then (1823) recognised them as independent, had no such distinct right.

President Wilson's further declaration against the establishment of any government in America which does not fulfil the Lincolnian canon of being "of the people, by the people, for the people," reads oddly. At a time when it is seriously questioned by political thinkers whether representative institutions and party government really do result in self-government, and whether they do not issue in the domination of hereditary cliques, it is scarcely wise to insist on the free and sacred character of parliamentary constitutions. When it is Central American parliamentary constitutions which are thus solemnly approved as superior to anything else that can be devised-so superior as to be maintained by strangers by force of arms-the declaration borders on burlesque. On the whole subject, German scholars may be referred to Kraus' Die Monroedoktrin (Berlin, 1913), and to an article in the Edinburgh Review, January, 1914.

Mexico.

It would nevertheless be wrong to refuse a warm tribute to the absolutely correct and impressive conduct of the American Administration in face of the Mexican problem. President Wilson and Mr. Bryan have not been moved a hair-breadth by the clamour of interested and disinterested advisers who have urged them on to intervention. Just as the Italian adventure in Tripoli was one of the most discouraging events of recent years to those who hope to see a reign of settled law in the world, so the attitude of America towards Mexico is one of the most hopeful. Acts speak louder than words, and while the Administration exhibits such force of character and intellect in its conduct, nothing but friendly criticism need be expended on its speeches.

The Hague Private Law Conferences.

The question, to which we briefly referred last November (in reporting the results of the Madrid Conference of the International Law Association), of the participation of the United States and Great Britain in the Hague Private Law Congresses, merits a further word. It will be remembered that Mr. A. K. Kuhn, of New York, read a paper in which he forcibly urged the desirability of the English-speaking nations entering into an arrangement which has worked well on the Continent, and that with this view, they ought to be represented at future Congresses. In justice to Mr. Kuhn, it ought to be added that he by no means thinks that these nations would necessarily be well advised to enter into the Conventions as they stand. That would involve the abandonment of their theory of domicile as the major criterion of the personal statute, and this he does not advocate. But, by participation in the Conference, American and British lawyers would have an opportunity of demonstrating to their Continental colleagues what our conception of domicile really is, and how nearly it approaches the conception put forward by Asser of a "private-law nationality." The competing criteria of nationality and domicile would be brought very near the fusing point. Such a fusion would remedy a serious divergence which has only existed in an acute form for some sixty years. It would not be difficult of accomplishment, and it would constitute a real contribution to the general welfare of all who have international relations. At present, Continental jurists have the greatest difficulty in appreciating the permanence of the tie of domicile, and the difficulty which exists in casting it off. They cannot imagine that it means more than the French domicile, which is little more than officially recognised residence. Formal and official interchange of views at a diplomatic conference would almost certainly pave the way for a better understanding.

Real Estate Abroad.

In Smith v. Smith ([1913], 2 Ch. 217), the true position of a testator who leaves immovable property situate abroad appears to have been imperfectly appreciated. Foreign

land is not "real property," and to apply to it the rules which place real property in a peculiar position in administration is a mistake. Yet, in Smith v. Smith, a testamentary charge of legacies on a fund of land and chattels situate in Argentina was held not to put the land and chattels on equal terms, but to make the land an auxiliary fund only. As regarded the Argentine chattels specifically bequeathed subject to the charge, it was held that they were applicable on an equal footing with the general residuary personalty.

This case raises questions of pure English law, which can only be lightly touched upon here. There was an express charge, which dispenses us from consideration of the rule laid down in Greville v. Browne (7 H. L. C. 589)-against Lord Wensleydale's opinion-that where there is a gift of a mixed fund and a gift of legacies, the latter are charged on the real, as well as on the personal, part of the mixed fund. The Lords laid down the rule as though it applied only in cases in which the testator first gives legacies and then makes an immediate gift of the residue of his real and personal estate. But Lord Wensleydale states the principle adopted by the House to be that-" wherever realty and personalty are united together in one fund, they are both made subject to the legacies given by the will." It is true that Jarman (II, 2002) says that this alone is not sufficient, and that in every case "something more" has existed as an indication of charge, quoting Lord Abinger (in Nyssen v. Gretton, 2 Y. & C. 232). But the "something more may be a very little more-and how much it is! In the present case of Smith v. Smith, however, the gift was expressly made

subject to the legacies, so that the charge clearly existed. But was it a charge on the land and chattels alike, or primarily on the chattels? It would seem that there should have been little room for doubt. Argentine land, it is submitted, is personal estate. The various categories of the mixed gift ought, therefore, to have been applied on a footing of entire equality. This course was not taken. Treating the Argentine land as real estate, Mr. Justice Eve was faced with the problem of Roberts v. Walter (1 R. & M. 752). It became necessary to decide the priorities as between the land and the chattels. Jessel had, in Gainsford v. Dunn (L. R., 17 Eq. 405), taken the view that the fund so blended was to be treated as a homogeneous whole, but it was now held that this view had been exploded in 1880 by Elliott v. Dearsley (16 Ch. 322). The land and chattels were charged; but, unless the testator has expressly directed that the legacies are to be satisfied out of their proceeds, thus specifically treating them as a mixed fund (which, of course, in these cases he does not), the land will only be an auxiliary fund.

It was therefore held that the residuary personalty was exonerated, as between itself and the chattel portion of the Argentine property. Had the Argentine land (as we think it should have) been held to be personalty, it would have come under the same rule. The reasoning by which Mr. Justice Eve supports the treatment of foreign land as on a footing with English land does not carry conviction. The executors, his Lordship says, are bound by the very terms. of their appointment to pay the debts out of the deceased's personalty irrespective of his desires: there is no such obligation to pay them out of realty. But this begs the question. What is personalty? In North v. Robinson (2 Ventr. 358) it was expressly said that foreign land-" is looked upon as a chattel to pay debts and a testamentary thing." And it is considered as pure personalty for the purposes of

the Mortmain Act.

(Beaumont v. Oliveira [1869], L. R., 4 Ch. 309). Any other conclusion will raise most difficult problems as to what rights in foreign land will be real and what personal property. The right of an owner of foreign land is not an estate holden of a lord paramount: it is an absolute ownership similar to the ownership of a chattel.

Foreign Judgments.

Three cases have recently been decided which have done something towards a further elucidation of the limits within which the English Courts will enforce a judgment passed in a foreign jurisdiction. These are, as is well known, not the same as those which they set to the exercise of their own jurisdiction. They have been restricted to the enforcement of final decrees for a liquidated amount in cases where the defendant was (a) domiciled in, (b) subject by allegiance to, or (c) resident in, the country of the judgment, or has elected to submit to its Courts. Dicey questions the adequacy of domicile as a ground, but on no very sure foundation: it seems to follow à fortiori from the admission of residence. But political allegiance, or subjection, is a good ground of jurisdiction; and a rather interesting point here arises as to the position of the Colonies. If the Court at Senegal or Saigon gives judgment against a Frenchman, the English Court will enforce it in England. Suppose it is a Sydney or a Singapore Court which passes the judgment against an Englishman, must it not, by a precise analogy, enforce that judgment here? One of the King's Courts has given judgment against one of the King's subjects, just as in the former case one of the French Courts has given judgment against a Frenchman.

The argument was not presented precisely on these lines. to the Court in G. Gibson & Co. v. Gibson ([1913], 3 K. B.