three separate defences set up the same facts with immaterial variations: viz., that the goods were sold to the defendant's wife without his knowledge or consent; that she had at the time wrongfully abandoned him, and was living apart from him, and for these reasons he was not liable for the price. A demurrer to these defences having been sustained in the court below, the Supreme Court on appeal held that they were all argumentative general denials: "their effect was simply to aver that the goods were not sold to the defendant, and all the matters relied upon could have been proved under a general denial." It was further said, that a motion was the proper remedy to correct such faulty pleading, and the demurrer was irregular; but the irregularity in this instance was merely technical, and the error committed was immaterial, and had not prejudiced any rights of the defendant; for, as he had pleaded the general denial in addition to the special defence mentioned, his entire case was provable under that part of the answer.1 § 521. * 630. Combination of General and Argumentative Denials. This leads me to the second branch of the present subdivision; namely, the combination of the general denial with other defences equivalent thereto in the same answer. The argumentative denial described above is frequently in practice used in connection with the general denial inserted in the same answer. It would seem as though the pleader, after he had written the brief general denial, could not be satisfied with its efficacy, and considered it necessary to add in separate divisions of the answer a further statement of the very facts which he knew would constitute the defence, and which could all be proven under the general denial. This mode of pleading is faulty in the extreme; it has not a single reason in its favor, not an excuse for its existence; it overloads the record with superfluous matter, and produces nothing but confusion and uncertainty. In a few States the courts have struggled to correct this vicious departure from the true theory of pleading, and have enforced the rules and remedies which the codes amply provide. It is unnecessary to argue that this species of answer 1 Day v. Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145. [In Burris v. People's Ditch Co. (1894), 104 Cal. 248, 37 Pac. 922, the court said: "It may be said, generally, that any allegation in an answer which, if found to be true, necessarily shows that the allegation of the complaint as to the same matter is untrue, is a good traverse, and sufficient as a denial." See also Phillips v. Hagart (1896), 113 Cal. 552, 45 Pac. 843.] is in direct conflict with the plainest principles and the most express requirements of the codes. Those statutes permit only "denials" and statements of 66 new matter," that is, matter which is truly a confession and avoidance; they do not authorize averments of matter which is not new, but which is simply a detail of evidence going in support of a denial. While this reformed system constructed by the codes is perfect in its scientific character, far surpassing in that respect the loose notions introduced by the common-law courts in relation to the function of the ordinary "general issues" of the old procedure, it is at the same time in the highest degree practical. If the advantages which ought to be derived from the great reform are to be obtained, it is clearly the duty of all the courts to insist upon a return to the simple methods which the codes so clearly prescribe, concerning which, indeed, they do not leave the slightest doubt or uncertainty. § 522. * 631. Practice in Indiana in Respect to Argumentative Denials. In Indiana, a practice has become settled, which might well be borrowed by the courts of all the other States. I know of no single rule of procedure, which, if uniformly adopted and rigidly enforced, would work out a happier result in bringing the forms and modes of pleading back to the simple and scientific theory embodied in the codes, than the rule which prevails in Indiana, and which I shall now explain and illustrate. I dwell on it at some length, not because it can now be regarded as part of the universal practice throughout the States in which the new system has been established, but because it ought to become so; and I hope that, by introducing it to the attention of the bench and bar in other commonwealths, its merits may be at once recognized, and its methods followed. § 523. * 632. Same Subject. When the answer contains the general denial, and, in addition thereto, a separate defence or separate defences equivalent to the general denial, that is, mere argumentative denials as above described, such additional defences, it is settled, are irregular, and will be overruled and expunged from the record. The remedy is not by demurrer, for the reasons already given, but by motion to strike out as redundant and superfluous. If, however, a plaintiff, instead of moving to strike out, should demur to the vicious. defences, and that demurrer should happen to be sustained by the lower court, no material error would have been committed, for the same result would have been reached which would be attained by a motion; the record would be cleansed of its redundancy, and the general denial would remain, under which all the facts constituting the defence, and which had been set forth at large in the rejected paragraphs, could be given in evidence at the trial. This practice, I say, is thoroughly settled in Indiana; and the result is a system of pleading in that State which far surpasses, in its brevity and its adherence to the spirit of the codes, that prevailing in any other State. The cases collected in the notes illustrate many forms of pleading to which the rule has been applied, and exhibit its practical workings in a very complete manner. The same doctrine and practice has been occasionally followed in other States.2 This subject will be again referred to in the subsequent section which deals with the union of defences. It is very plain that the faulty method described and criticised proceeds in a very great measure from an uncertainty in the mind of the pleader as to the matter which may be given in evidence under the "general denial:" whatever, then, will remove that uncertainty, will aid in producing a reform in the manner of stating defences in the answer. § 524. *633. General Denials of all Allegations not otherwise Admitted or Referred to. A practice has recently grown up of framing an answer in the following manner: To admit such of 1 Adams Ex. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20; Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82; Jeffersonville, etc. R. Co. v. Dunlap, 29 id. 426; Rhode v. Green, 26 id. 83; Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 id. 160; Butler v. Edgerton, 15 id. 15; Westcott v. Brown, 13 id. 83; Garrison v. Clark, 11 id. 369; Cain v. Hunt, 41 id. 466, 471; Ferguson v. Ramsey, 41 id. 511, 513; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. West. 37 id. 211; Urton v. State, 37 id. 339; Port v. Russell, 36 id. 60; Day v. Wamsley, 33 id. 145; Allen v. Randolph, 48 id. 496; Trogden v. Deckard, 45 id. 572; Wolf v. Schofield, 38 id. 175; Widener v. State, 45 id. 244; Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 66; Lewis v. Edwards, 44 id. 333; Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. Hemberger, 43 id. 462, 464; Wilson v. Root, 43 id. 486, 493. See also Lowry v. Megee, 52 id. 107; Watts v. Coxen, 52 id. 155; Bannister v. Grassy Fork Ditch Ass'n, 52 id. 178, 184; West ern Union Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49 id. 53; Smith v. Denman, 48 id. 65, 70; Milford Sch. T. v. Powner, 126 Ind. 528; Wallace v. Exch. Bk. of Spencer, 126 Ind. 265; Craig v. Frazier, 127 Ind. 286; Wickwire v. Angola (Ind. App., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 917; Hoosier Stone Co. v. McCain (Ind. Supr., 1892), 31 N. E. 956. 2 Rost v. Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446, per Bosworth J.; Radde v. Ruckgaber, 3 Duer, 684; Simpson v. McArthur, 16 Abb. Pr. 302 (n.), per Brady J.; Bruck v. Tucker, 42 Cal. 346; Page v. Merwin, 54 Conn. 426. It is held in Florida that the court may strike out such a special defence or not as it pleases, and neither ruling will be error. Davis v. Shuler, 14 Fla. 438, 445. See also Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Mollanden, 4 Colo. 154. A denial which is a mere inference from facts alleged is not a good denial. Wright v. Schmidt, 47 Iowa, 233. the plaintiff's averments, if any, as the facts of the case require; to deny others wholly or partially; to explain and modify others if thought necessary; in short, to unite in one answer or division thereof a mass of special admissions, denials, explanations, and affirmative statements, and to conclude the whole with a sweeping clause somewhat in this form: "As to each and every other allegation in said complaint not herein expressly admitted or denied or mentioned, the defendant hereby denies the same;" or, "And the defendant denies each and every other allegation in said complaint not herein before expressly admitted or denied or mentioned." Although a somewhat similar mode of putting in issue the averments of a bill in equity was occasionally resorted to by chancery pleaders under the former system, the codes give no countenance to, nor authority for, such a mongrel form of answer. The true spirit and intent of the theory introduced by the reformed procedure plainly demand certainty, precision, and definiteness in the allegations of both parties, and especially in the denials by which the defendant places on the record the exact issues intended to be tried. In this respect the new method was to be a complete departure from the vagueness and uncertainty resulting from the broad effect given to the general issues in "assumpsit," "debt," and "trover" by the common-law courts, and also from the loose and incomplete manner of presenting the issues which necessarily characterized the answer in chancery. This design of the codes would, however, be utterly defeated if the vicious style of defence thus described should become common; and the courts, it is submitted, ought to have pronounced most emphatically against it when it first made its appearance. § 525. 634. Proper Distinction to be observed between General and Specific Denials. The codes require either a general denial, or specific denials, or defences in confession and avoidance; and also that each defence must be separately stated, so that the issue raised by it may be perceived at once. The "general denial" is evidently intended to be an answer to the entire complaint or petition, to negative all its averments. The design of the legislature and the understanding of the bar upon this point were shown by the immediate adoption of the form in use throughout all the States. The code of Iowa expressly enacts that the general denial is interposed to the whole petition; and this provision is plainly a statutory construction of the universally prevailing doctrine: a specific denial, on the other hand, must be addressed to some single, particular allegation, and must distinctly indicate the portion intended to be controverted by it. I am of opinion that each specific denial ought to be a single and separate defence by itself, so that, if the issue upon it should be decided in favor of the defendant, the cause of action would be defeated. In this respect, I think, the specific denials of the codes were intended to be analogous to the special traverses provided for by the English judges in their new rules of pleading adopted in 1834. Certain it is that the codes do not, by any stretch of their language, contemplate an answer consisting of a general denial directed to a part only of the complaint or petition, and connected with other admissions, partial denials, and explanations. § 526. *635. Difficulty Arising from this Form of Answer. Again this form of answer makes it extremely difficult, and often impossible, to determine what allegations are denied, and what are passed by in silence, and therefore admitted. If the complaint or petition contains numerous averments, and the answer is such a mass of express admissions, partial explanations, and statements of matter which is merely evidentiary, and concludes with the formula above quoted, we have all the evils which can result from the most vicious system or no-system that can possibly be conceived. The object of pleading is to ascertain and present the issues of fact between the litigants, so that they can be readily perceived and decided by the court and jury. The special boast of the common-law methods was, that they brought out these issues singly and clearly. I am confident that the theory of the reformed procedure, when lived up to and accurately followed, will give much better practical results than were ever obtained as a whole from the former system. The kind of answer which I have described violates every principle of this theory, and is a contrivance of ignorance or indolence. § 527. *636. This Form Sanctioned by some Courts. Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations, which appear to be such plain and necessary inferences from the language as well as the intent of the codes, the courts of New York and of some other States have given a seeming approval to this most slovenly manner of stating the defence of denial. So far as their decisions have passed upon the subject, they seem either to approve such an |