By the Statute of Enrolments, 27 Hen. VIII. c. 16, every bargain and sale of a freehold interest is to be enrolled in Chancery within six (lunar) months after its date.

general name of Saxons, as unto this day (1605) they are of the Welsh and Irish called, yet did he rather choose and ordain that they should be all called Englishmen, as but a part of them before was called, and that the country should be No assurance by a tenant-in-tail, under the called England. To the affectation of which 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74, will have any operation name of Englishmen, it should seem he was unless it be enrolled in the Court of Chancery chiefly moved in respect of Pope Gregory, his within six calendar months after its execution, alluding the name of Engelisce unto Angellyke. which enrolment will be sufficient of itself, even The name of Engel is yet at this present in all where the conveyance is by bargain and sale, the Teutonic tongues, to wit, the high and low within the Statute of Enrolments. This provi Duitsh, &c., as much to say as Angel, and if a sion does not extend to copyholds, the enrolment Dutchman be asked how he would in his lan- then being on the court-rolls of the manor. guage call an Angellykeman, he would answer If a party to a suit in equity, who has obtained ein Engelsch-man, and being asked how in his a decree or order, is desirous of preventing a own language he would or doth call an English-rehearing of the cause before the judge proman, he can give no other name for him, but nouncing the same, or of preventing an appeal even the very same that he gave before for an to the Lord Chancellor, or Lords Justices of Angellykeman, that is, as before is said, ein Appeal, it must be enrolled. So also where a Engelsch-man; Engel being in their tongue an decree is pronounced either by the Master of the Angel; and English, which they write Engelsche, Rolls, or one of the Vice-Chancellors, and the Angellyke. And such reason and consideration party, instead of appealing to the Lord Chanmay have moved our former kings, upon their cellor, or Lords Justices of Appeal, is desirous best coin of pure and fine gold, to set the image of appealing at once to the House of Lords, the of an angel, which may be supposed has as well decree must first be enrolled. The effect of been used before the Roman conquest as since. enrolling a decree of the Lord Chancellor, is to "Thus the name generally of Saxons was by prevent its being reheard by him. After a decree the ordinance of noble King Egbert, about the is enrolled, it can only be reversed or altered year of our Lord 800, brought into the general either by appeal to the House of Lords or by name of Englishmen, which being a name of bill of review. It may be enrolled immediately such glory, as the derivation sheweth it, ever may after it has been passed and entered, unless a they with all increase of honor therein continue. caveat have been entered, and then, if the party "The country was accordingly called Enga- entering it does not present his petition of apland, and by abbreviation England, a name peal or rehearing within twenty-eight days, the which well accords unto two significations, for enrolment may be perfected. The order of 17th first it seems to have had it by reason of the March, 1843, diminished expenses of enrolment English people, whose land it now was; and of decrees and orders: and the ninety-first of the secondly, in regard of the form or fashion there- Orders, 8th May, 1845, gave the defendant power of, for that it grows unto a narrowness both to- to vacate under certain circumstances. The enwards the north and towards the west: the name rolment may be vacated generally where the of the first, or old England, whereof before I merits have not been gone into, or the decree have spoken, having risen (as most apparently was obtained and enrolled through the neglect it seemeth) for like cause and reason of the of the opposite solicitor, or where it was obtained straightness or narrowness thereof." by surprise.

ENGLECERY, or ENGLESCHERIE (fr. Engleceria, Lat.), the being an Englishman.14 Edw. III. st. 1, c. 4.

ENGROSSER, he that purchases large quantities of any commodity, in order to sell it at a high price. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 24.

ENICIA PARS. See ESNECY.

Enitia pars semper præferenda est propter privilegium ætatis. Co. Litt. 166. (The part of the elder sister is always to be preferred, on account of the privilege of age.)

ENLARGER L'ESTATE, a species of release which enures by way of enlarging an estate, and consists of a conveyance of the ulterior interest to the particular tenant; as if there be tenant for life or years, remainder to another in fee, and he in remainder releases all his right to the particular tenant and his heirs, this gives him the estate in fee.--1 Step. Com. 521.

ENLARGING STATUTES. See AcT or
PARLIAMENT.

ENPLEET, anciently used for implead.
ENQUETS. See INQUEST.
ENQUIRY. See INQUIRY.

ENROLMENT, register, record; writing in which anything is recorded.

ENS, being, or existence.

ENSCHEDULE, to insert in a list, account, or writing.

ENSIENT, or ENSEINT, pregnancy.

ENTAIL (fr.feudum talliatum, Lat., entaillé, Fr., from tailler, to cut), an estate settled with regard to the rule of its descent. See TAIL.

ENTAILED MONEY, money directed to be invested in realty to be entailed.-3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 74, ss. 70, 71, 72. See TAIL.

ENTENDMENT. See INTENDMENT.

ENTERING SHORT. When bills are paid into a banker's hands to receive the amount when due, this is what is called "entering them short;" and although the banker may indorse them away for a valuable consideration, yet, if he fail with them in his hands, the assignees must give them up, or the amount, if received, deducting of course any set-off. And bills in the hands of a factor are subject to the same rules.

ENTERPLEADER. See INTERPLEADER. ENTIRETY, (fr. entier, Fr.), the whole, and not barely a part. Completeness.

ENTIRE TENANCY, a sole possession by one person, called severalty, which is contrary

Such an officer is mentioned in the statutes of, formal deed or a written memorandum, notice some of the cathedrals of the old foundation in being given to the trustees in order to preserve England. the priority.

(4.) Where a debtor deposits the title-deeds of his estate with his creditor or some person on EPOCH, or EPOCHA (fr. ¿ñozǹ, Gk., a his behalf, without even a verbal communication. pause), the time at which a new computation is The deposit itself is deemed evidence of an exbegun; the time whence dates are numbered.-ecuted agreement or contract for a mortgage of Encyc. Lond. such estate.

seisin and possession of the land under an elegit, without notice of the equitable mortgage. -Whitworth v. Gangain, 3 Hare, 416 (1844), affirmed by Lord Lyndhurst, 1 Ph. 728. A depositee of title-deeds is entitled to priority over a subsequent legal mortgagee or purchaser, who lent or paid his money with notice of the deposit, but not in the absence of such notice; for then the equities of these parties being equal, the law must prevail.

A deposit in the hands of one person will not secure an advance made by another person, unless the former person be merely a trustee, who has not lent any money upon it.

An equitable mortgage being a contract for a mortgage, the mortgagee may file a bill or claim in Equity, either for a legal mortgage, a foreclosure and conveyance, or a sale.

not to say anything of the doubtful policy (even if it were practicable) of reducing moral motives to legal compulsions.

(2.) Taken, however, in a less universal sense, Equity is used in contradistinction to strict law. This is Moral Equity, which should be the genius of every kind of human jurisprudence; since it expounds and limits the language of the positive laws, and construes them not according to their strict letter, but rather in their reasonable and benignant spirit.

Aristotle, in his discussion concerning Moral Equity, Ethics, B. V. c. x., calls it the correction of mere law, which (being altogether universal, and it not being possible to treat a subject exhaustively, when speaking universally) takes the most obvious case, from an impossibility of providing for every possible predicament in express Where an equitable mortgagor is a trader liable words. Now, this fault is not in the law, nor the to bankruptcy, the deposit should be accompanied legislature, but in the nature of the thing itself; with a written memorandum; because then, in for the subject-matter of human conduct is altocase of bankruptcy, the mortgagee will be enti-gether of this description. When, therefore, the tled to the costs of his petition to the court for law speaks universally, and a matter happens the sale of the property. These he will not be somewhat differing from the case provided for, entitled to in the absence of such a memorandum. then it is proper that where the legislator falls See Lord Loughborough's General Order in short, and has erred from speaking generally, to Bankruptcy, of the 8th March, 1794, and the fill up the deficiency, as the legislator would himRules in Bankruptcy, 55—58. self direct if he were present, or, as he would have included in the law, if he had anticipated the matter. This, then, is the nature of Moral Equity, that it is a rectification or correction of justice, where it is deficient from speaking uniA mere depositary of a lease cannot be com-versally, for this is the reason why all things are pelled to take a legal assignment so as to enable the lessor to sue him at law on the covenants in the lease, nor is he liable to them until he has made himself legal assignee.

Where an equitable mortgage is satisfied upon a bankruptcy, no release from him is necessary, nor will the expense of it, if taken, be allowed in the solicitor's bill.

For further information on this subject, consult 1 White & Tudor's Lead. Cas. 440-450. [4 Kent's Com. 169.]

EQUITABLE WASTE. See WASTE. EQUITY (fr. Equitas, Lat.). There seems to be some confusion with regard to the meaning of Equity, as a scheme of jurisprudence, distinct from the common and ecclesiastical laws. This confusion would appear to be a result of not sufficiently distinguishing before defining. "Equity" is obviously an equivocal term: the difficulty then lies in drawing dividing lines between the several senses in which it is used. Its three leading senses, however, are distinguishable in this way:

(1,) Taken broadly and philosophically, Equity means to do to all men as we would they should do unto us, compendiously enjoined in the Justinian Pandects, honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere. This is Natural Equity, which, being derived from the principles of universal truth and justice, prescribes piety and reverence towards GoD, the Maker and Disposer of us all; honesty and benevolence to one another, by doing good and eschewing evil; and chastity and temperance in our own life and actions. It is clear that human tribunals cannot cope with so wide a range of duties as Natural Equity comprehends; not only on account of the difficulty of framing laws to enforce them, but also from the impracticableness of compelling such obligations as piety. gratitude, charity, and kindness, which are binding in conscience only;

not directed by positive law, that on every casual subject, it is impossible to forecast a law. And Lord Bacon has said, "there is no law under Heaven which is not supplied with Equity; for, summum jus, summa injuria; or, as some have it, summa lex, summa crux.” If thou take all that the words of the law giveth thee, thou shalt sometimes do against the law! From the application of Moral Equity, to "fetch out the sense of the legislator," spring the several rules for the interpretation of law, and the guidance of that judgment, which, unfettered by the mere letter, decides a controversy in accordance with the spirit of the given provision.

Ratio legis est anima legis. So that Moral Equity, being the sound and judicial exposition of a law, is, or ought to be, the active principle at work in every Court of Justice. In omnibus, maxime tamen in jure, æquitas spectanda est.

(3.) But it is in neither of these senses that Equity is to be understood as the substantial justice which is expounded by our courts of Chancery. It is here accepted in a more limited and technical sense, and may be called Municipal Equity, and described as the system of supplemental law administered in Chancery, and founded upon defined rules, recorded precedents, and established principles, to which it closely adheres; the judges, however, liberally expounding and developing them, in order to meet novel exigencies. While it aims to assist the defects of the common law, by extending relief to those rights of property which the strict law does not recognize, and by giving more ample and distributive redress than the ordinary tribunals afford, it by no means either controls, mitigates, or supersedes the common law, but rather guides it

self by its analogies, and does not assume any power to subvert its doctrines. This is amply shown by two well-known maxims of the Court of Chancery, viz., Equitas sequitur legem, and Where the Equities are equal the Common Law must prevail.

lor, and prolocutor of the House of Lords. The writs for a new Parliament issue out of this department; but in case of a vacancy during the session, the Speaker, on the motion of a member, directs the Clerk of the Crown, by warrant, to issue a new writ. The Petty Bag Office is in The grand characteristic of Municipal Equity this jurisdiction; it is a Court of Common Law is displayed in the nature and extent of its re- and of Record; pleas of scire facias to repeal dress. Not content, as the common law gene-letters-patent are here exhibited, together with rally is, to adjudicate strictly and absolutely in many other matters, and all original writs issue rem, i. e. upon the transaction itself, as it is pre- hereout. sented by the litigants; Equity insists upon the conscientious obligations of the suitors, and by adjudicating in personam, compels an actual completion of the matter intended to be accomplished by the parties, adjusting, qualifying, and restraining their several and sometimes conflicting rights, duties, and interests. It also grapples with anticipated injuries, by preventing the perpetration of meditated or threatened mischief; a very wholesome prerogative, since an interdictive power is more valuable and frequently of much greater efficacy than a merely compensative or punitory function.

An Equity judge pronounces his decision upon the proofs, arguments, and merits presented to him without the assistance of a jury; yet, if a serious doubt be entertained as to a question of fact, the court may direct an issue upon it to be tried by a judge and jury at common law, and may now itself impanel a jury to award damages to an injured party either in addition to or in substitution for an injunction or specific performance, pursuant to "The Chancery Amendment Act, 1858"-21 & 22 Vict. c. 27. The mode of taking evidence has lately undergone considerable alteration by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 28, which abolished the system of examining witnesses upon written interrogatories, unless specially ordered by the court; and enacted by its sections 30, 31, and 32, that allegations shall be verified by affidavit, unless either party elect to have the evidence taken orally either by an examiner, in town, or one specially appointed in the country, who then records it in the form of a narrative, the witnesses being subjected to examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and reexamination in the presence of the suitors, their counsel, and solicitors; the public, however, or a short-hand writer, not being admitted, unless allowed by such examiner. See 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, ss. 28-41, and Orders of 7th of August, 1852, pl. 31-39, and of 13th Jan. 1855. Also Wright v. Wilkin, 6 W. R. (V.C. K.) 643 (1858).

Any attempt to trace the origin and growth of Equity-Jurisprudence can only excite curiosity, without satisfying inquiry; for, although less ancient than the common law, yet, like many a venerable institution, its birth is hidden among the disruptions of systems during our elder time, and its progress shrouded amidst the haze and palpable obscure of our mediæval history; so that authenticity is unattainable, and all that is left to an antiquary, examining the sparse and disjected materials, is at best the moulding of an ingenious theory, or the construction of a plausible myth.

The jurisdiction of Chancery is fourfold:— 1st. The Common Law or Ordinary jurisdiction, by which the Lord Chancellor is a privy council

2d. The Statutory jurisdiction. Here the Lord Chancellor exercises his power under the celebrated Habeas Corpus Act, inquires into charitable uses, and had the appeal in bankruptcy, now exercised by the Lords Justices of Appeal. Under this jurisdiction the Judges in Chancery are intrusted with numerous authorities which are conferred upon them wholly and solely by acts of Parliament. The Statutes which regulate or enlarge the Equity jurisdiction, are not to be classed under this division.

3d. The Specially Delegated jurisdiction. Under this head the Lord Chancellor and the Lords Justices of Appeal have exclusive authority over the persons and property of idiots and lunatics.

4th. The Equity or Extraordinary jurisdiction. It has been suggested, and with great propriety, that the usual arrangement of Equity principles is by no means analytical or clear, and that the particulars of such jurisdiction would have been better arranged under two principal branches: as, first, in favor of creditors or claimants, who seek to establish some claim; and, secondly, on behalf of parties, who seek to resist some present or future claim. Such an arrangement would, no doubt, be more lucid and philosophical; but inasmuch as the best treatises have adopted the usual divisions of the subject, I will follow them, rather than this more preferable system, because, from being more known, they will be less confusing,

The Equity or Extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, then, is distributable into three subdivisions, namely:

(I.) The Assistant, being auxiliary to the Common Law, under which range matters of

(a.) Discovery for the promotion of substantive justice at Common Law.

(b.) Preservation of testimony relating to a question at law, from persons not being the litigants.

(c.) Removal of improper impediments, and prevention of unconscientious defences, at Common Law.

(d.) Giving effect to, and relieving from the
consequences of, Common Law judgments.
(II.) The Concurrent with the Common Law,
comprehending—

(a.) The remedial correction of fraud.
(b.) The prevention of fraud by injunction.
(c.) Accident.
(d.) Mistake.
(e.) Account.
(f) Dower.

(g.) Interpleader.

(h. The delivery up of documents and spe

cific chattels.

(2.) The specific performance of agreements.