The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and PolicyCorruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform. |
Other editions - View all
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and ... Johann Graf Lambsdorff No preview available - 2008 |
The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and ... Johann Graf Lambsdorff No preview available - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
Argentina asks its panel assess the extent assumption Bangladesh BC-approach beta-transformation bootstrap sample business environment Common composite index confidence interval continuous annual surveys correlations that relate countries with reportedly country’s country's score data by PRS EIU FH elite businesspeople enter the index Estonia extent of corruption Finland five percent probability forms of corruption Global Insight Hong Kong IMD IMD IMD IMD IMD PERC IMD PERC PERC included joint subsample Kendall’s rank correlation kickbacks know the CPI levels of corruption lower Corruption Risk Malaysia matching percentiles mean and standard measurable corruption methodology Nepotism Never occur ninety percent confidence normally distributed obtain panel of experts Pearson correlation PERC PERC PERC percent confidence range political corruption political instability previous year’s CPI respondents source’s standard deviation standardized value statistical subsample of countries Taiwan Transparency International Steering Trends underlying precision UNECA WEF WEF United Kingdom United Nations valid WEF WEF WEF WMRC