§ 333. *439. Features Common to many Codes. States in which these Features are wanting. The scheme contained in all these codes is marked by certain common features, which should claims for damages, for rents in arrear, for profits during any unlawful occupation thereof, and for any waste committed thereon. Provided, That all such claims arise from the same property for the recovery of which the suit is brought. Class Second - Action to recover specific personal property with which may be joined any and all claims for damages for the unlawful detention of the same, or for the forcible taking of the same, including, in proper cases, claims for exemplary damages; and in case the property cannot be recovered in specie, damages for the unlawful conversion thereof. Class Third -All actions sounding only in damages, whether the same be for breach of contract, sealed or parol, express or implied, or for injuries to property, person or character, or for any two or more of these causes, and in all cases it shall be necessary to state separately in the complaint the different causes for which the action is brought, and in all cases equitable relief may be granted." § 70. For provisions relative to foreclosure suits, see § 252. Connecticut. "In every civil action not brought before a justice of the peace, the plaintiff may include in his complaint both legal and equitable rights and causes of action, and demand both legal and equitable remedies; but where several causes of action are united in the same complaint they must all be brought to recover either (1) upon contract, express or implied; or (2) for injuries, with or without force, to person and property, or either, including a conversion of property to defendant's use; or (3) for injuries to character; or (4) upon claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits of the same; or (5) upon claims to recover personal property specifically, with or without damages for the withholding thereof; or (6) claims arising by virtue of a contract or by operation of law, in favor of or against a party, in some representative or fiduciary capacity; or (7) upon claims, whether in contract, or tort, or both, arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action. The several causes of action so united must all belong to one of these classes, and, except in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages or liens, must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated; and in all cases where several causes of action are joined in the same complaint, or as matter of counter-claim or set-off, in the answer, if it appear to the court that they cannot all be conveniently heard together, the court may order separate trials of any such causes of action, or may direct that any one or more of them be expunged from the complaint or answer." Gen. St., 1902, § 613. Georgia. "All claims arising er contractu between the same parties may be joined in the same action, and all claims arising ex delicto may in like manner be joined. The defendant may also set up, as a defence, all claims against the plaintiff of a similar nature with the plaintiff's demand." Code, 1895, § 4944. Idaho. Identical with the provisions of the California Code without the portious added by the Commissioners' Amendment of 1901. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3205. For provisions relative to foreclosure suits see § 3331. Indiana. "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when they are included in either of the following classes: First. Money demands on contract. Second. Injuries to property. Third. Injuries to person or character. Fourth. Claims to recover the possession of personal property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and for injuries to the property withheld. Fifth. Claims to recover the possession of real property, with or without damages, rents and profits for the withholding thereof, and for waste or damage done to the land; to make partition of and to determine and quiet the title to real property. Sixth. Claims to enforce the specific performance of contracts, and to avoid contracts for fraud be noticed; namely, the express provision for the uniting of legal and equitable causes of action, and the exceedingly general and or mistakes. Seventh. Claims to foreclose mortgages; to enforce or discharge specific liens; to recover personal judgment upon the debt secured by such mortgage or lien; to subject to sale real property upon demands against decedents' estates, when such property has passed to heirs, devisees, or their assigns; to marshal assets; and to substitute one person to the rights of another; and all other causes of action arising out of a contract or a duty, and not falling within either of the foregoing classes. But causes of action so joined must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated and numbered." Burns' St., 1901, § 279. Iowa. "Causes of action of whatever kind, where each may be prosecuted by the same kind of proceedings, if held by the same party, and against the same party, in the same rights, and if action on all may be brought and tried in that county, may be joined in the same petition; but the court may direct all or any portion of the issues joined to be tried separately, and may determine the order thereof." Code, 1897, § 3545. Kansas. The enumeration of classes is identical with that given in the text, followed by this clause: "But the causes of action so united must all belong to one of these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action, except in actions to enforce mortgages or other liens." Code, § 83, Gen. St., 1901, § 4517. Kentucky. Identical, with very slight verbal changes, with the Arkansas statute, exclusive of subdivision 7. Code, 1895, § 83. Minnesota. Identical with the provisions of the text, except that, in the second paragraph, the words "except in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages omitted. St., 1894, § 5260. Third paragraph wanting. are Missouri. The enumeration of classes is identical with that given in the text except the seventh class, which is as follows: "Claims by or against a party in some representative or fiduciary capacity, by virtue of a contract or by operation of law," followed by this clause: "But the causes of action so united must all belong to one of these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated, with the relief sought for each cause of action, in such manner that they may be intelligibly distinguished." Rev. St., 1899, § 593. Montana. Identical with the provisions of the California Code without the portions added by the Commissioners' Amendment of 1901, except that the second paragraph reads as follows: "The causes of action so united must all appear on the face of the complaint to belong," etc., the remainder being identical with the California provision. Code, 1895, § 672. Nebraska. The enumeration of classes is identical with that given in the text, except that the order of classes 5 and 6 is reversed, the enumeration being followed by this clause: "The causes of action so united, must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial." Code, 1901, §§ 87, 88. Nevada. Identical with the provisions of the California Code, without the portions added by the Commissioners' Amendment of 1901, with very slight verbal changes. Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3159. New York. "The plaintiff may unite, in the same complaint, two or more causes of action, whether they are such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, or both, where they are brought to recover as follows: (1) Upon contract, express or implied; (2) For personal injuries, except libel, slander, criminal conversation, or seduction; (3) For libel or slander; (4) For injuries to real property; (5) Real property, in ejectment, with or without damages for the withholding thereof; (6) For injuries to personal property; (7) Chattels, with or without damages for the taking or detention thereof; (8) Upon claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law; (9) Upon claims arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action, and not included vague clause permitting the union of causes of action arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same. within one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section; (10) For penalties in curred under the fisheries, game and forest laws. But it must appear, upon the face of the complaint, that all the causes of action, so united, belong to one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section; that they are consistent with each other; and, except as otherwise prescribed by law, that they affect all the parties to the action; and it must appear upon the face of the complaint, that they do not require different places of trial." Code Civ. Pro., § 484, as amended Laws, 1877, c. 416, and Laws, 1900, c. 590. the action, except in actions to enforce mortgages or other liens." St., 1893, §3961. Oregon. "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaiut when they all arise out of—(1) Contract, express or implied; (2) Injuries, with or without force, to the person; (3) Injuries, with or without force, to property; (4) Injuries to character; (5) Claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof; (6) Claims to recover personal property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof; (7) Claims against a trustee, by North Carolina. Identical with the virtue of a contract or by operation of provisions given in the text. § 126. North Dakota. Identical with the provisions given in the text, except that the words " or waste committed thereon "" added to the fifth subdivision. Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5291. are Ohio. "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same petition, whether they are such as have heretofore been denominated legal or equitable, or both, when they are included in either of the following classes: (1) The same transaction; (2) Transactions connected with the same subject of action; (3) Contracts, express or implied; (4) Injuries to person and property, or to either; (5) Injuries to character; (6) Claims to recover the possession of personal property, with or with out damages for the withholding thereof; (7) Claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, the rents and profits of the same, and the partition thereof; (8) Claims to foreclose a mortgage given to secure the payment of money or to enforce a specific lien for money, and to recover a personal judgment for the debt secured by such mortgage or lien; (9) Claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law." Bates' St., 1903, § 5058. Oklahoma. The enumeration of classes is identical with that of the text, except that the order of classes 5 and 6 is reversed, and the enumeration is followed by this clause: "But the causes of action so united must all belong to one of these classes, and must affect all the parties to law. But the causes of action so united must all belong to one only of these classes, and must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated." Hill's Laws, § 93. South Carolina. Identical in all respects with all three paragraphs given in the text. Code, 1893, § 188. South Dakota. Identical in all respects with the three paragraphs given in the text, except that to class 5 are added the words "or for waste committed thereon." Ann. St., 1901, § 6138. Utah. Identical with the first two paragraphs of the text, except that to class 5 are added the words "or waste committed thereon." Paragraph three of text, respecting mortgage foreclosures, is wanting. Rev. St., 1898, § 2961. subject of action. In a few States these peculiar features are wanting; while the other classes of causes of action which may be joined are substantially the same as provided in the arrangement already given. This is the case in Kentucky, in Oregon, and in California.1 It should be remembered that in Kentucky and in Oregon [also in Iowa and Arkansas] a slight distinction between legal and equitable proceedings is preserved; and this fact, doubtless, accounts for the form of the provision in the codes of those States. No such distinction remains in California, and, as has been seen in a former chapter, legal and equitable causes of action may be united, according to the established procedure in that State, notwithstanding the omission in the clause expressly regulating such joinder. § 334. * 440. Departures from Original Type. In other States, the original type set forth in the New York code has been widely departed from. Thus, in Indiana, an attempt is made to enumerate and arrange the particular classes of equitable as well as legal causes of action which may be joined. In Iowa the departure from the common type and the changes of the common law are much wider, and more radical. The code of that State, as do the codes of Kentucky and of Oregon, retains some slight separation between legal and equitable actions, but permits all possible actions that are legal, or all that are equitable, to be united in one petition. The only requirement in reference to their nature is, that all causes of action so united must be in the same kind of proceedings; that is, all legal, or all equitable. * § 335. 441. Scope and Meaning of Statutory Provisions. Difficulties of Interpretation. These various statutory provisions will be examined, and the judicial interpretation put upon them will be ascertained, in a subsequent portion of the present section. Their general scope and meaning, however, are very plain. Excepting in Iowa, a plaintiff may unite different causes of action in the one complaint or petition, under the following restrictions: They must affect all the parties; they must all be triable in the same county; and they must all belong to one of the various specified classes. The result is, that all the causes of action so by this section, "The causes of action so united must not require different places of trial, and, except as otherwise provided, must affect all the parties to the action." Following this is a section relative to mortgage foreclosures in some respects similar to that given in the text. Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3493, 3494, 3495.] 1 [Lamb v. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56.] united must be either upon contract, or for injuries to person or property, and the like, unless they all arise out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action. This latter exception does not, as has been seen, prevail in a few of the States; but, where it does prevail, the most incongruous and dissimilar causes of action may be joined, if they arise out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of the action, within the meaning of that phrase. It is evident that very little difficulty can arise in interpreting and applying most of the classes. The real doubts and uncertainties grow out of (1) the confounding the reliefs demanded by the plaintiff with the cause of action upon which such demand is based; and this confusion is more apt to exist in equity causes, and especially in those where legal relief is prayed for as well as equitable; (2) the clause permitting the joinder of causes of action arising out of the same transaction, etc. "Transaction" has had no technical legal meaning, and is a word of very vague import at best; but this vagueness is largely increased by the additional clause which permits causes of action arising out of transactions connected with the same subject of action to be united. These are the two chief, and almost only, sources of doubt in the practical construction of the passage in question. The first one the liability of confounding the reliefs demanded with the causes of action may, of course, be avoided by the exercise of care and discrimination: the second is much more embarrassing, and it is hardly possible that all doubt should ever be removed from the legal meaning of the language. II. The Forms and Modes in which a Misjoinder may occur, and the Manner in which it must be objected to and corrected. § 336. *442. Separate Statement of Different Causes of Action. All of the codes require that the different causes of action should be separately stated. In other words, each must be set forth in a separate and distinct division of the complaint or 1 [Pollock v. Association (1896), 48 S. C. 65, 25 S. E. 977, quoting the text. Willey v. Nichols (1898), 18 Wash. 528, 52 Pac. 237, to the effect that "an action against the principal and sureties upon an injunction bond for the penalty therein named and against the principal in a further sum for maliciously instituting |