Where a statute for the condemnation of lands for a public use provides a definite and complete remedy for obtaining compensation, such remedy is exclusive. Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay and Miss. Canal Co., 254.
See RAILROAD, 2 (4); RIPARIAN OWNER, 3.
ADMIRALTY.
See WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
The commission of a trespass on real estate, and the commission of acts of waste upon it do not constitute a possession which in itself would drive the owner to an action of ejectment, and prevent him from filing a bill quia timet. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 417.
ALIEN IMMIGRANT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 24;
HABEAS CORPUS, 2.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. The statutes of Texas in relation to assignments for the benefit of cred- itors, 1 Sayles's Civil Stats. 61, 62, 68, Arts. 65a., 66c. and 658., do not contemplate an assignment of partnership property only by partners for the benefit of creditors, and while such an assignment may be valid as to creditors who accept its provisions, creditors who do not may levy upon the property conveyed by it, subject, it may be, to the rights of the accepting creditors. Kennedy v. McKee, 606.
2. The question of the construction and effect of a statute of a State, regu- lating assignments for the benefit of creditors, is a question upon which the decisions of the highest court of the State, establishing a rule of property, are of controlling authority in the courts of the United States. South Branch Lumber Co. v. Ott, 622.
3. The decisions of the highest court of Iowa with regard to the statute of that State regulating such provisions now codified in section 2115 of
the Code, hold: (1) that it does not prevent partial assignments with preferences or sales or mortgages of any or all of the party's property in payment of or security for indebtedness; its operation being limited to the matter of general assignments: (2) that several instruments, executed by a debtor at about the same time, may be considered as parts of one transaction, and as in law forming but one instrument; and if, so construed, they have the effect of a general assignment with preferences, they are within the denunciation of the statute: (3) that although several instruments may be executed by the debtor at about the same time, they do not necessarily create one transaction, nor must they necessarily be considered as one instrument; but the decision of whether they do or not, and whether they come within the denuncia- tion of the statute, or not, must depend, in each case, upon the charac- ter of the instruments, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the parties. Ib.
4. When the effect of invalidating such an assignment, without preferences on its face, by reason of previous preferential transactions claimed to be part of it, will be to let in to preference another creditor attaching after the assignment, the court will be justified in adhering to the letter of the statute, when the circumstances permit it. Ib.
1. In December, 1871, Y., who was a member of the stock exchanges in New York and in Philadelphia, was declared to be a bankrupt. At that time his seat in the New York Exchange was worth about $4000, and the other about $2000. By the rules of each, membership, in case of failure, was suspended until settlement with its members who were creditors, and the seat in each was liable to be sold and the pro- ceeds applied to the payment of the debts of such of its members. At the time of his failure the indebtedness of Y. to members of the New York Exchange amounted to about $8500, and to members of the Philadelphia Exchange to nearly $22,000. The assignees notified each exchange of their appointment, but took no steps to adjust the debts or to acquire the seats, which were appraised as of no value. Within two years Y. notified them that assessments on the seats were overdue. They told him he was the proper party to pay them, and that what he might pay would be recognized as properly to be re- funded, in case the seats should be sold by them. Y. was discharged in bankruptcy in 1873. From his private means he paid all assess- ments overdue and from time to time maturing, and eventually settled with all the creditor members. Such members had proved their debts against his estate in bankruptcy, and in the several settlements he had the benefit of the dividends (28 per cent) paid by the assign- ees. Having thus settled all such debts he was, in June, 1883, rein- stated in his membership in the Philadelphia board, and in December, 1883, in his membership in the New York board. At that time the
value of the Philadelphia seat was about $6000, and of the New York seat about $20,000. In November, 1885, the assignees filed bills against Y. and each board, to have these memberships decreed to be assets of the bankrupt's estate. Held, (1) That the assignees must be deemed to have elected not to accept these rights as property of the estate; (2) That Y. was not their trustee in expending his own money to give value to a property which was worthless and aban- doned; (3) That the assignees could not be permitted to avail them- selves of the result of his action, or to take the property to work out a return of the dividends paid to these particular creditors. Spar hawk v. Yerkes, 1.
2. Sections 5105 and 5106 of the Revised Statutes relate to different classes of debts against a bankrupt; the former to debts that are proved, the latter to debts that are provable but not proved. Scott v. Ellery, 381. 3. A mortgage creditor of a bankrupt obtained a decree for the foreclosure of the mortgage, under which the property was sold for less than the mortgage debt. He proved the remainder, deducting the amount received from the sale, in the bankruptcy proceedings. After the dis- charge of the bankrupt he obtained a decree in the foreclosure pro- ceeding against the debtor for the balance due on the mortgage debt. Held, that by proving his debt in bankruptcy he waived his right, pending the question of discharge, to take a deficiency decree against the bankrupt; that after the discharge the right to such a decree was lost altogether; that the debtor was not bound, after his discharge, to give any attention to the foreclosure suit; and that, under the cir- cumstances, the obtaining a deficiency decree amounted to a fraud in law. Ib.
A bill of exchange is not negotiated within the meaning of § 537, Rev. Stats. Missouri ed. 1879, (§ 723, ed. 1889,) while it remains in the ownership or possession of the payee. Hall v. Cordell, 116.
1. Hopkins v. McClure, 133 U. S. 380; Hale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 554; and Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 141 U. S. 679, affirmed. Ham- mond v. Johnston, 73.
2. In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, followed. McElvaine v. Brush, 155.
3. Rutherford v. Greene, 2 Wheat. 196, cited and followed. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 241.
4. Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, approved. Deseret Salt Co. v. Tarpey, 241.
5. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18, affirmed and applied. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Co. v. Todd County, 282.
6. Ayers v. Watson, 137 U. S. 584, affirmed and applied. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 417.
7. United States v. Mosby, 133 U. S. 273, affirmed and applied. Phelps v. Siegfried, 602.
8. Oberteuffer v. Robertson, 116 U. S. 499, affirmed and applied. Magone v. Rosenstein, 604.
See LACHES, 2;
PUBLIC LAND, 14.
CASES DISAPPROVED.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 16.
CASES DISTINGUISHED OR EXPLAINED.
1. New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U. S. 637, distinguished. New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Co. v. Jopes, 18.
2. Hughes v. Blake, 6 Wheat. 453, explained and distinguished from this case. Pearce v. Rice, 28.
3. Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493, examined and explained. Franklin County v. German Savings Bank, 93.
4. Medley, Petitioner, 134 U. S. 160, explained. McElvaine v. Brush, 155. 5. Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, and Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, affirmed and distinguished from this case. Chaffee County v. Potter, 355.
1. The rule of caveat emptor applies exclusively to a purchaser, who must take care, and make due inquiries, and is bound by constructive as well as by actual notice - the latter being equivalent in effect to the former: but, in applying the rule, each case must be governed, in these respects, by its own peculiar circumstances. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 417.
2. Actual and unequivocal adverse possession is notice to a purchaser of land: because it is incumbent upon him to ascertain by whom and in what right it is held, and the unexplained neglect of this duty is equiv- alent to notice. Ib.
3. In this case the defendants had such notice as to put them on inquiry, and to charge them with knowledge of the facts. Ib.
See CORPORATION;
RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.
COMMON CARRIER.
See RAILROAD, 1.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See CONTRACT, 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. In order to constitute a violation of the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his own property without due process of law, it should appear that such person has a property in the particular thing of which he is alleged to have been deprived. New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 79.
2. The contract between the city of New Orleans and the Water Works Company, which forms the basis of these proceedings, was void as being ultra vires; and, having been repudiated by the city, cannot now be set up by it as impaired by subsequent state legislation. Ib. 3. A municipal corporation, being a mere agent of the State, stands in its governmental or public character, in no contract relation with its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may be amended, changed or revoked without the impairment of any constitutional obligation; but such a corporation, in respect of its private or proprietary rights and interests, may be entitled to constitutional protection. Ib.
4. There was no contract between the city and the Water Works Com- pany, which was protected against state legislation by the Constitu- tion of the United States. lb.
5. The repeal of a statute providing that a municipal government may set off the taxes of a water company against the company's rates for water, and the substitution of a different scheme of payment in its place, does not deprive the municipality of its property without due process of law, in the sense in which the word "property" is used in the Consti- tution of the United States. Ib.
6. The provisions in the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, (§§ 491, 492,) respecting the solitary confinement of convicts condemned to death, are not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, as they are construed by the Court of Appeals of that State. Mc- Elvaine v. Brush, 155.
7. A state statute which requires every corporation, person or association operating a railroad within the State to pay an annual tax for the privilege of exercising its franchises therein, to be determined by the amount of its gross transportation receipts, and further provides that, when applied to a railroad lying partly within and partly without the State, or to one operated as a part of a line or system extending be- yond the State, the tax shall be equal to the proportion of the gross receipts in the State, to be ascertained in the manner provided by the statute, does not conflict with the Constitution of the United States; and the tax thereby imposed upon a foreign corporation, operating a line of railway, partly within and partly without the State, is one within the power of the State to levy. Maine v. Grand Trunk Rail- way Co., 217.
8. Proceedings under a state statute enacted before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if taken before its adoption, would
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