close a mortgage given (together with a note) by a corporation which had become insolvent, certain judgment creditors of the company intervened, alleging fraud in the execution of the note and mortgage by the defendant, and that they were void as against its creditors; and praying that they might be adjudged void, and the action to foreclose be dismissed. The intervention of these judgment creditors was sustained, but it was held, at the same time, that simple contract creditors had no foundation for an intervention, since they could not dispute the mortgage.1 1 Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62. [The following quotation from Horn v. Volcano Water Co. appeared as § 429 in the text of the last edition: "The petition of the creditor R. does not disclose any right on his part to intervene; it shows that he was a simple contract creditor, holding obligations against the company, but it does not show that any portion of them are secured by any lien on the mortgaged premises. His intervention is only an attempt of one creditor to prevent another creditor from obtaining judgment against the common debtor, -a proceed ing which can find no support either in principle or authority. The interest mentioned in the statute which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties, must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. The provisions of our statute are taken substantially from the Code of Procedure of Louisiana, which declares that in order to be entitled to intervene, it is enough to have an interest in the success of either of the parties to the suit; and the Supreme Court of that State, in passing upon the term 'interest,' thus used, held this language: This we suppose must be a direct interest by which the intervening party is to obtain immediate gain or suffer loss by the judgment which may be rendered between the original parties; otherwise the strange anomaly would be introduced into our jurisprudence of suffering an accumulation of suits in all instances where doubts might be entertained or enter into the imagination of subsequent plaintiffs, that a defendant against whom a previous action was under prosecution might not have property sufficient to discharge all his debts. For as the first judgment obtained might give a preference to the person who should obtain it, all subsequent suitors down to the last would have an indirect interest in defeating the action of the first.' To authorize an intervention, therefore, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand or some part thereof in suit, or a claim to or lien upon the property or some part thereof which is the subject of litigation. No such claim or lien is asserted in the petition of R., and his right to intervene in consequence thereof fails. The petition of S. and others stands upon a different footing. It shows that they were judgment creditors having liens by their several judgments upon the mortgaged premises at the time of the institution of the suit. As such, they were subsequent incumbrancers and necessary parties to a complete adjustment of all the interests in the mortgaged premises, though not indispensable parties to a decree determining the rights of the other parties as between themselves. For such adjustment the court would have been justified in ordering them to be brought in, either upon their own petition, as in the present case, or by an amendment to the complaint."] See also Lewis v. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428; Yetzer v. Young (S. D. 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 1054; McClurg v. State Bindery Co. (S. D. 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 428; Gale v. Shillock (Dak., Oct. 1886), 30 N. W. Rep. 138; Smith v. Gale, 12 Supr. Ct. Rep. 674; Limberg v. Higginbotham, 11 Colo. 316; Curtis v. Lathrop, 12 Colo. 169; Daniels v. Clark, 38 Iowa, 556; Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481. § 324. *430. Author's Statement of the Doctrine. The doctrine stated by Mr. Justice Field [in Horne v. Volcano Water Co.] is clearly the correct interpretation of the provisions contained in the California and the Iowa codes, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Dillon [in Taylor v. Adair] is in complete harmony with it. The cases cited above all fall within this doctrine. In each the intervenors had a direct interest, either in prosecuting the action and obtaining the benefit of the recovery, or in defending the action and entirely defeating the recovery. If the intervenor claims to be the only one entitled to the relief, if he asserts that the ultimate cause of action is vested in him and not in the original plaintiff, then his interest is adverse to both of the parties. The doctrine may be expressed in the following manner: The intervenor's interest must be such, that if the original action had never been commenced, and he had first brought it as the sole plaintiff, he would have been entitled to recover in his own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief sought; or if the action had first been brought against him as the defendant, he would have been able to defeat the recovery in part at least. His interest may be either legal or equitable. If equitable, it must be of such a character as would be the foundation for a recovery or for a defence, as the case might be, in an independent action in which he was an original party. As the new system permits legal and equitable causes of action or defences to be united by those who are made the parties to an ordinary suit, for the same reason either or both may be relied upon by an intervenor. In short, the same rules govern his rights which govern those who originally sue or defend. The proceeding by intervention is not an anomalous one, differing from other judicial controversies, after it has been once commenced. It is, in fact, the grafting of one action upon another, and the trying of the combined issues at one trial, and the determining them by one judgment. In this aspect of the proceeding it is both plain and reasonable that the intervenor should not be required to apply for permission to come in. He brings himself into court, and 1 [See Wall v. Mines (1900), 130 Cal. the intervention, and such defendant then 27, 62 Pac. 386, in which the court say: has all the rights to plead given the de"The intervention may be adverse to fendants in an ordinary action, and may both plaintiff and defendant. Where it is adverse to either, such party becomes defendant, and the intervenor plaintiff in file a cross complaint to the intervention under sec. 442."] becomes a litigant party by filing and serving his petition, which is answered by the adversary parties - plaintiff or defendant, or. both in the same manner as though it was the pleading of a plaintiff the issues are thus framed, -issues upon the plaintiff's petition and the intervenor's petition, and the trial of the whole is had at one hearing. If the intervenor fails on this trial, a judgment for costs is of course rendered against him; if he succeeds, a judgment is given in his favor according to the facts and circumstances of the case.1 § 325. *431. Concluding Remarks. This is certainly a great innovation upon the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in courts of law and of equity. It is, however, a method based upon the very principles which lie at the foundation of the entire reformed American system. The only possible objection is the multiplication of issues to be decided in the one cause, and the confusion alleged to result therefrom. This objection is not real it is the stock argument which was constantly urged in favor of retaining the common-law system of special pleading, and was repudiated when the codes were adopted by the American States, and has been at last utterly repudiated in England. Complicated issues of fact are daily tried by juries, and complicated equities are easily adjusted by courts. The description 1 Poehlmann v. Kennedy, 48 Cal. 201; Brooks v. Hager, 5 Cal. 281, 282; Sargent v. Wilson, 5 Cal. 504, 507; Moss v. Warner, 10 Cal. 296, 297; People v. Talmage, 6 Cal. 256, 258; County of Yuba v. Adams & Co., 7 Cal. 35; Davis v. Eppinger, 18 Cal. 378, 380; Dixey v. Pollock, 8 Cal. 570; Speyer v. Ihmels, 21 Cal. 280, 287; Coghill v. Marks, 29 Cal. 673. Contra to these cases, see the wellconsidered opinion of Clark J. in Lewis v. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428. Dutil v. Pacheco, 21 Cal. 438, 442; Coster v. Brown, 23 Cal. 142, 143; Gradwohl v. Harris, 29 Cal. 150, 154; People v. Sexton, 37 Cal. 532, 534; Joliet Iron, &c. Co. v. Chicago C. & W. R. Co., 51 Iowa, 300; Switz v. Black, 45 Iowa, 597; Ingle v. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286; Harwood v. Quinby, 44 Iowa, 385; Henry v. Cass Cy. Mill, &c. Co., 42 id. 33; Coburn v. Smart, 53 Cal. 742; Rosecrans v. Ellsworth, 52 Cal. 509; Porter v. Garrissino, 51 Cal. 559. See also Martin v. Thompson, 63 Cal. 3; Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 1 which I have here given of the enlarged power of intervention. admitted by the codes of California and of Iowa may, by introducing its methods to the profession of other States, procure its general adoption wherever the new procedure is established. Courts and legislatures of the several States may well borrow the improvements which have been made in other commonwealths; and thus, by a comparison of methods, the common system may become perfected and unified.1 1 See ante, § 413, and note. CHAPTER THIRD. THE AFFIRMATIVE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ACTION: THE FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION BY THE PLAINTIFF. SECTION FIRST. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS. § 326. * 432. Introduction. I here collect all the provisions of the various codes which relate in a general manner to the plaintiff's complaint or petition, and which contain the rules applicable to the theory of pleading as a whole: those which prescribe the mode of alleging certain particular classes of facts, or regulate the joinder of causes of action, or define the nature and uses of the reply, will be quoted in subsequent portions of the chapter, in immediate connection with the several subjects to which they refer. The important clauses which announce the fundamental and essential principles and doctrines of the reformed system in regard to all pleadings, and which determine the form and substance of the one by which the plaintiff sets forth the grounds of his claim for judicial relief, are nearly the same in the different State codes. With the few variations in the language, which will be pointed out, there is no substantial difference; and the system of pleading, as found in the statute, is absolutely the same wherever the reform prevails. The following are all the provisions which it is necessary to quote in order to exhibit the simple and natural methods introduced by the new procedure. § 327. * 433. Statutory Provisions as to Complaint. "All the forms of pleading heretofore existing are abolished; and hereafter the forms of pleading in civil actions in courts of record, and the rules by which the sufficiency of the pleadings is to be determined, are those prescribed by this act."1 "The first pleading 1 Kansas, § 85; Nebraska, § 90; North Carolina, § 91. The corresponding provision of the Iowa code is more detailed: "§ 2644. All technical forms of action and pleading, all common counts, general issues, and all fictions, are abolished; and hereafter the forms of pleading in civil actions, and the rules by which their suffi |