make such sale." Have appellees followed the petition with proof sustaining their allegations in this regard? We have only to look to the admissions of appellants, made on the witness stand, for proof that appellants refuse to consent to a sale at this time or to fix upon a definite time for the same. They insist that this is not a favorable time to sell. As to this the evidence is conflicting, but we think the weight of the evidence supports the contention that conditions, while not as favorable now as in 1891 or 1892, are as favorable as they are likely to be soon. The evidence shows sales of other acre property in the southern portion of the city and that some of these sales were at good figures. A number of improvements are being made in that locality, factories are being built in the vicinity of the land, street car lines extend along one edge of it, steam railroads pass within from half to three-quarters of a mile of it in different directions, and the belt line passes near it on the south. The activities going on in the section of the city and country surrounding the land in question indicate that the present is a reasonably favorable time for the sale of this property. The decree of the circuit court herein directs the master to proceed with the sale upon the expiration of six months from the date of the decree. This would afford ample time for advertising the property and for procuring bidders at such sale. We do not think the court erred in entering the decree and ordering the sale to proceed.

We do not see wherein the modification allowing the purchaser to pay all cash on the approval of sale or to defer such payments, at his option, can work harm to any one, and we find no error in the ruling of the trial court in this regard.

Appellants have, as plaintiffs in error, sued out a writ of error for the purpose of bringing to this court for review the decree entered in the circuit court on April 15, 1902, and that case has been consolidated with the case at bar on the hearing.

It is alleged that the decree of April 15, 1902, is erroneous in prescribing the order of payment in making distribution; that the provision that the parties should bear any loss pro rata, and the order allowing appellees to become purchasers at the sale, are also erroneous. A comparison of the decree of April 15, 1902, with that of July 6, 1900, shows that they are in all essential particulars identical except as to the provision concerning the payment of interest on the $30,000, which was modified in accordance with the mandate of this court. In prescribing the manner of distribution the decree follows the views expressed in Ingraham v. Mariner, supra, using the language of this court in substance. The expressions "first," "second," "third" and "fourth" at the beginning of the distributive clauses in the decree are mere enumerations of payments to be made, and are not intended to give priority to any claim. The decree contemplates that all the items enumerated shall be paid in full if the proceeds of the sale shall afford sufficient funds, otherwise the losses shall be borne pro rata. The court committed no error in this particular.

The contention that Ingraham's executors should not be allowed to become purchasers at this sale is not well taken. The parties are placed upon an equality in this regard by the decree, both or either being allowed to become purchasers if they overbid other buyers. The decree of July 6, 1900, contained the same provision, and the question is res judicata and is not open for review in this court.

The decree of April 15, 1902, made pursuant to the mandate of this court, and the decree of March 22, 1905, ordering the master to proceed with the sale of the land in question, are affirmed.

Decrees affirmed.

NATHAN DONASON

V.

JOHN J. BARBERO et al.

Opinion filed October 23, 1907-Rehearing denied Dec. 5, 1907.

1. MORTGAGES when making of deed is, in effect, a redemption. Where a mortgage is foreclosed and a deed issued to the purchaser, who agrees with the widow, acting for herself and heirs, to extend the time for redemption and make her a deed upon payment of the amount due, the making of a deed to one of the heirs, in pursuance of the contract, who raised the money upon the property itself by deed and mortgage, except a small amount furnished from his own funds, is, in effect, a redemption, and the heirs are tenants in common, the same as if statutory redemption had been made.

2. DEEDS when deed does not convey an interest at time of its delivery―ratification by grantor. A deed in which the name of the grantee was inserted by an agent of the grantor but without the grantor's authority, in a blank left in the deed at the time of its execution, conveys no interest in the land; but if the grantor, in a subsequent suit between the grantee and the other heirs of the estate for partition and accounting, files an answer disclaiming any interest in the premises, such disclaimer ratifies the agent's act as between the heirs and those claiming under them.

3. CO-TENANCY-fact that party's possession is hostile must be brought to notice of his co-tenants. Before the exclusive possession of land, coupled with appropriation of its profits and the payment of taxes, can be relied upon by the possessor and his mortgagee with notice as barring the rights of persons who are, in equity, the possessor's co-tenants, the fact that such possession was hostile must have been brought to the notice of such co-tenants; and in determining this question the fact that possession was acquired under an arrangement whereby the property was to be redeemed for the benefit of all the heirs of the estate, and the income applied upon the encumbrance thereon, must be considered.

4. NOTICE what is not notice that one co-tenant is claiming entire title. The fact that in a suit for partition and accounting the tenant in possession filed an answer claiming to be absolute owner of the premises is not notice of that fact to certain of his co-defendants, where no trial of such cause was ever had, and it does not appear that such co-defendants ever filed any answer to the bill or knew what defense the tenant in possession proposed to make.

5. SAME when grantee in deed, intended as a mortgage, is not an innocent purchaser. One who is familiar with the affairs of an estate and who knows that one of the heirs has acquired the title under a contract by which the property was to be redeemed for the benefit of all the heirs, does not by a deed from such heir, made to secure the pre-existing indebtedness upon the property, become an innocent purchaser as against the other heirs of the estate, and he is chargeable, in law, with notice of their rights. (Dugan v. Follett, 100 Ill. 581, distinguished.)

6. SAME when grantee of co-tenants is not a mere volunteer. Tenants in common who have an equitable interest in land may deed the same, without consideration, to a stranger, and the latter may assert such interest against the party in possession to the same exent which his grantors might have done, except as to rents accruing before the deed was made.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. R. J. GRIER, Judge, presiding.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Knox county dismissing for want of equity, upon a hearing, a bill filed by appellant against John J. Barbero and Andrew C. Housh, and others, for partition, accounting and other relief.

It appears from the record that on October 20, 1882, Nathan Barbero, Calista W. Barbero, his wife, and John J. Barbero, their son, executed a mortgage on 957 acres of land owned by said Nathan Barbero in Knox county, Illinois, to the Provident Life and Trust Company of Philadelphia to secure a loan from it of $15,000. John J. owned no interest in the land, but seems to have joined in the mortgage for the reason that he was then engaged in managing the business of his father. On January 1, 1885, Nathan Barbero died intestate, seized of all of said lands, leaving surviving him, his widow, Calista W. Barbero, and Sarah L. McGirr, John J. Barbero, Nathan H. Barbero and Ann M. Donason, his children and only heirs-at-law. Upon the death of said Barbero the widow took out letters of administration, and by agreement of all the heirs remained in pos

session of the premises and collected the rents and profits therefrom, and applied the same to the payment of taxes, repairs, improvements, interest on the mortgage indebtedness and her living expenses. At the February term, 1888, of the said circuit court the mortgage was foreclosed, and on April 9, 1888, the premises were sold, under the decree of sale, to the mortgagee for $16,005.39, the amount of the debt, interest and costs. After the sale, and during the time allowed for redemption, Calista W. Barbero, on behalf of herself and the heirs of Nathan Barbero, endeavored to raise the money necessary to redeem the said property. This, however, she was unable to do. In her efforts to secure the money she employed one George W. Lyon to assist her, and on May 31, 1888, Lyon entered into a contract in writing with the said mortgagee whereby it agreed to assign and transfer the certificate of purchase of said property upon the payment to it of $16,005.39, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from April 9, 1888, in the following manner: $917.15 on July 20, 1888, $450 on October 20, 1888, $450 on April 20, 1889, and the balance of said amount and interest on August 1, 1889. This contract was made for the benefit of the widow and all the heirs of the deceased. On the application of the Provident company the master in chancery, upon the expiration of the statutory period of redemption, executed and delivered to it a deed for the said premises. The first three payments as provided for in the contract were made by Calista W. Barbero, but whether as they fell due does not certainly appear. The fourth and principal payment was not made. She seems to have been hampered in her efforts by the fact that Sarah L. McGirr would not join in a mortgage for the purpose of raising the funds necessary, and Lyon, who was endeavoring to negotiate a loan, seems to have been unable to find anyone willing to advance the money. After receiving the deed from the master the Provident company made a tentative or qualified extension of the time within which the final