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Opinion of the Court.
company for such damages. The question, therefore, soon arose whether the payment of these damages devolved upon the United States; and this question was submitted by the Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives to the Secretary of War, and was by him referred to the Assistant Judge Advocate General. That officer held that liability for the damages incurred from the flowage of water on the lands of others, caused by the works constructed, followed the property transferred and devolved on the United States." It is true that the defendant in error could not by its deed of 1870, or by any reservation of the water power therein contained, saddle the government with the burden, but it was a burden already existing, which could not be discharged until the proper compensation had been provided. The land was not taken for the purpose of creating a water power, but for improving the navigation of the river, and there was no reason for charging the defendant in error, which had reserved the water power only, with the payment of compensation. The question of compensation is one separate and apart from the transfers of which this property was the subject, but one which in honor as well as in law was chargeable upon the public. The act of 1875 in question seems to have originated from the report of the Assistant Judge Advocate General, upon whose opinion a bill was prepared for the assumption by the United States of the company's liability for such damages. The terms of this act are broad enough to cover not only lands taken for flowage purposes, but all injury done to lands or other property by means of any part of the works of said improvement, which would include damages caused by the diversion of the water. It is true that this act, after remaining in force about thirteen years, seems to have been repealed by the deficiency bill of 1888, 25 Stat. 4, 21, which, after making appropriation for the payment of flowage damages to about 125 different claimants, declared that the United States should not be “held liable for damages heretofore or now caused by the overflow of the lands or other property of any person
unless the action or proceeding to ascertain and determine the amount
shall have been or shall
Opinion of the Court.
prior to the passage of this act; and all claims and causes of action now existing upon which no proceeding has been already or shall be taken within the time last specified to enforce the same shall be forever barred.” Congress was not obliged to keep the act of 1875 in operation forever, and reasonable opportunity having been afforded to the plaintiffs in error to obtain compensation for the damages sustained by the construction of the improvement, we think they must be deemed to have waived their right to them.
Where a statute for the condemnation of lands provides a definite and complete remedy for obtaining compensation, this remedy is exclusive; the common law remedy or proceeding is superseded by the statute, and the owner must pursue the course pointed out by it. Mills on Eminent Domain, sections 87, 88. It is true that, if the statutory remedy be incomplete or imperfect, the owner is not thereby debarred from his common law remedy and may recover his damages in an action of trespass or ejectment.
But it does not follow even from this that he has a right, especially after acquiescing in the appropriation of his land for a number of years, to take the law into his own hands, and manu forti repossess himself of his own. Thus, if a railway company, without condemnation proceedings, took possession of a lot of land for its track and ran its trains over it for the time which elapsed in this case between the building of the dam and the cutting of the embankment by the plaintiffs in error, it would scarcely be claimed that the owner could enter upon the land, tear up the rails, and throw his fences across the road-bed. Such a proceeding was attempted in State v. Hessenkamp, 17 Iowa, 25, and the result was an indictment for wilfully obstructing the track. The court declined to instruct the jury that if the defendant owned the land, and the railroad company had not obtained a right of way over it, defendant had a right to place what he pleased upon the land, and should be acquitted; and the Supreme Court said of this refusal that it was so obviously right that “we can scarcely believe it is expected of us to undertake a vindication of its correctness." So in Dunlap v. Pulley, 28 Iowa, 469, the defendant, during his term of office
Opinion of the Court.
as road supervisor, fenced up and obstructed a certain county road which had been laid out over a tract of land owned by him, claiming the right to do so upon the ground that he had never been paid a just compensation. The court held, however, that though entitled to compensation, he was entitled to it only in the manner provided by law. “If he failed to ask for compensation, or failed to apply in time, or applying, was unsuccessful in showing his right thereto, he could not, upon any principle, resist the right of the public to open the road, upon the ground that he has not been paid for injuries or losses which he claims to have sustained. If the board rejected his claim because not properly presented, because not preferred in time, or upon any ground, (having jurisdiction so to decide,) his remedy was by appeal.”
Under the circumstances of this case we do not think it was within the power of the owner of lot 5, after acquiescing for over twenty-five years in the construction of the dam, and the exclusive appropriation of the water by the State, to treat their proceedings as a nullity, and take such action as could only be justified upon the theory that the State and the Canal Company had acquired no rights by its long silence. The claim of the Water Power Company is to cut the embankment erected by authority of the State, and to draw off one-half of the surplus water power of the pond, upon the ground that it is now the owner of the southern bank of the river, and this, too, without taking any legal proceedings in assertion of this right so to do. Its position necessarily assumes that, by virtue of its ownership of lot 5 (all damages connected with lots 6 and 7 having been released by their then owner, Hunt), it is entitled to onehalf of the water created by this improvement, and that, too, without reference to the riparian rights properly appurtenant to lot 5 before the improvement was made, or to any particular fall from the upper to the lower corner of such lot. It is difficult to see how, under these circumstances, this claim can be sustained. The dam was built for a public purpose, and the act provided that if, in its construction, any water power was incidentally created, it should belong to the State, and might be sold or leased, in order that the proceeds of such sale
or lease might assist in defraying the expenses of the improrement. A ruling which would allow a single riparian owner upon the pond created by this dam to take to himself one-half of the surplus water without having contributed anything towards the creation of such surplus or to the public improvement, would savor strongly of an appropriation of public property for private use. If any such water power were incidentally created by the erection of a dam, it was obviously intended that it should belong to the public and be used for their benefit, and not for the emolument of a private riparian proprietor. The cutting of the embankment under the circumstances of this case and the appropriation of the surplus water which the Water Power Company had had no hand in creating, was a trespass which the court had a right to enjoin.
We do not undertake to say whether a bill in equity, framed upon the basis of a large amount of surplus water not used, might not lie to compel an equitable division of the same upon the ground that it would otherwise run to waste.
Our conclusion is that there was no taking of the property of the plaintiff in error without due process of law, and the decree of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.
ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA RAIL
WAY COMPANY V. TODD COUNTY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
No. 132. Argued and submitted December 18, 1891. – Decided January 4, 1892.
A decision of the Supreme Court of a State, sustaining as valid a statutory
contract of the State exempting the property of a railway company from taxation, but deciding that a certain class of property did not come within the terms of the exemption, is not an impairment of the contract by a
law of the State and is not subject to review in error here. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S.
18, affirmed and applied.
Statement of the Case.
The court stated the case as follows:
This was a proceeding to enforce payment of taxes on real estate remaining delinquent on the first Monday of January, 1886, for the county of Todd, State of Minnesota, and was tried in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of that State, which made and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered judgment for the county against the railway company for the collection of the taxes in question and the interest and penalti zs thereon together with costs. The entry of judgment was then stayed by the District Court, which certified its findings of fact and its decision in the case to the Supreme Court of the State for its consideration. The matter having been duly argued and submitted, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court below, whereupon a remittitur having been sent down, judgment was given in favor of the county and against the railway company, adjudging the lands in question liable for taxes, penalties, costs and disbursements, and that the lands be sold unless the amounts were paid accordingly, and afterwards, an appeal having been taken to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the District Court was in all things affirmed. A writ of error from this court was then allowed by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court. The opinion of that court will be found reported in 38 Minnesota, 163, and states the case as follows:
“This railway corporation in 1882 purchased 35,000 acres of land in Todd County, which, excepting an inconsiderable portion, was timbered land. The question to be determined is as to whether these lands are exempt from ordinary taxation. The lands were purchased on account of their being valuable timber lands. Since 1885 the corporation has been engaged in cutting the timber, and converting it into boards, plank, ties and lumber of all kinds. The greater part of this has been used in constructing and repairing the railroad of this corporation in this State; the remainder (about one-third) has been used for a like purpose upon that part of the road which is in the Territory of Dakota. In some places, where the timber has been cut, grass has grown up, a small quantity of which