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REPORT.

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,

CARSON CITY, Nevada, January 5, 1893.

To His Excellency, R. K. Colcord, Governor of the State of Nevada : SIR: I have the honor to submit for your consideration a report of the business transacted by this office for the years 1891 and 1892, as required by law.

JAMES D. TORREYSON,
Attorney General.

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REPORT.

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,

CARSON CITY, Nevada, January 5, 1893.

To His Excellency, R. K. Colcord, Governor of the State of Nevada: SIR: When I assumed charge of this office there were no criminal cases pending in the Supreme Court of this State.

The case of the Reno Smelting, Milling and Reduction Works vs. C. C. Stevenson, et al., was pending, however, and for a complete history of this case I refer you to the report of the Commissioners for the Indigent Insane of Nevada for the years 1889 and 1890. This case was tried and a decision rendered against the defendant, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of this State, and a decision rendered in April, 1889, reversing the decision of the lower court and granting a new trial therein. The new trial took place June 2, 1890, and a decision was rendered in September following, which was in effect: that the State had no right to take water from the Truckee at any point where it was raised above its natural level by reason of the dam of the Reno Smelting, Milling and Reduction Works. From this decision a motion for a new trial was made and an appeal contemplated being taken to the Supreme Court of this State. This was the state of the case when I assumed charge of this office.

Upon investigating the records I found that a statement on motion for a new trial had been prepared by my predecessor in office and filed in the office of the County Clerk of Washoe county, Nevada. Upon investigating the record I ascertained that my predecessor had neglected to sign his name to the statement on motion for a new trial as attorney for the State of Nevada.

I made and filed a motion for leave to amend said statement by adding and inserting the name of my predecessor as attorney for

the State.

This motion was argued at length and denied by Judge Cheney of the District Court of Washoe county.

It then became necessary to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of this State and have a decision rendered, as to whether or not the nisi prius court was correct in its decision, and if not, then to have a decision upon the merits of the case. I consulted freely

with the Board of Commissioners for the care of the Insane of this State, and against whose predecessors in office this suit was pending, as to the advisability of appealing the case to the Supreme Court of this State. After considerable research and discussion said Commissioners declined to have said case appealed, and instructed me to dismiss the case, which I accordingly did.

I now submit to you a synopsis of the various cases decided by the Supreme Court of this State during the past two years, in which the State of Nevada was a party and in which the public have an interest.

The State of Nevada, respondent, vs. Samuel G. Depoister, appellant. The defendant was indicted in the District Court of Humboldt county, Nevada, tried and convicted for the crime of rape upon the person of Bertha May Sadler, of the age of about seven years. An appeal was taken by the defendant to the Supreme Court and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

The State of Nevada, appellant, vs. the Central Pacific Railroad Company, respondent, No. 1,335.

This was an action brought to recover from the defendant the taxes due Lander county for the year 1889. Included in the property assessed are 29,15 miles of road bed and main track of the railroad, at a valuation of $14,000 per mile.

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Upon the trial, the record of the Board of Equalization of Lander county, offered in evidence, shows that on September 24, 1889, the railroad company filed a complaint with the Board, asking that its assessment be reduced to $9,000 per mile; at the same time one Dickson filed a complaint asking that it be raised to $20,000 per mile. The two complaints were heard together, and on the same day the Board made an order that the assessment remain as fixed by the Assessor at $14,000 per mile.

On October 7, 1889, the Board met again and a motion to reconsider their action was adopted. Thereupon another motion was made and also adopted to reduce the assessment to $12,000 per mile. The questions involved in this case are of vital importance to the people of this State.

The Supreme Court decided that the county Boards of Ecualization are of special and limited jurisdiction, and have only such powers as are conferred upon them by statute. That after complaint is made as to the assessed valuation of any piece of property, and said complaint is heard and determined by the Board, and said Board decide and determine said complaint and fix the valuation of the property, that there is no provision in the law for a new trial, a rehearing or any further consideration of the matter. That the power to reconsider, not being expressly given by the statute, does not exist. In other words, that where the Board of Equalization, upon a complaint made as to the valuation of property, and after hearing

and determining all of the proofs introduced before it arrives at a judgment and fixes the valuation of said property, that its judgnent is res adjudicata, and that the same cannot be reconsidered.

A petition for rehearing was presented in this case, which was denied, and in denying said petition the Court says that "the action of the Board of Equalization fixing values is final and conclusive where taken honestly and in good faith."

The next case in which the State appealed as a party was: The county of Esmeralda, respondent, vs. the State of Nevada, appellant. This action was tried in the District Court of Ormsby county, Nevada, to recover from the State the sum of $592 40, alleged to be due as a balance incurred by the county of Esmeralda under the Special Election Law of 1889. In the lower court judgment was rendered against the State of Nevada. An appeal was taken by the State to the Supreme Court and the judgment of the lower court was reversed and the cause remanded, the Court holding that the statute of 1889, under which said claim was sought to be made a charge against the State, was adopted for the purpose of reimbursing the counties their expenses at the special election, but since the county had neither paid said claim nor allowed it, so as to make a legal charge against the county, that no expenses had been incurred by the county, and it should not, therefore, recover.

The next case was that of the State of Nevada, respondent, vs. Charley Lung, appellant, an appeal from the 'District Court of Humboldt county, Nevada. The defendant was charged with an attempt to commit rape. He was convicted in the lower court, but upon an appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the lower court was reversed, and I am informed that the lower court discharged the defendant.

The next case was that of the State of Nevada ex. rel., L. A. Dunkle vs. W. S. Beard. This was an appeal from the District Court of the county of Eureka, and the question was whether the relator as Sheriff of Eureka county was entitled to retain the commissions provided for in section 133 of the Revenue Law of 1891 for the collection of licenses. [Statutes of Nevada, 1891, page 182.] The Court held that the Sheriff of Eureka county being a salaried other, and the law providing that his salary should be the only compensation allowed or paid for any and all services and ex-officio services of every kind and character rendered by said Sheriff, that said Sheriff was not entitled to retain the commissions provided for under section 123 of the Revenue Law of 1891.

The State of Nevada vs. D. S. Shaw et. al., was an appeal from the District Court of Eureka county. This case also involves questions of vital importance to the taxpayers of the various counties in

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