general increases as argued. Replicants dispute various findings in the initial decision supporting this conclusion. The first finding to which replicants object is that paragraph (k) in Ex Parte No. 318 and parallel paragraph (1) in Ex Parte No. 3302 do not prevent SCL from taking the full ex parte increases. Paragraph (k) states that the increases will not apply to: SP Rates or charges applicable from, to, via or at points on the following carriers: It is replicants' position that since Thebes and East St. Louis, IL, are points on SSW, no increase is applicable on any of SCL's routes which traverse those points. We affirm the finding that the SCL's increases are not prevented or limited by this language. The finding is correct for several reasons. First, the paragraph referred to was published by the independent action of the Southern Pacific Transportation System (SP), of which St. Louis South Western Railway Company (SSW), is a part. Increased Freight Rates and Charges-1976, 355 I.C.C. 254, 258, 304, 306 (1976). To find that several carriers acting for their own account could bind all other carriers crossing points which the several carriers serve is to contort independent action to where it is not independent at all. Independent action under section 5b of the Interstate Commerce Act, does not give any carrier the power to 2 APPLICATION OF MAXIMUM INCREASES 1. Rates or charges applicable from, to, via or at points on the following carriers: *** SSW *** are subject to a MAXIMUM INCREASE of five (5) percent ***. Effective January 14, 1977, paragraph (1) was changed to read: (a) Rates or charges applicable from or to points in the following carriers when these carriers perform originating and/or terminating line-haul services, and rates and charges applicable at points on these carriers for account of these carriers. are subject to a MAXIMUM INCREASE of five (5) percent ***. The effect of this change, which was not made in the parallel Ex Parte No. 318 provision, is discussed hereafter. St. Louis South Western Railway Company. abridge another carrier's rights. Thus, we have stated that unilateral independent action by only one party to a joint rate is impossible, Declaratory Order-Rule 52 of Tariff Cir. No. 20, 337 I.C.C. 274, 280 (1970); and that we have no intention of granting special permission to reverse effective joint rates unless all parties to the rate agree to the change. Southern Ry. Co.-Petition for Declaratory Order, 356 I.C.C. 590, 591 (1978); 49 CFR 1300.58(b). If we were to find that in every case in which a carrier's route intersects any points served by the SP that the carrier may not apply these general increases, SP's "independent action" would have a great effect on an untold number of carriers without their consent. Moreover, those carriers do not even necessarily participate in joint rates with SP over these routes. Thus, SP would have no reason to want to keep them from taking the full increases. It is by far the more rational interpretation of the tariff provisions that SP's flagout and holddown were only for its own account; and that paragraphs (n)* and (2)3 in Ex Parte No. 318 and 330, respectively, were published in reaction to SP's action for the account of all other railroads. Increased Freight Rates, supra at 306 (concurrence of Commissioner O'Neal). Thus, paragraphs (k) and (1) have no bearing on SCL's rates, when traffic merely traverses points served by SSW. Second, we note that if paragraphs (k) and (1) had the meaning replicants suggest (i.e., that any carrier crossing points served by SSW may not take the full increases), there would be no reason for the publication of paragraphs (n) and (2), since the latter paragraphs would cover less than the former. It is a fundamental principle of tariff construction that tariffs are interpreted to give effect to all of their provisions. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., v. Alton & S. R. 298 I.C.C. 491, 494 (1956). If paragraphs (n) and (2) are to have any effect, paragraphs (k) and (1) cannot mean what replicants contend they do. Third, the language of paragraphs (k) and (1), which require that rates or charges affected be “applicable," and also refers to SSW, is sufficient to inform the average tariff user that the rates or charges must be applicable over SSW. This reasoning does not rely on the principle that to express one thing implies the exclusion of all (n) Rates or charges applying via all routes in which any carrier participates between points where any route is applicable via one or more of the carriers named in paragraph (k). (2) Any rate or charge via all routes, which applies via or in connection with any carrier named in paragraph (1) herein to the extent provided therein is subject to a MAXIMUM INCREASE of five (5) percent *** *Paragraphs (n) and (2) would be more restricted in application than (k) and (I) since the former requires that there must be routing via or in connection with SP between the involved points. others (as replicants suggest), but only on what seems to be a reasonable construction of the words of the tariff. In addition, as discussed in the initial decision, for a rate or charge to be applicable to a carrier, it must apply over a route in which that carrier participates. Thus, it would not apply to routes merely traversed by SCL in which SSW did not participate. Turning now to the remaining arguments raised by replicants, they contend that the Administrative Law Judge was in error in relying on the intention of the carriers in framing the tariff provisions to justify his findings. Replicants maintain that the carriers' intention is not revealed in the record. We agree insofar as replicants argue that there were no express statements of intention. However, our conclusions on tariff interpretation are on the most reasonable construction of the tariffs. An independent statement of intention was not necessary. Replicants' own statement that the carriers' true intention was to meet market competition is entitled to little weight since they do not state why they believe this to be true. Moreover, any intention should be discernible from the tariff. Essex Wire Corp. v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co., 302 I.C.C. 417, 418 (1957). Replicants also maintain that it was error to conclude that because paragraph (n) refers to routes, paragraph (k) must also be interpreted to refer to routes and to conclude that (k) and (n) are companion provisions. We affirm the finding that (k) and (n) are companion provisions. In fact paragraph (n) specifically refers to paragraph (k). As stated earlier, the the two paragraphs are complementary in that by paragraph (n) the carriers attempted to meet competition from SP's independent action in paragraph (k). However, merely because paragraph (n) refers to routes, does not by itself compel the conclusion that paragraph (k) also refers to routes. As previously discussed, the term "applicable" rates and charges used in paragraph (k) itself indicates that (k) refers to routes. The amendments to the Ex Parte No. 330 tariff, which expressly restricted the application of paragraph (1) to routes over which SSW participates, replicants argue, was an admission that prior to the amendment, paragraph (1) [and by implication paragraph (k)] was not restricted to routes over SSW. Replicants contend that the Administrative Law Judge was wrong in finding that any change was unintentional, particularly since the same change was later made in the Ex Parte Nos. 336 and 343 tariffs. However, the Administrative Law Judge did not conclude that the change was unintentional. Rather, he found that it was not an unconscious "Freudian slip." Nor was the change evidence that the prior publication was defective. See Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Florida East Coast Ry., 289 I.C.C. 165, 168 (1953). If we were to find that tariff changes are acknowledgments of some defect in earlier versions, we would discourage carriers from clarifying their tariffs. It is our judgment that the tariff amendment merely clarified the existing tariff. Replicants argue that the use of the tariff symbol denoting a rate increase proves that the addition of the route restriction did result in a material change. However, the Administrative Law Judge correctly concluded that the use of the increase symbol was not a result of the route restrictions, but was used because the holddown had been changed to apply only to originating and terminating services, thus excluding intermediate services. Therefore, the full increase went into effect on intermediate services, necessitating use of the increase symbol. It is also argued by replicants that it was incorrect to reach a conclusion different from that expressed in Commission letters dated September 27 and October 15, 1976. These conclusions, which were in response to letters from petitioner and one of the replicants, were reached without benefit of the evidence and argument in this proceeding. Moreover, it was clearly stated in the second letter that the views expressed "are informal and are without prejudice to a different conclusion should the matter come before the Commission on a formal docket." The second finding to which replicants' object is that the holddown and flagout are not effective on SCL routes from origins in central Florida to points in Illinois Freight Association Territory (IFA) because of language in paragraphs (n) and (2). The central question here is whether SSW has routing from Thebes to IFA, in which case the holddown and flagout would apply. Replicants argue that there must be such a route since in the initial decision we found that there was a route for SCL from the same origins to Central Freight Association Territory (CFA). Replicants argue that, since IFA is intermediate to CFA, it is illogical not to have a route to IFA. We have no grounds for speculating why SSW did not publish such a route. However, the applicable tariffs do not contain one. Similarly, replicants contend that the provisions governing IFA and CFA are companion provisions, and should achieve the same routing result. Again, if the same result was intended, it certainly does not appear in the tariffs, one of which contains a vital routing restriction only applying west of the Mississippi River while the other contains a systemwide restriction. This has been thoroughly |