Federalist Government in Principle and PracticeDonald P. Racheter, Richard E. Wagner Federalism has generally been characterized as a system of government that is friendly to liberty. It is not obvious, though, why this should be so. Federalism is a form of government where citizens simultaneously reside in at least two governments, each of which has independent authority to tax and to regulate. By contrast, in a unitary form of government citizens face only one government with independent authority to tax and regulate. At first glance, it would seem a bit strange to claim that liberty is more secure when citizens are members of two governments with independent authority than when they are members of only one such government. The relationship between federalism and liberty turns out to be a complex one, and one that is capable of working in either direction. Whether federalism supports or erodes liberty depends on importantly on the institutional framework within which federalist governance takes place. The essays in Federalist Government in Principle and Practice examine this institutionalist theme from both theoretical and practical perspectives. |
Contents
Competitive Federalism in Institutional Perspective | 19 |
39 | 38 |
Fiscal Competition in a Federal System | 55 |
List of Figures and Tables | 78 |
Immobile Taxation in a World of Mobility | 97 |
111 | 110 |
Federalism and Commercial Regulation | 133 |
Other editions - View all
Federalist Government in Principle and Practice Donald P. Racheter,Richard E. Wagner Limited preview - 2001 |
Federalist Government in Principle and Practice Donald P. Racheter,Richard E. Wagner No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
action activities AFDC agencies agricultural Amendment American American Heritage Rivers authority autonomy Basque Autonomous Community Basque Country benefits Benson Bruce Yandle bureaucrats centralized charter schools citizens Commerce Clause Congress constitutional costs created decentralization decisions deregulation districts Economic Development economic growth effects efficient environmental European European Union example expenditures externalities federal government Federalist finance fiscal Fiscal Federalism funds grazing Heritage Foundation impact imposed income increase industries institutional interest groups interjurisdictional competition interstate commerce issue Journal jurisdiction land trusts legislation levels of government Leviathan limits member-states nation-states national government OECD ownership percent political problems production programs protection Public Choice reduce regional governments regulation regulatory rent-seeking responsibility revenue sharing Sagebrush Rebellion sales tax sector sovereignty Supreme Court tax competition tax incentives tax rates taxation Test transfers United Washington wealth welfare recipients welfare reform Western wetlands Wicksellian Wisconsin