1 tax shall not be levied on that district. In some instances, districts have been laying aside a sinking fund for building purposes, but generally the balance on hand is composed almost entirely of primary school interest fund and one mill tax. Where the census is low and the valuation high, the surplus will be largely one mill tax. Where the reverse is true, the surplus is largely primary money. The present system of apportioning, makes it possible for some districts to have on hand a large amount of primary school interest fund which is not used, and this money is simply tied up and does no one any good, while other districts are really suffering because of lack of funds with which to maintain even five months of school. From the standpoint of the State, such unequal conditions ought to be adjusted, because the school exists for the children and their interests ought to be safeguarded by the State at every point. The question is, what plan of distribution of this money will be for the best interests of our schools. STATISTICS SHOWING AMOUNT OF PRIMARY MONEY ON HAND IN CERTAIN DISTRICTS The purpose of legislation on this subject is to secure the greatest good to the greatest number, and alleviate the extremely trying conditions in hundreds of school districts of the State of Michigan without distressing any single district. II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL REVENUES [From the Report of the Ohio School Revenue Commission, 1907, pp. 41-45.] Important as is the raising of sufficient school revenues, the distribution of such revenues is even more important. Granted that we are able to "raise the money," and that we have "raised the money," the next important question is how to distribute this money so as to accomplish best the real purpose of public education. Taxes and all forms of public revenues are designed primarily to promote the public good. We have systems of government, local, state, and national, as the machinery necessary to carry out the will of the people in this respect. Government is for the people as a whole rather than for the individual apart from his relations to the whole. The beneficent effects of popular education raise the standards of the citizenship of the whole State by raising the ideals and efficiency of individuals. As a means of self perpetuation, therefore, the State must provide means for raising and maintaining such standards of efficiency as will effectually permeate the whole citizenship. The matter of popular education is not one of personal privilege. Wealth cannot rightly buy immunity from its just share of the responsibility in providing educational advantages for even the most unfortunate or improvident. Education and the consequent advances of civilization make wealth possible. But the wealth of a man in Chicago may be all produced by labor of men in Colorado, or by the mere environment of property in Wisconsin. If wealth has any particular locus, it ought to be where it is produced, rather than where its possessor happens to reside. Wealth should be levied upon wherever it is found to make better the educational advantages of those whose work and citizenship make that wealth possible. The State, then, owes to every child within its borders equal educational advantages up to a minimum standard of efficiency. A child in the poorest section of the State has as much right to this minimum of training as the child of the wealthiest man within the State's borders. The geographical distribution of wealth has no vital relation to the problems of universal education. - Our present system of distribution of the State Common School Fund in Ohio is almost the poorest that could be devised to accomplish the purpose for which it is supposed to be maintained, to equalize the burdens of taxation for school support. In brief, it is as follows: One mill is levied equally on all the listed property of the State. This amount, $1 on every $1000, is paid to the county treasurer and the whole amount so collected by him is paid to the state treasurer, and this collective sum is known as the State Common School Fund. Until 1906 the county treasurer retained 1 per cent for collecting the tax. The state treasurer, on the warrant of the state auditor, showing the total enumeration (unmarried youth between 6 and 21) in the county, pays back to each county treasurer an amount determined by multiplying $1.70 by the number of school youth enumerated in the county. This total is then distributed among the various township, village, special and city districts in the county on the basis of the school enumeration. The rate of distribution, $1.70 per enumerated pupil, is determined by the legislature by computing the amount of tax that will likely be raised by the levy of one mill and dividing this amount, plus any accumulated balance, by the number of school youth enumerated. This amount per enumerated pupil, $1.70, was raised to $1.75 for 1907, due to the fact that the valuation had increased faster than the school population. The rate fixed by the legislature is to be understood to be the minimum rate and the state auditor has the right to increase it if there is sufficient balance to warrant such increase. For more than 30 years prior to 1904 it was $1.50, which occasionally was advanced to $1.55. Yet for a number of years prior to 1904 a balance was allowed to increase until it reached $318,078. Just why would be hard to tell, but this balance in 1904 made it possible, after a warm fight in the legislature, to advance the pro rata distribution to $1.70, and it is not likely to fall below that again. It will be noticed from the tables that all but $213,000 of this $2,163,000 raised in 1905 went back to the counties paying it in. There was, therefore, no State aid in so far as the remaining $1,950,000 was concerned. But this system of distribution is manifestly unfair if the claim for it is, that it will help weak communities to reach the minimum of educational advantages which the State must make possible if it is impossible for the community to do so itself. For example, there is Cleveland, with a large foreign population over 14 and under 21. These people are enumerated but they are not enrolled and are not receiving instruction. In 1905 Cleveland enumerated 114,393 school youth, but the average daily attendance was only 52,102 or 45 per cent of the enumeration. This means that Cleveland is drawing $1.70 per pupil for 62,291 children who are not receiving daily instruction, or $104,894.70 for children who are not being taught. If these 62,291 children were in school, it would require 1,557 more teachers at 40 pupils to the teacher and would add about $1,600,000 to the annual cost of the schools, supposing these pupils were all enrolled in elementary schools. The city would also find it necessary to build more school houses, and have $9,000,000 more invested in school property. This extra $104,894.70 which Cleveland draws annually from the State Common School Fund, and for which the city gives the State nothing in return to these 62,291 children, raises the average received per pupil actually in daily attendance to $3.73. But take any town or city in which the average daily attendance is higher and quite a different result will be obtained. There is Painsville, not far from Cleveland. The enumeration in 1905 was 1,371 and the average daily attendance was 932, or 68 %. Painsville received $1.70 per pupil enumerated, or $2.50 per pupil actually taught, as against $3.73 per pupil actually taught in Cleveland. This discrimination of $1.23 per pupil actually taught gives Cleveland $64,085.46 more than the city would be entitled to on the basis the State is aiding Painsville. In Cincinnati the amount the city receives from the State per pupil actually taught is $6.51, or $137,683.35 more than that city would be entitled to on the Painsville basis. When we take the cases of the smaller town and rural communities, the discrimination is still greater. The State School Fund was originally provided for in 1853 with the thought that it would equalize the burdens of taxation, but investigation clearly and conclusively shows that the system extends the greatest favors to the populous centers where there is always more wealth per capita, and consequently, where the people are better able to help themselves or make ample provision for their schools without state aid. Here, for example, is Portsmouth, Ohio, on the opposite side of the State. The enumeration for 1905 was 6837 and the average daily attendance was 2812, or only 41 % of the enumeration. The city is drawing money from the State Common School Fund for the 4,025 children of school age not in average daily attendance, at $1.70 per pupil, or $6,842.50-enough to pay 13 teachers $525 each. The amount Portsmouth received from the State was really not $1.70 per pupil, but $4.13 per pupil actually taught. Instead of encouraging communities to provide educational opportunities for all the youth, such a law encourages a community to enumerate as many youth as possible and enroll as few as possible - encourages the non-enforcement of the com pulsory attendance law. Of course, it is well understood by all that a large percentage of youth not enrolled are beyond the reach of the compulsory attendance law. But the contention of the writer is that the present method of distribution of the State Common School Fund is inequitable, unfair, and lacks the essentials of giving an educational incentive to local communities. No premium is placed upon the universal education of the people, but rather upon the lowest average enrollment and attendance. It is quite well understood, too, that many cities having a low percentage in actual attendance have many enrolled in private schools. But such communities ought not to be given such State aid or share in the distribution of the State funds as will actually encourage those communities to foster other than public schools with State funds. A city or community should not receive money for the education of children whom it is not educating. This brings us to the conclusion that State funds ought to be distributed on the basis of the number of pupils actually taught, the average daily attendance rather than upon the basis of the school census. This conclusion is reenforced by a careful study of the statistics of the cities compared with each other and with those of villages and rural communities. Here is a table compiled by selecting the names of cities, villages and townships at random over Ohio. In the case of villages and townships, only those have been selected that maintain high schools, thus placing them as nearly as possible on the plane of the cities, so far as educational advantages are considered. A study of these tables will make clear the present discrimination in favor of the larger cities in the matter of the distribution of the State Common School Fund. The twelve cities listed in this table, chosen at random, average $3.64 per pupil taught, while the eleven villages average $2.03 per pupil taught in their sharing of the State Common School Fund. The enrollment of nonresidents in the villages accounts for their lower value. This means that the twelve cities average 80 % higher than the eleven villages. But this is not all. The average tax levy for school purposes is much lower in the cities than in the villages and townships, showing that they are relatively much better able to maintain their schools without aid than the villages and townships. For example, Cincinnati, with a levy of but four and one-eighth mills, received from State funds $6.51 per pupil taught, while the villages and townships averaged but a little more than two dollars per pupil taught, with many of them levying twelve mills and upwards. This same discrimination is noticed when one compares |