us quite correct.

All the statute requires is written evidence of the contract. Why that evidence came into being is a question of no importance.

In Wood v. Conway Corporation (L. R. [1914], 2 Ch. 47), the question arose whether an injunction should issue where fumes from gasworks did not interfere with the comfort of the neighbouring landowner, but did interfere with the health of his trees. The Court of Appeal (affirming Joyce, J.) held that it should issue, because the interference, though not perhaps a nuisance, was a permanent and continuous injury to the neighbour's property, the extent of which could not be sufficiently accurately ascertained to be compensated for by damages under Lord Cairns' Act. The difficulty here was, of course, to ascertain, not the extent of the inquiry up to date, but the possible extent of it in the future.

The case of In re Drummond, Ashworth v. Drummond (L. R. [1914], 2 Ch. 90) may be usefully compared with another of Eve, J.'s decisions cited above (In re Gardom). In this case he held that a trust for the workpeople in the spinning department of a factory was not a charitable gift, as such workpeople were not poor within the statute of Elizabeth. Gentlefolks of "limited means are.

J. A. S.

Out of the abundance of workmen's compensation cases which the High Court has been called upon to consider, few incidents have led to more contradictory decisions. than the one where an accident has happened to a sailor not actually on shipboard. Parker v. Owners of Ship Black Rock (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 39), adds one more to the number. The question was, whether a claim under the Act could be supported by the representatives of a sailor

who was drowned in his endeavour to reach his ship. By the articles of agreement the crew were to provide their own food, and it was to procure stores for himself that he had gone ashore. ashore. The Master of the Rolls and Eve, J., were of opinion that the sailor was only acting in his own interests, and was in the same position as a factory hand would be in going for his meals from his workshop to his home; and the stipulation about obtaining his own food was not a contractual obligation towards the owners. the other hand, the President held that, even if the stipulation did not form an express contract, a contract would be implied, for it was part of the business of the ship that the sailor should procure food to enable him to do his work. But as the President was in a minority, the decision was against the plaintiff. One of the leading cases, that of Moore v. Manchester Liners, Limited, was noted in our issues of May 1909 and February 1911, Nos. 352 (Vol. XXXIV) and 359 (Vol. XXXVI) respectively.

On

In Oelkers v. Ellis (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 139), Horridge, J., has steered through some conflicting decisions, and decided, in accordance with the weight of authority, that, though the Statute of Limitations is a bar to a claim for breach of duty, it is not a bar to one based on fraud so long as the plaintiff remains, without any fault of his own, in ignorance of the fraud; and this notwithstanding that the wrong doer has taken no active measures to prevent detection. It is a logical assumption, supported by some of the decisions, that the Statute would not begin to run till the time when the discovery of the fraud was made. Probably, however, when the discovery is not made till after six years from the date of the transaction, any considerable delay in taking proceedings would, in the absence of good reason for delay, be hazardous.

In re Phillips (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 689), was merely an application for directions, and, as there was no legal or equitable claim, the judgment could not be a very strong one. But it will be of authority if hereafter a similar case should arise of a bankrupt taking out, unknown to the official receiver, a policy on his own life before the expiry of a term for which his discharge was suspended, and then, after paying many premiums, becoming bankrupt a second time. On his decease, the trustee of the first bankruptcy had an admitted right to the proceeds of the policy. But the official receiver of the second submitted that the amount of the premiums paid should be allowed to him, for by so much the assets available for distribution in the second bankruptcy had, of course, been diminished. But it was held, and rightly, that there was no moral obligation on the official receiver of the first bankruptcy to surrender them.

In our issue for May last (No. 372, Vol. XXXIX), a note on Grimble & Co. v. Preston commented on the importance at a trial of taking prompt objection when there has been an omission of any essential formality in preliminary proceedings. In Rex v. Thompson (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 99), the desirability of promptitude was again pointed out. The Court was of opinion that a defect on the face of an indictment should, in strictness, be taken before plea. But the danger of acting contrary to this opinion was removed to the point of harmlessness by the relieving announcement that "we do not decide that the objection may not be taken at a later period, or even after verdict." The suggestion seems to leave the enforcement of the technicality unsupported by any legal principle.

The Finance Act 1910, sect. 46, relates to "tied houses' only, and imposes upon the person from whom a licence

holder is bound to obtain a supply of intoxicating liquors, such part of the burden of increased licence-duty as may be proportionate to any increased rent of the licensed premises. or increased prices of the liquors supplied.. The latter clause, as to increased prices, was probably inserted because sometimes higher charges are made to the holders of tied houses than to the licensees of free houses. These "free" houses are dealt with by the Finance Act 1912; sect. 2 of which entitles the lessee to recover from the lessor so much of the increase of licence duty as may be proportionate to any increased rent or premium on account of the premises being let as licensed premises. In Procter v. Terry (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 178) it was held that, in ascertaining the proportionate part, the point to be considered was the difference between the existing rent as licensed premises and the rent which would be obtained for the same premises merely adapted to other business purposes or to domestic use; not what additional rent might be obtained if the site were fitted to more profitable uses by a considerable capital outlay.

A sentence of hard labour for an attempt to commit suicide, was, on the ground that the crime was an attempt to commit a felony, supported in Rex v. Mann (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 107), against the appeal which raised the contention that the attempt could not be a felony, as the Act 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23, speaks of treason, felony or felo de se, and thus separates felo de se from felony. Blackstone, in Book IV, chapter 14, says, "the law has ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony."

Of the two judgments in Norman v. Great Western Railway (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 153), it may be permitted to give a preference to that of Bray, J., over that of Lush, J. That a

railway company, owing to its public calling and its statutory privileges, is under a higher obligation than a private trader to keep its premises reasonably safe for persons using them, is a firmly established principle. Both judges, of course, concurred in that. The interesting point is their divergence of opinion on the question of negligence. If a station yard, to which carriers are bound to resort in the course of business, has in it a declivity, there is in that fact a permanent source of danger. If the slope is within a few yards of a weighing office to which carriers must go for the railway company's requirements, the possibility of danger is increased. And if the slope is left unfenced the possibility expands into probability. The probability is not much diminished, though no accident has happened at the spot. This is shown by the present case, where the plaintiff's horse backed the cart over the slope while the driver was in the company's weighing office on business. Lush, J., found contributory negligence, because the accident would not have occurred if the horse had not been left unattended. But, similarly, the accident would not have occurred if the dangerous slope had been fenced. And to so guard such a pitfall was a primary obligation on the company as well as a prudent precaution in their own interests. On all grounds the judgment of Bray, J., seems the better.

Lucy v. Bawdon (L. R. [1914], 2 K. B. 318), is another case of alleged negligence, but in this instance imputed to a private person. The plaintiff, wife of a tenant of rooms in a lodging-house, had here however no remedy for injuries received from slipping from defective doorsteps and falling thence into an insufficiently protected area. Both steps and area were under the control of the landlord. But Atkin, J., in a considered judgment, based his decision against the plaintiff on the ground that she had knowledge of the disrepair of the steps, and that, in the absence of agreement,