not have violated the Constitution, may, when taken after its adoption,
violate it, if prohibited by that amendment. Kaukauna Water Power
Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 254.
9. Under the circumstances disclosed in this case, there was no taking of
the property of the plaintiff in error without due process of law. Ib.
10. The provisions in c. 40 of the General Statutes of South Carolina of
1882, requiring the salaries and expenses of the state railroad commis-
sion to be borne by the several corporations owning or operating rail-
roads within the State, are not in conflict with the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution hat a State shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty or property, hout due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction a qual pro-
tection of the laws." Charlotte, Augusta & Columbia Railroad Co.
v. Gibbes, 386.
11. It is again decided that private corporations are persons within the
meaning of that amendment. Ib.
12. Requiring the burden of a public service by a corporation, in conse-
quence of its existence and of the exercise of privileges obtained at its
request, to be borne by it, is neither denying to it the equal protec-
tion of the laws, nor making any unjust discrimination against it. Ib.
13. Under the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which declares that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself," where a person is
under examination before a grand jury, in an investigation into cer-
tain alleged violations of the interstate commerce act of February
4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, and the amendatory act of March 2, 1889, 25
Stat. 855, he is not obliged to answer questions where he states that
his answers might tend to criminate him, although § 860 of the Re-
vised Statutes provides that no evidence given by him shall be in any
manner used against him, in any court of the United States, in any
criminal proceeding. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 547.
14. The case before the grand jury was a criminal case. 1b.
15. The meaning of the constitutional provision is not merely that a per-
son shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a crim-
inal prosecution against himself; but its object is to insure that a
person shall not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any inves-
tigation, to give testimony which may tend to show that he himself
has committed a crime. Ib.
16. The ruling in People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, that the words "criminal
case" mean only a criminal prosecution against the witness himself,
disapproved. Ib.
17. The protection afforded by § 860 is not co-extensive with the consti-
tutional provision. Ib.
18. Adjudged cases on this subject, in courts of the United States, and of
the States, reviewed. 1b.
19. As the manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the
States and of the United States, is to prohibit the compelling of tes-
timony of a self-criminating kind from a party or a witness, the lib-
eral construction which must be placed on constitutional provisions
for the protection of personal rights, would seem to require that the
constitutional guaranties, however differently worded, should have as
far as possible the same interpretation. Ib.
20. It is a reasonable construction of the constitutional provision, that the
witness is protected from being compelled to disclose the circum-
stances of his offence, or the sources from which, or the means by
which, evidence of its commission, or of his connection with it, may
be obtained, or made effectual for his conviction without using his
answers as direct admissions against him. Ib.
21. No statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution,
after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the
effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the constitution. Ib.
22. In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offence to which the question relates. Ib.
23. The witness, having been committed to custody for his refusal to
answer, is entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. Ib.
24. The act of March 3, 1891, c. 551, forbidding certain classes of alien
immigrants to land in the United States, is constitutional and valid.
Nishimura Ekiu v. The United States, 651.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3;
EXPRESS COMPANIES;
INSPECTOR OF IMMIGRATION;
1. The act of the legislature of Missouri of May 16, 1889, "to define
express companies, and to prescribe the mode of taxing the same, and
to fix the rate of taxation thereon," imposes a tax only on business
done within the State, and does not violate the requirements of uni-
formity and equality of taxation prescribed by the constitution of the
State of Missouri. Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 339.
2. The legislative and constitutional provision of the State of South Caro-
lina that taxation of property shall be equal and uniform and in pro-
portion to its value, is not violated by exacting a contribution accord-
ing to their gross income of the several railroads, in proportion to the
number of miles of railroad operated within the State, in order to
meet the special service required of the State Railroad Commission.
Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Railroad Co. v. Gibbes, 386.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.
See CAVEAT EMPTOR, 1, 2;
CORPORATION.
1. When a contract for the payment of money at a future day, with inter-
est meanwhile payable semi-annually, is made in one place, and is to
be performed in another, both as to interest and principal, and the
interest before maturity is payable according to the legal rate in the
place of performance, the presumption is, in the absence of attendant
circumstances to show the contrary, that the principal bears interest
after maturity at the same rate. Coglan v. South Carolina Railroad
Co., 101.
2. The obligation to perform a verbal agreement, made in Missouri, to
accept and pay, on presentation at the place of business of the prom-
isor in Illinois, all drafts drawn upon him by the promisee for live
stock to be consigned by the promisee from Missouri to the promisor
in Illinois, is to be determined by the law of Illinois, the place of per-
formance, and not by the law of Missouri. Hall v. Cordell, 116.
3. The plaintiff agreed to construct a flour mill for the defendant, the
work to be done at a specified day. After the expiration of that day
defendant wrote to plaintiff that the mill was satisfactory, but that
the corn-rolls did not work to his satisfaction, and that when they
were made to do satisfactory work he should be ready to pay for the
entire work. This was completed and accepted within about two
months. Held, that this amounted to an agreement to pay if the com-
pletion was done within a reasonable time, and that this was a ques-
tion for the jury to determine, under proper instructions from the
court. Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Manufacturing Co., 128.
4. An oil company contracted with a railway company to purchase certain
rolling stock and lease the same to the railway company at an agreed
rental, the latter agreeing to purchase the same on or before a given
day and pay for it in cash, or if it should be unable to do so to turn it
over to the oil company, at the expiration of the contract, in good
order and condition. It was further agreed that freights earned by
the railway by transportation for the oil company might be applied to
the payment of the rental and of the purchase money. The railway
company was insolvent and, before the expiration of the contract, its
mortgage bondholders had proceedings instituted in equity for the
foreclosure of their mortgage, in which W. was appointed receiver.
The receiver continued to use the rolling stock. The oil company
intervened claiming to recover from the receiver the balance of the
purchase money, and to secure the carrying out of the contract by the
receiver, and the retention by it of the amount of freights due from it,
and their application to the payments of the rent and the purchase
money. The receiver answered, declining to complete the contract,
and averring that the rental had been paid in full and that there was
a balance due him for freight. He also filed a cross-petition to recover
the surplus. Held, (1) That the contract provided that if the railway
company became unable to pay its current debts in the ordinary course
of business, it should be released from its obligation on returning the
property; (2) That the receiver had the right to return the property,
upon complying with the terms of the contract in respect thereto; (3)
That notwithstanding the absence of a provision in the contract for-
feiting payments already made, in case of failure to complete the pur-
chase, it was open to doubt whether an action at common law would
lie to recover such payments; (4) That the dismissal of the interven-
ing petition did not necessarily involve the dismissal of the cross-
petition, and that the court might do full justice between the parties;
(5) That the receiver was as much entitled to recover the money due
upon the contract made with the railway company as with himself;
(6) That as between the railway company and the receiver, the latter
was entitled to the money, subject to any valid set-off of the oil com-
pany. Sun Flower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 313.
5. It is not necessary that a party should formally agree to be bound by
the terms of a contract to which he is a stranger, if, having knowledge
of such contract, he deliberately enters into relations with one of the
parties, which are only consistent with the adoption of such contract.
Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co., 396.
See EQUITY, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, 3, 9;
RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.
When each and all of the individuals who organize a corporation under a
state law had knowledge, or actual notice, of a defect in the title to
lands acquired by the corporation through them, their knowledge or
actual notice was knowledge or notice to the company, and if construc-
tive notice bound them it bound the company. Simmons Creek Coal
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 7, 11, 12.
The judge presiding at a trial, civil or criminal, in any court of the United
States, may express his opinion to the jury upon the questions of fact
which he submits to their determination. Simmons v. United States,
148.
See CONTRACT, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 4.
COURTS OF STATES.
See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 2;
1. An indictment on Rev. Stat. § 5209, is sufficient, which avers that the
defendant was president of a national banking association; that by
virtue of his office he received and took into his possession certain
bonds (described), the property of the association; and that, with
intent to injure and defraud the association, he embezzled the bonds
and converted them to his own use. Claassen v. United States, 140.
2. In a criminal case, a general judgment upon an indictment containing
several counts, and a verdict of guilty on each count, cannot be
reversed on error if any count is good and is sufficient to support the
judgment. lb.
3. When it is made to appear to the court during the trial of a criminal
case that, either by reason of facts existing when the jurors were
sworn, but not then disclosed or known to the court or by reason of
outside influences brought to bear on the jury pending the trial, the
jurors or any of them are subject to such bias or prejudice as not to
stand impartial between the government and the accused, the jury
may be discharged, and the defendant put on trial by another jury,
and the defendant is not thereby twice put in jeopardy, within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. Simmonds v. United States, 148.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 6, 14, 16;
EVIDENCE, 2.
1. Invoices of merchandise entitled to free entry were required in August,
1889, to conform to the requirements of sections 2853, 2854, 2855 and
2860 of the Revised Statutes. Phelps v. Siegfried, 602.
2. Soft wood boxes, imported from Sweden, containing parlor matches, or
safety matches, are not subject to duty under the act of March 3, 1883,
22 Stat. c. 121, p. 488, § 7, p. 523. Magone v. Rosenstein, 604.
3. In a suit to recover back customs duties paid under protest, where the
only question tried was, whether in re-appraisement proceedings the
importer was denied rights secured to him by law; Held, (1) It was
proper to admit in evidence a protest filed by the importer with the re-
appraisers, as a paper showing what rights the importer claimed, and
especially his claim that the merchant appraiser was not qualified;
(2) A motion to direct a verdict for the defendant was properly denied,
the court having ruled in accordance with the decision of this court in
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310, and having instructed the jury
fully and properly, and there being no exception to the charge, and a
question proper for the jury. Hedden v. Iselin, 676.
1. This being a suit to establish a deed alleged to have been executed, and
not recorded, but lost, the court holds the evidence to be entirely suffi
cient to establish the existence and loss of that deed. Simmons Creek
Coal Co. v. Doran, 417.
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