYNE, O'CONNOR & HOYNE, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought before a justice of the peace of Cook county by Joseph I. Sheridan, administrator of the estate of George DeQuetterville, deceased, appellant, against the Prudential Insurance Company of America, the appellee, upon a policy of insurance issued by the appellee upon the life of said deceased. The justice rendered judgment against appellee for $85, that being the amount which appeared from the face of the policy to be due. The insurance company appealed to the superior court of Cook county, where the cause was submitted to the court without a jury, upon an agreed state of facts. The finding of the superior court was in favor of the company, and a judgment was entered in conformity with such finding. Sheridan appealed

to the Appellate Court for the First District. The cause was assigned to the Branch Appellate Court, and that court affirmed the judgment of the superior court but granted a certificate of importance, and appellant has prosecuted a further appeal to this court.

There were no written pleadings in the case, the hearing in the superior court having been upon an appeal from a justice of the peace. No objection was made in the superior court to the admission or exclusion of evidence, the cause having been submitted to that court for decision upon an agreed state of facts. No propositions of law were submitted to the superior court to be held as the law of the case. There is therefore no question presented upon this appeal which this court can review. Mutual Protective League v. McKee, 223 Ill. 364, and authorities there collated.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will accordingly be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

HENRY J. BURWASH

V.

A. PERCY BALLOU et al.

Opinion filed October 23, 1907.

1. SALES-extent of implied warranty upon sale of stock in corporation. The vendor of stock in a corporation impliedly warrants that the stock is genuine and that he is the owner thereof and authorized to transfer title, but if the purchaser desires further protection he must exact special warranties.

2. SAME what is not ground for rescinding sale. If the stock sold by one person to another was issued by a de facto corporation, the facts that the corporation was not a corporation de jure, and that the increase of stock, of which that sold formed a part, was illegally issued, do not furnish ground for annulling the sale, in the absence of special warranties by the vendor covering such facts.

3. SAME-one seeking to rescind a sale must act promptly. A purchaser who seeks to rescind a sale of stock, particularly mining

stock purchased for speculation, must act promptly, and will not be permitted to stand by and await the result of the investment, and if the same is unprofitable, rescind the sale for alleged fraud.

4. SAME "puffing" mining claims is not fraudulent representation. "Puffing" mining claims and making glowing predictions as to how such claims will “pan out" do not amount to such false representations as will justify a court of equity in setting aside a sale of stock in a mining company, where the parties are compos mentis and deal at arm's length.

5. APPEALS AND ERRORS—whether party made the alleged false representations is a question of fact. Upon a bill to cancel a sale of mining stock for certain alleged false representations, the question whether such representations were made is one of fact; and if the evidence is conflicting, the chancellor's finding, unless clearly contrary to the evidence, will not be set aside upon appeal.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES M. WALKER, Judge, presiding.

This was a bill in chancery filed by the appellant in the circuit court of Cook county, against the appellees, to set aside a sale of seven thousand shares, of the par value of one dollar per share, of the capital stock of the International Copper and Gold Company, a corporation purporting to be organized under the laws of Arizona, made by the appellees to the appellant, at eighty cents per share, on the 15th day of July, 1903, and to enjoin the appellees from converting to their own use $1400 in cash paid on said sale by the appellant to appellees, and from transferring fifteen promissory notes, aggregating the sum of $4200, given by the appellant to the appellees in part payment for said stock, which promissory notes were not due at the time said bill was filed, and to require the appellees to re-pay to the appellant said sum of $1400 and to cause said promissory notes to be surrendered and delivered up by appellees for cancellation, on the ground (1) that said International Copper and Gold Company was not legally organized; (2) that the appellees fraudulently represented to the appellant, at