1. Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U. S. 584, affirmed and applied. In re Kemmler,
436.
2. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, has never been questioned
and is again affirmed. District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 450.
3. Hartranft v. Oliver, 125 U. S. 525, affirmed and applied to this case.
Sherman v. Robertson, 570.
4. Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, affirmed and applied to this case.
Irwin v. San Francisco Union, 578.
5. Glenn v. Fant, 134 U. S. 398; Raimond v. Terrebonne Parish, 132 U. S.
192; Andes v. Slauson, 130 U. S. 435; and Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S.
604; affirmed and applied to the stipulation filed in this case by coun-
sel, the jury being waived. Davenport v. Paris, 580.
CHARITABLE USES.
See MORMON CHURCH.
CONFLICT OF LAW.
See LOCAL LAW, 11.
1. An agency of a line of railroad between Chicago and New York, estab-
lished in San Francisco for the purpose of inducing passengers
going from San Francisco to New York to take that line at Chicago,
but not engaged in selling tickets for the route, or receiving or paying
out money on account of it, is an agency engaged in interstate com-
merce; and a license-tax imposed upon the agent for the privilege of
doing business in San Francisco is a tax upon interstate commerce,
and is unconstitutional. McCall v. California, 104.
2. A railroad which is a link in a through line of road by which passengers
and freight are carried into a State from other States and from that
State to other States, is engaged in the business of interstate commerce;
and a tax imposed by such State upon the corporation owning such
road for the privilege of keeping an office in the State, for the use of
its officers, stockholders, agents and employés (it being a corporation
created by another State) is a tax upon commerce among the States,
and as such is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Norfolk and Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114.
3. A State is not liable to pay interest on its debts, unless its consent to
pay it has been manifested by an act of its legislature, or by a lawful
contract of its executive officers. United States v. North Carolina,
211.
4. On bonds of the State of North Carolina, expressed to be redeemable
on a day certain at a bank in the city of New York, with interest at
the rate of six per cent a year, payable half-yearly "from the date of
this bond and until the principal be paid, on surrendering the proper
coupons hereto annexed;" and issued by the Governor and Treasurer
of the State under the statute of December 22, 1852, c. 10, which pro-
vides that the principal of such bouds shall be made payable on a day
named therein, that coupons of interest shall be attached thereto, and
that both bonds and coupons shall be made payable at some bank or
place in the city of New York, or at the public treasury in the capital
of the State, and makes no mention of interest after the date at which
the principal is payable; the State is not liable to pay interest after
that date. Ib.
5. The statute of Minnesota approved April 16, 1889, entitled "an act for
the protection of the public health by providing for inspection, before
slaughtering, of cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for hu-
man food," is unconstitutional and void so far as it requires, as a con-
dition of sales in Minnesota of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork,
for human food, that the animals, from which such meats are taken,
shall have been inspected in that State before being slaughtered.
Minnesota v. Barber, 314.
6. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be
determined by its natural and reasonable effect; and the presumption
that it was enacted in good faith, for the purpose expressed in the title,
cannot control the determination of the question whether it is, or is
not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. 1b.
7. This statute of Minnesota by its necessary operation, practically excludes
from the Minnesota market all fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork,
in whatever form, and although entirely sound, healthy and fit for hu-
man food, taken from animals slaughtered in other States; and as it
thus directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals, whose meat
is to be sold in Minnesota for human food, to those engaged in such
business in that State, it makes such discrimination against the prod-
ucts and business of other States in favor of the products and busi-
ness of Minnesota, as interferes with and burdens commerce among
the several States. Ib.
8. A law providing for the inspection of animals, whose meats are designed
for human food, cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police
power of the State, if the inspection prescribed is of such a character,
or is burdened with such conditions, as will prevent the introduction
into the State of sound meats, the product of animals slaughtered in
other States. Ib.
9. A burden imposed upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained sim-
ply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all
the States, including the people of the State enacting it. Ib.
10. Chapter 489 of the Laws of New York of 1888, which provides that
"the punishment of death must in every case be inflicted by causing
to pass through the body of a convict a current of electricity of suffi
cient intensity to cause death, and the application of such current
must be continued until such convict is dead," is not repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, when applied to a convict who
committed the crime for which he was convicted after the act took
effect.
11. The dominion and jurisdiction of a State, bounded by a river, con-
tinue as they existed at the time when it was admitted into the Union,
unaffected by the action of the forces of nature upon the course of the
river. Indiana v. Kentucky, 479.
12. Long acquiescence by one State in the possession of territory by
another State, and in the exercise of sovereignty and dominion over it,
is conclusive of the title and rightful authority of the latter State. Ib.
See MORMON CHURCH;
RAILROAD, 3.
1. When a state constitution provides that "private property shall not
be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation" a railroad company constructing its road in a public street,
under a sufficient grant from the legislature or municipality, is never-
theless liable to abutting owners of land for consequential injuries
to their property resulting from such construction. Hot Springs Rail-
road Co. v. Williamson, 121.
1. The facts stated by the court constituted a valid contract, mutually
binding on the parties, for the sale to the United States of a tract
of land in Michigan for purposes of fortification and garrison, as spec-
ified in the act of July 8, 1886, 24 Stat. 128, c. 747. Ryan v. United
States, 68.
2. If an offer is made by an owner of real estate in writing to sell it on
specified terms, and the offer is accepted as made, without conditions,
without varying its terms, and in a reasonable time, and the accept-
ance is communicated to the other party in writing within such time,
and before the withdrawal of the offer, a contract arises from which
neither party can withdraw at pleasure. Ib.
3. The city of Marshall agreed to give to the Texas and Pacific Railway
$300,000 in county bonds, and 66 acres of land within the city limits
for shops and depots; and the company, "in consideration of the do-
nation" agreed "to permanently establish its eastern terminus and
Texas offices at the city of Marshall," and "to establish and construct
at said city the main machine shops and car works of said railway
company." The city performed its agreements, and the company, on
its part, made Marshall its eastern terminus, and built depots and
shops, and established its principal offices there. After the expiration
of a few years Marshall ceased to be the eastern terminus of the
road, and some of the shops were removed. The city filed this bill in
equity to enforce the agreement, both as to the terminus and as to the
shops; Held, (1) That the contract on the part of the railway com-
pany was satisfied and performed when the company had established
and kept a depot and offices at Marshall, and had set in operation car
works and machine shops there, and had kept them going for eight
years and until the interests of the railway company and of the
public demanded the removal of some or all of these subjects of the
contract to some other place; (2) That the word "permanent" in the
contract was to be construed with reference to the subject matter of
the contract, and that, under the circumstances of this case it was
complied with by the establishment of the terminus and the offices
and shops contracted for, with no intention at the time of removing
or abandoning them; (3) That if the contract were to be interpreted
as one to forever maintain the eastern terminus, and the shops and
Texas offices at Marshall, without regard to the convenience of the
public, it would become a contract that could not be enforced in
equity; (4) That the remedy of the city for the breach, if there was
a breach, was at law. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Marshall, 393.
See COURT AND JURY;
CONTRACTS WITH THE UNITED STATES.
See SECRETARY OF WAR.
1. This court concurred with the Court of Appeals, 111 N. Y. 66, in hold-
ing that, at the time of the death of the testatrix, the property held
by Cornell University exceeded $3,000,000, and, therefore, it could not
take her legacy. Cornell University v. Fiske, 152.
2. The legislation of New York on the subject, in its acts of May 5, 1863,
May 14, 1863, April 27, 1865, April 10, 1866, May 4, 1868, and May
18, 1880, and the contract of the State with Ezra Cornell, of August
4, 1866, selling to him the land scrip received by the State from the
United States under the act of Congress, did not violate the act of
Congress of July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 503, c. 130. Ib.
1. Railroad corporations created by two or more States, though joined in
their interests, in the operation of their roads, in the issue of their
stock, and in the division of their profits, so as practically to be a sin-
gle corporation, do not lose their identity; but each one has its exist-
ence and its standing in the courts of the country, only by virtue of
the legislation of the State by which it is created; and union of name,
of officers, of business and of property does not change their distinc-
tive character as separate corporations. Nashua and Lowell Railroad v.
Boston and Lowell Railroad, 356.
2. Under a will bequeathing stock in a corporation and government bonds,
in trust to pay "the dividends of said stock and the interest of said
bonds as they accrue " to a daughter of the testator "during her lifetime,
without percentage of commission or diminution of principal," and
directing that upon her death "the said stocks, bonds and income shall
revert to the estate" of the trustee, "without incumbrance or impeach-
ment of waste," a stock dividend declared by a corporation which from
time to time, before and after the death of the testator, has invested
accumulated earnings in its permanent works and plant, and which,
since his death, has been authorized by statute to increase its capital
stock, is an accretion to capital, and the income thereof only is paya-
ble to the tenant for life. Gibbons v. Mahon, 549.
See JURISDICTION, B, 1;
MORMON CHURCH;
RAILROAD, 1, 2.
The construction and effect of a correspondence in writing, depending in
no degree upon oral testimony or extrinsic facts, is a matter of law, to
be decided by the court. Hamilton v. Liverpool, London and Globe Ins.
Co., 242.
1. A sale by a postmaster of postage stamps on credit is a violation of the
act of June 17, 1878, c. 259, § 1, forbidding him to “sell or dispose of
them except for cash." In re Palliser, 257.
2. Sending a letter to a postmaster, aking him whether, if the writer of the
letter will send him five thousand circulars in addressed envelopes, he
will put postage stamps on them and send them out at the rate of one
hundred daily, and promising him, if he will do so, to pay to him the
price of the stamps, is a tender of a contract for the payment of
money to the postmaster, with intent to induce him to sell postage
stamps on credit and in violation of his duty, and is punishable under
§ 5451 of the Revised Statutes. Ib.
3. The offence of tendering a contract for the payment of money in a letter
mailed in one district and addressed to a public officer in another, to
induce him to violate his official duty, may be tried in the district in
which the letter is received by the officer. Ib.
A testator devised all his real and personal estate to his widow for life, in
trust for the equal benefit of herself and two children or the survivors
of them; and devised all the property, remaining at the death of the
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