by the law, the claimant himself (neither on his own motion, nor under the guidance of those who are legally responsible for his actions in this claim) had not made application to be rated in pursuance of the act of June 18, 1874, but, on the contrary thereof, had asked to be rated and had been rated at $36 per month, under the act of February 28, 1877."

The decision proceeds to discuss further the reasons for the conclusion to which the commissioner had come.

of the peace of the District of Columbia; and a commission in due form was signed by the president appointing him such justice, and the seal of the United States was duly affixed thereto by the secretary of state; but the commission had not been handed to Marbury when the offices of the government were transferred to the administration of President Jefferson. Mr. Madison, the new secretary of state, refused to deliver the commission, and a mandamus was applied for to this court to compel him to do so. The court The relator, by his counsel, strenuously held that the appointment had been made contends that the concession made by the and completed, and that Marbury was enti commissioner with regard to the disability of tled to his commission, and that the delivery the relator shows that it was his clear duty of it to him was a mere ministerial act, to have granted a certificate for the larger which involved no further official discretion pension of $72 per month. The following on the part of the secretary, and could be enpassage in the petition for mandamus shows forced by mandamus. But the court did not the position taken by the relator: "And your issue the writ, because it would have been relator further says that the respondent has an exercise of original jurisdiction which it thus expressly found the facts in your rela- did not possess. While this opinion will altor's case to be (1) that while your relator was ways be read by the student with interest in the military service. * * he sus- and profit, it has not been considered as intained such wounds and injuries as resulted vested with absolute judicial authority, exin the loss of his right hand and right foot, cept on the question of the original jurisdicand at the same time sustaining injury to the tion of this court. The decision on this point head; (2) that your relator was thereby ren- has made it necessary for parties desiring to dered totally and permanently helpless, re- compel an officer of the government to perquiring from thence till now the regular aid form an act in which they are interested to and attendance of another person; and (3) resort to the highest court of the District of that your relator applied to the commissioner Columbia for redress. It has been held in of pensions on June 26, 1880, for pension on numerous cases, and was held after special account thereof. And your relator says that discussion in the cases of Kendall y. U. S., 12 upon this finding of the facts whether he is Pet. 524, and U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378, entitled to a rerating and an increase of pen- that the former circuit court of the District, sion from date of discharge, so as to give and the present supreme court of the Disunto him a pension commensurate with his trict, respectively, were invested with plendisabilities so found to exist by the respond-ary jurisdiction on the subject. On this ent, is a question of law; and that it does not lie in the discretionary power of the respondent, as commissioner of pensions, to deny or in anywise abridge his rights with respect thereto."

point there is no further question.

The two leading cases which authoritatively show when the supreme court of the District may, and when it may not, grant a mandamus against an executive officer, are the above-cited case of Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. 524, and Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497. The subsequent cases have followed the principles laid down in these, and do little more than illustrate and apply them. In the former case the mandamus was granted, and the decision was affirmed by this court. The case was shortly this: Stockton & Stokes, as contractors for carrying the mails, had certain claims against the government for extra services, which they insisted should be credited in their accounts, and a controversy arose between them and the post-office department on the subject. Congress passed an act for their relief, by which the solicitor of the treasury was authorized and directed to settle and adjust their claims, and make them such allowances as upon a full examination of all the evidence might seem to be equitable and right; and the postmaster general was directed to credit them with whatever sums the solicitor should decide to be due them. The solicitor, after due investigation, made his report, and stated the sums due to Stockton & Stokes on the claims made

This extract shows the theory of the peti*ioner, and the doctrine which he invokes in support of his application. We have been more full in stating the facts of the case in order that the legal grounds on which that application is based may clearly appear. The case does not require an extended discussion. The questions of law on which it depends have been closed by repeated decisions of this court. The amenability of an executive officer to the writ of mandamus, to compel him to perform a duty required of him by law, was discussed by Chief Justice MARSHALL in his great opinion in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; and the radical distinction was there pointed out between acts performed by such officers in the exercise of their executive functions, which the chief justice calls political acts, and those of a mere ministerial character; and the rule was distinctly laid down that the writ will not be issued in the former class of cases, but will be issued in the latter. In that case President Adams had nominated, and the senate had confirmed, Marbury as a justice

er.

by them; but the postmaster general, Mr. | head of one of the executive departments of Kendall, refused to give them credit as di- the government, in the ordinary discharge of rected by the law. This the court held he his official duties. In general, such duties, could be compelled to do by mandamus, be- whether imposed by act of congress or by rescause it was simply a ministerial duty to be olution, are not mere ministerial duties. performed, and not an official act requiring | The head of an executive department of the any exercise of judgment or discretion. This government, in the administration of the vacourt, through Mr. Justice THOMPSON, said:rious and important concerns of his office, is "The act required by the law to be done by continually required to exercise judgment the postmaster general is simply to credit the and discretion. He must exercise his judgrelators with the full amount of the award ment in expounding the laws and resolutions of the solicitor. This is a precise, definite of congress, under which he is from time to act, purely ministerial, and about which the time required to act. If he doubts, he has a postmaster general had no discretion whatev-right to call on the attorney general to assist The law upon its face shows the exist-him with his counsel; and it would be diffience of accounts between the relators and the cult to imagine why a legal adviser was propost-office department. No money was re- vided by law for the heads of the departquired to be paid, and none could be drawn ments, as well as for the president, unless from the treasury without further legisla- their duties were regarded as executive, in tive provision, if this credit should over- which judgment and discretion were to be balance the debit standing against the re- exercised. If a suit should come before this lators. But this was a matter with which court which involved the construction of any the postmaster general had no concern. He of these laws, the court certainly would not was not called upon to furnish the means of be bound to adopt the construction given by paying such balance, if any should be found. the head of a department; and, if they supHe was simply required to give the credit. posed his decision to be wrong, they would, This was not an official act in any other of course, so pronounce their judgment. But sense than being a transaction in the depart- their judgment upon the construction of a ment where the books and accounts were law must be given in a case in which they kept; and was an official act in the same have jurisdiction, and in which it is their sense that an entry in the minutes of a court, duty to interpret the act of congress, in orpursuant to an order of the court, is an of- der to ascertain the rights of the parties in ficial act. There is no room for the exercise the cause before them. The court could not of any discretion, official or otherwise; all entertain an appeal from the decision of one that is shut out by the direct and positive of the secretaries, nor revise his judgment, in command of the law, and the act required to any case where the law authorized him to exbe done is, in every just sense, a mere minis-ercise discretion or judgment. Nor can it terial act."

by mandamus act directly upon the officer,
and guide and control his judgment or dis-
cretion in the matters committed to his care,
in the ordinary discharge of his official du-
ties. The case before us illustrates these
principles, and shows the difference between
executive and ministerial acts." The chief
justice then goes on to show that the decis-
ion of the secretary of the navy in that case
was entirely executive and official in its char-
acter, and that in this respect the case dif-
fered entirely from that of Kendall v. U. S.

The

In the other case (Decatur v. Paulding) the mandamus was refused by the circuit court, and that decision was also affirmed by this court. The case was this: On the 3d of March, 1837, congress passed an act giving to the widow of any officer who had died in the naval service a pension equal to half of his monthly pay from the time of his death until her death or marriage. On the same day congress passed a resolution granting a pension to Mrs. Decatur, widow of Stephen Decatur, for five years, commencing June The principle of law. deducible from these 30, 1834, and the arrearages of the half pay two cases is not difficult to enounce. of a post captain from Commodore Decatur's court will not interfere by mandamus with death to the 30th of June, 1834. Mrs. Deca- the executive officers of the government in tur applied for and received her pension un- the exercise of their ordinary.official duties, der the general law, with a reservation of her even where those duties require an interpretarights under the resolution, claiming the tion of the law, the court having no appellate pension granted by that also. The secretary power for that purpose; but when they refuse of the navy, acting under the opinion of the to act in a case at all, or when, by special attorney general, decided that she could not statute or otherwise, a mere ministerial duty have both. Thereupon she applied for a is imposed upon them, that is, a service mandamus to compel the secretary to com- which they are bound to perform without ply with the resolution in her favor. Chief further question, then, if they refuse, a Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the mandamus may be issued to compel them. court, and laid down the law in terms that Judged by this rule, the present case presents have never been departed from. We can only quote a single passage from this opinion. The chief justice says: "The duty required by the resolution was to be performed by him [the secretary, of the navy] as the

3P.H.CAS.-158

no difficulty. The commissioner of pensions did not refuse to act or decide. He did act and decide. He adopted an interpretation of the law adverse to the relator, and his decision was confirmed by the secretary of the in2513

terior, as evidenced by his signature of the of the patent was a ministerial matter for certificate. Whether, if the law were prop- which a mandamus would lie. This case, erly before us for consideration, we should like that of U. S. v. Schurz, is unlike the be of the same opinion, or of a different opin- present. All deliberation had ceased; the ion, is of no consequence in the decision of right of Gill, the applicant, was adjudged; this case. We have no appellate power over there was nothing to be done but to deliver the commissioner, and no right to review his to the party the documentary evidence of his decision. That decision, and his action taken title. That was a mere ministerial matter. thereon, were made and done in the exercise | We think that the mandamus was properly of his official functions. They were by no means merely ministerial acts.

refused, and the judgment of the supreme court of the district is affirmed.

No. 992 is similar in all essential respects to the preceding, and the decision must be the same. Judgment affirmed.

The decisions of this court, which have been rendered since the cases referred to, corroborate and confirm all that has been said. The following are the most important, No. 993 differs materially from Nos. 991 to-wit: Brashear v. Mason, 6 How. 92; U. and 992. Charles R. Miller, the relator, havS. v. Guthrie, 17. How. 284; Commissioner ing made an unsuccessful application to the v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 522; Georgia v. Stanton, commissioner of pensions for an increase 6 Wall. 50; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. of his pension, finally appealed to the secre347; U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378; Butter-tary of the interior, and in his petition for worth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. mandamus says as follows, to-wit: "That 25. In the two last cases cited, the man- the secretary, upon a personal, careful indamus was granted; and they were cases in spection of the record, and all the evidence which it was held that a mere ministerial filed therein in his case, and on due considduty was to be performed by the officer. In eration thereof, made and rendered the folU. S. v. Schurz the question related to a pat-lowing official decision: DEPARTMENT OF ent for land claimed by a pre-emptor. All THE INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, D. C., Februthe proceedings had been gone through, the ary 12, 1885. The Commissioner of Pensions right of the applicant had been affirmed, the -SIR: Herewith are returned the papers in patent had been made out in the land-office, the pension claim (certificate No. 55,356) of signed by the president, sealed with the land- Charles R. Miller. It appears from the paoffice seal, countersigned by the recorder of pers that Mr. Miller's claim was before this the land-office, recorded in the proper book, | department on the 6th inst., and it was held and transmitted to the local land-officers for that the pensioner is greatly disabled, and it delivery; but delivery was refused because is evident from the papers in his case that he instructions had been received from the com- is utterly unable to do any manual labor, and missioner to return the patent. The plea he is therefore entitled to $30 per month unwas that it had been discovered that the der the act of March 3, 1883, which has been lands belonged to a town-site. The court allowed him by your office. Since the deheld that this was an insufficient plea; that partmental decision above referred to, the the title had passed to the applicant, and he papers in the claim have been carefully rewas entitled to his patent, subject to any considered by the department, and a personal equity which other parties might have to the examination of the pensioner made; and it land, or to a proceeding for setting the pat- satisfactorily appears that he is unable to put ent aside; and that the duty of the commis- on his shoe and stocking on the foot of his sioner or secretary of the interior had become injured leg, for the reason that the nearest a mere ministerial duty to deliver the instru- point that can be reached by hand from foot ment, as was held in Marbury v. Madison, in is 23 inches, and for the further reason that relation to the commission of Marbury as from "necrosis of the lower vertebræ of justice of the peace. Of course, this case is spine, producing anchylosis of the spinal entirely different from the case now under column and destruction of some of the spinal consideration. nerves," he is unable to bend his back. The case of Butterworth v. Hoe was very After a careful review of all the facts in this similar in principle to that of U. S. v. Schurz. case, the department is constrained to think The commissioner of patents had decided in that the pensioner comes under the meaning favor of the right of one Gill, an applicant of the laws granting pensions to those perfor a patent, in a case of interference, and ad-sons who require aid and attendance. judged that a patent should issue to his assigns accordingly. An appeal was taken to the secretary of the interior, who reversed the decision of the commissioner. The latter thereupon, and for that reason, refused to issue a patent. It was a question whether an appeal lay to the secretary of the interior, and this court held that it did not, and that he had no jurisdiction in the matter. The court, therefore, held that the patent ought to be issued in accordance with the decision of the commissioner, and that the mere issue

The

decision of the 6th inst. is therefore overruled. Very respectfully, H. M. TELLER, Secretary.' And your orator avers that the said official decision of the secretary of the interior, so made as aforesaid, was a final adjudication of his claim in his favor, and conclusively establishes his right under the laws to be rerated at $25 per month from June 6, 1866; $31.25 per month from June 4, 1872; $50 per month from June 4, 1874; and $72 per month from June 17, 1878,-and to be paid the difference monthly between these sums

sue.

and what has been allowed him; and all that remained for the commissioner of pensions to do in the premises was the simple ministerial duty of accordingly carrying the said final official decision of the secretary into execution." The petition goes on to state that the former commissioner of pensions refused to carry out the secretary's decision to its full extent, and that the present commissioner, the respondent, still refuses. If, as the petition suggests, the commissioner of pensions refuses to carry out the decision of his superior officer, there would seem to be prima facie ground for at least calling upon him to show cause why a mandamus should not isThis was all that the petitioner asked, and this the court refused. As a general rule, when a superior tribunal has rendered a decision binding on an inferior, it becomes the ministerial duty of the latter to obey it and carry it out. So far as respects the matter decided, there is no discretion or exercise of judgment left. This is the constant course in courts of justice. The appellate court will not hesitate to issue a mandamus to compel obedience to its decisions. The appellate tribunal in the present case is the secretary of the interior, who has no power to enforce his decisions by mandamus, or any process of like nature; and therefore a resort to a judicial tribunal would seem to be necessary, in order to afford a remedy to the party injured by the refusal of the commissioner to carry out his decision. But it is suggested that removal of the contumacious subordinate from office, or a civil suit brought against him for damages, would be effectual remedies. We do not concur in this view. A suit for damages, if it could be maintained, would be an uncertain, tedious, and ineffective remedy, attended with many contingencies, and burdened with onerous expenses. Removal from office would be still more unsatisfactory. It would depend on the arbitrary discretion of the president, or other appointing power, and is not such a remedy as a citizen of the United States is entitled to demand. We think that the case suggested by the petition is one in which it would be proper for the court to interfere by mandamus. Whether it will turn out to be such, when all the circumstances are known, can be ascertained by a rule to show cause; and such a rule, we think, ought to have been granted. The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to grant a rule to show cause as applied for by the petitioner.

Judgments will be entered separately in the several cases.