way of redemption thereof shall not be capable of being assigned, charged or attached," has been the subject of a decision of great practical interest in the Sheriff Court at Greenock (Woods v. The Royal Bank of Scotland [1913], I S. L. T. 499). A sum of £235, which admittedly represented the balance of a sum of £325, which had been paid by way of redemption of compensation, was arrested in the hands of the Royal Bank of Scotland, with whom it lay on deposit receipt. The arrester maintained that the protection of the statute only applied to the compensation money so long as it was in the hands of the Clerk of Court, and that whenever it was paid over it became part of the common debtor's moveable estate, and liable to all legal diligence. The Sheriff took the view that compensation money was designed by the statute to be of an alimentary nature for the subsistence of the workman, and that so long as money belonging to a workman can be identified as having come to him by way of compensation, it is protected from arrestment.

The case of Wood v. Clydesdale Bank Limited ([1913], 2 S. L. T. 82), which arose out of the theft of an endorsed deposit receipt is worth notice. Wood sent a registered. packet to his brother containing a deposit receipt for £100 with the Clydesdale Bank, endorsed by him, and a letter addressed to the Bank asking them to pay £60 to his brother. At the same time he posted a letter to the Bank asking them to pay £60 out of the £100 deposited with them to his brother. The registered packet was stolen, and the deposit receipt and the letter which it contained were presented at the Bank by someone who represented himself as Wood's brother, and who, at the request of the Bank, endorsed the deposit receipt by forging the name of Wood's brother. The Bank thereupon paid him the £60, and handed him a deposit receipt

for the balance in the name of Wood. Wood raised an action against the Bank for £100, being the amount in the deposit receipt. Lord Hunter gave decree for the sum sued for. He said that it was a case where one of two innocent parties must suffer for the fraud of a third party. Here the loss must fall on the Bank. A deposit receipt was not a negotiable instrument. The Bank had come under an obligation to pay to the person named thereon, or according to his instructions. The fact that a person was in possession of the endorsed deposit receipt did not necessarily mean that he had a right to receive payment of its contents. If the Bank chose to make a payment to him it must take the risk of having to pay over again, not only in a case where the signature was forged, but also in a case where it was proved that the holder of the deposit receipt was not entitled to payment, unless it could be shown that the depositor had contributed to the mistake by his own negligence. Here the Bank could only maintain its defence by showing that the payee was really Wood's brother.

D. M.

IRISH CASES.

When an Irish tenant-farmer dies intestate, possessed of a moderately small estate, it is the exception rather than the rule that any surviving relative should take out administration. The ordinary custom is that the widow and children remain in occupation of the farm, working it as before. Each of them on the intestate's death becomes entitled to a specific undivided interest in the tenancy, in respect of his or her share under the Statute of Distributions. As time goes on, and as some of the children leave the farm and some receive a "portion" or "fortune" out of the assets, questions as to the transmission or devolution of the various shares among the

several members of the family often become very com. plicated, and lead to many an equity suit in the County Court. In particular, where some of the children are minors at the time of the intestate's death, a mother or other adult member of the family taking possession of the land is held, so far as the infants' shares are concerned, to be in possession as a "bailiff" for such infants. In the past, some Courts have seemed inclined to hold that virtually no lapse of time, and hardly any other circumstance, could put an end to this bailiffship, so as to cause the Statute of Limitations to bar a child who was an infant at the intestate's death. It is now admitted that this view was exaggerated. In MacMahon v. Hastings ([1913], 1 Ir. R. 395), will be found a useful summary of the law. In order that a person entering upon an infant's estate should be held a bailiff for the infant, he must enter with a knowledge of the infant's rights. But if he has that knowledge, then he continues a bailiff even although the infant has come of age; some other circumstance, beyond the mere attainment of majority, is necessary to dissolve the relationship. One such circumstance will be a demand of possession: if that is refused, the possession of the former bailiff becomes "adverse" from the time of the refusal. Only, if the demand and refusal are within six years. before an action brought by the infant, the latter's rights are saved by sect. 3 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1874.

Of cases upon the construction of wills there is no end: of reconciling some of those cases with each other there is hardly even a beginning. Two recent decisions illustrate the divergent views, which different judicial minds may take of very similar words, in deciding whether a person has a beneficial interest or is a trustee. In Hickey v. Hickey ([1913], 1 Ir. R. 390), a husband bequeathed to his wife his entire worldly effects "to be managed as best she can for the benefit of our children"; and it was held, that this

gave no beneficial interest to the wife. In Berryman v. Berryman ([1913], 1 Ir. R. 21), a husband gave to his wife all his property (enumerating it) “to be disposed of as she may think best for the good of our children "; and it was held, that this gave the whole beneficial interest to the wife, unaffected by any binding trust. The former is a decision of the Court of Appeal, the latter of a judge of first instance; and, therefore, it looks as if Berryman v. Berryman would not have a very useful career as an authority. If one could speculate as to what was really in the minds of the two illiterate testators, while two semi-literate but unprofessional friends were writing out their wills, one would probably think that neither testator wished his wife to take nothing and the children to take all; but this guessing is dangerous, and litera scripta manet. The moral is the old one: that if you wish a recipient of bounty under your will to take an out-and-out beneficial interest, you ought to say so with decision.

In the August number of the Law Magazine, these notes referred to a case upon the legality of an agreement between husband and wife (who were living apart when the agreement was made), providing for an immediate reconciliation, but also making provision for the wife in the case of such reconciliation not proving permanent. Such an agreement, although in a sense it contemplates a future separation, was held valid and not contrary to public policy. That decision has now been affirmed by the Court of Appeal: Purser v. Purser ([1913], 1 Ir. R. 428). The judgment of Palles, C.B., is valuable as reviewing the development of the law as to separation-agreements from early times.

Where a person libelled resides in Ireland, and the author of the libel in England, the attempt to keep the trial of the libel action in Ireland meets with some difficulties. The Irish R. S. C., Ord. XI, r. I (h), provide that leave may be

given to issue and serve a concurrent writ out of the jurisdiction against a person who is a necessary or proper party to an action properly brought against a defendant within the jurisdiction. It seemed therefore that if there had been a publication of the libel in Ireland (say, the sale of a newspaper by a news-agent), an action might be begun in Ireland against the news-agent, that the Author might be joined as a co-defendant to this action, and that then leave might be obtained to serve a concurrent writ out of the jurisdiction upon the Author. The risk is that the Court. may hold that the action was not bonâ fide brought against the nominal defendant within the jurisdiction; and this was virtually the ground for setting aside the proceedings in Ross v. Eason & Sons Ltd. ([1911], 2 Ir. R. 459). In a recent case, however, Cooney v. Wilson & Henderson ([1913], 2 Ir. R. 402), such an attempt, under a stronger state of facts, was successful, and the order giving leave to serve the concurrent writ was upheld. Here the author of the alleged libels had sent over to Ireland placards containing them, and had employed a bill-poster to post and circulate these near the plaintiff's residence. The bill-poster was evidently in a very different position from that of the ordinary news-agent: the latter would be entitled to a verdict on showing that he did not know the newspaper which he sold contained a libel, that he had no ground for supposing it was likely to contain one, and that such ignorance was not due to his negligence. The bill-poster, a special agent for the publication of the alleged libel, could show none of these things-the Author suggested no defence but justification: and the fact that the bill-poster was said to be a pauper did not seem to the Court a ground for thinking that he was not bona fide made a defendant. Upon this view, the only question upon the construction of the rule was: Would the action lie against both defendants if both were within the jurisdiction?

J. S. B.