Opinion of the Court.

to be void, namely, because both series were issued pursuant to the same vote and subject to the same conditions.

The record of the equity suit does not show clearly the ground upon which the court based its distinction between the two classes of bonds; nor is it necessary to be ascertained here. It is sufficient for the purposes of this suit to know that the validity of these bonds was directly put in issue by the pleadings, and determined adversely to the county. The plaintiff alleged in its bill that these bonds were invalid by reason of the non-compliance of the road with certain conditions precedent upon which they were issued, setting up with great particularity all the proceedings prior to the issue of the bonds; reciting the laws under which they were claimed to have been authorized; and demanding their cancellation and surrender upon the ground that the acts of the county officers were unauthorized and void, and the laws under which they were issued unconstitutional. The entire question of their validity was presented and tried upon the merits, and the court could not have dismissed the bill as to these bonds without holding that they were valid, and the further finding that the several bonds and coupons thereof "are valid and legal obligations" added nothing to the force of the decree dismissing the bill.

The defendant's position in this connection is, that as the entire record taken together shows that these bonds were void, this court ought not to treat the decree of the court below, adjudging them to be valid, as res adjudicata. It is true that there are certain authorities to the effect that, in the case of deeds, if the truth plainly appears on the face of the deed, there is, generally speaking, no estoppel, meaning simply, as stated by Mr. Bigelow, (Bigelow on Estoppel, 351,) "that all parts of the deed are to be construed together; and that if an allegation in the deed which alone would work an estoppel upon the parties is explained in another part of the deed, or perhaps another deed to which reference is made for the purpose, there is ordinarily no estoppel." Lord Coke also states certain exceptions to the conclusive effect of records, one of these being, "where the truth appears in the same record, as

Opinion of the Court.

where the defendant is sued by the wrong name and enters into a bail bond prout the writ, as he must, and then put in bail by his right name, he who was arrested is not estopped from pleading in abatement; or where the record shows that the judgment relied on as an estoppel has been reversed in error." But we know of no case which goes to the extent of holding that where a court having complete jurisdiction of the case has pronounced a decree upon a certain issue, such issue may be retried in a collateral action, even although the evidence upon which the case is heard is sent up with the record. If this were possible, then in every such case where a judgment or decree is pleaded by way of estoppel, and the record shows the evidence upon which it was rendered, the court in which the estoppel was pleaded would have the power to retry the case, and determine whether a different judgment ought not to have been rendered. The case of Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493, 503, 505, has perhaps gone as far in the direction indicated by the defendant as any case reported in the books, but it is far from being an authority for the position assumed here. That was a petition for a mandamus to enforce the collection of judgments of a Circuit Court upon certain bonds which this court had held to be invalid. The court denied the application of the relator upon the ground that, in his pleadings, he did not rely exclusively upon the judgments, but opened the facts which attended the judgments for the purpose of counting upon a certain act of the legisla ture as furnishing the remedy which he sought, and that by so doing he in effect asked the court to order the levy of a tax to pay the coupons, and relied upon the judgments principally as creating an estoppel of a denial of the power to do so. "Thus invited," said the Chief Justice, "to look through the judgments to the alleged contracts on which they are founded, and finding them invalid for want of power, must we nevertheless concede to the judgments themselves such effect, by way of estoppel, as to entitle the plaintiff, ex debito justitiæ, to a writ commanding the levy of taxes under a statute which was not in existence when these bonds were issued ? But where application is made to collect judgments by pro

Syllabus.

cess not contained in themselves, and requiring, to be sustained, reference to the alleged cause of action upon which they are founded, the aid of the court should not be granted when upon the face of the record it appears, not that mere error supervened in the rendition of such judgments, but that they rest upon no cause of action whatever." This, however, does not touch the question of the binding effect of judgments when offered in evidence in a distinct and collateral action. We know of no case holding their probative effect to be anything else than conclusive. Had the plaintiff county desired further to test the validity of these bonds, it was its duty to have appealed from this decree, as did the bank with respect to the bonds which that court held to be invalid, when the question of the validity of both issues could have been heard and determined by this court.

There was no error in the finding of the court below, and its judgment must be

Affirmed.

COGHLAN v. SOUTH CAROLINA RAILROAD COM

PANY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

No. 47. Argued October 21, 22, 1891.- Decided December 7, 1891.

When a contract for the payment of money at a future day, with interest meanwhile payable semi-annually, is made in one place, and is to be performed in another, both as to interest and principal, and the interest before maturity is payable according to the legal rate in the place of performance, the presumption is, in the absence of attendant circumstances to show the contrary, that the principal bears interest after maturity at the same rate.

The report of the master in a suit in equity to foreclose a railroad mortgage, to whom it had been referred to take proof of the claims, found as to a bondholder, that his bonds were due and unpaid, that certain coupons had been paid, and that certain other subsequent coupons had been paid, but made no mention of the intervening coupons. No exception was taken to this report. Held, that it was a reasonable inference that the claimant did not offer these coupons in proof, and that the failure to find as to them could not be urged as an objection to the final decree.

Statement of the Case.

THE Court stated the case as follows:

By an act of the general assembly of South Carolina, of December 19, 1835, the Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company was incorporated with power to construct a railroad from Charleston, South Carolina, to Cincinnati, Ohio. 8 Stats. So. Car. 409. See also 8 Stats. So. Car. 354, 355, 380, 384, 406. Subsequently, December 21, 1836, the name of that company was changed to that of the Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company. 8 Stats. So. Car. 96. By a later act, passed December 19, 1843, the name of the latter company was changed to that of the South Carolina Railroad Company, which acquired, subject to certain conditions, the rights, privileges, and property of the South Carolina Canal and Railroad Company incorporated December 19, 1827. 11 Stats. So. Car. 273

The Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company, before its change of name, and by virtue of an act of December 20, 1837, and an act amendatory thereof, passed December 19, 1838, 6 Stats. So. Car. 571, 604, issued its bonds. for the sum of about four hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, redeemable on the first day of January, 1866, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent per annum, some in denominations of £500, others of £250. The £500 bonds were in the following form:

"£500 st❜g.

£500 st❜g.

"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

"Five Per Cent Loan.

"The Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company, under the guarantee of the State of South Carolina, promise to pay to bearer five hundred pounds sterling, redeemable on the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, and not before without the consent of the holder of this certificate, with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum from the date hereof, the said interest to be paid semi-annually, on the first days of January and July, on presenting the proper coupons for the same at the house of

Statement of the Case.

Palmers, Mackillop, Dent & Co., London, where the principal will also be redeemed on the surrender of this certificate.

"In witness whereof the said company has "[SEAL.] caused its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed, at Charleston, this 31st day of December, 1838.

"ROB'T Y. HAYNE, President.

"E. H. Edwards, Sec'y & Treas'r."

To each bond a warrant or coupon was attached in this form: "Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company, warrant No. 49, for £12 108., being half yearly interest on bond C. No. 18, payable January 1, 1863. E. H. Edwards, Treas'r." These warrants were endorsed: "Payable at Messrs. Palmers, Mackillop, Dent & Co."

The £250 bonds were in the same form as the ones of larger amount, the coupons or warrants calling only for £6 58. in

terest.

Upon the back of each bond was endorsed the above act of December 20, 1837, in these words:

"An act to lend the credit of the State to secure any loan which may be made by the Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company, and for other purposes. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, now met and sitting in General Assembly, and by the authority of the same, That the faith and funds of the State of South Carolina be, and the same are hereby, pledged to secure the punctual payment of any contract which shall be made for borrowing money by the Louisville, Cincinnati and Charleston Railroad Company from any person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, to any amount not exceeding two millions of dollars, either in the United States or in Europe; and when such contract or contracts shall be made by bond or bonds, certificate or certificates, or other instrument or instruments, signed by the president of the said company, under its seal, and countersigned by the secretary thereof, it shall be the duty of the comptroller general of this State to endorse thereon that the faith and funds of the State