cial departments as well as the executive. Under the constitution the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints all officers whose offices are established by the constitution or by law and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for. The Governor's power to appoint did not begin to be effective until the constitution of 1848 forbade legislative appointments. Since 1848 the General Assembly, when it has established new offices, has ordinarily vested the power of appointment in the Governor. The Governor's appointing power has thus expanded with the expansion of state functions, and its present extent is due to statutes rather than to the consitution alone. The General Assembly has a discretion to provide that appointments to new statutory offices shall be made by the Governor with the advice and consent of the senate, or by the Governor alone, or in some other manner, provided of course, that it does not itself seek to make appointments. Aside from the general authority in the Governor under article 5, section 10, just referred to (which vests little appointing power in the Governor in the absence of statute), substantially the only constitutional power of appointment vested in the Governor is that to fill certain vacancies in elective offices (article 5, section 20, and article 6, section 32). Power to make appointments may be vested in other elective constitutional state officers or in a new statutory creation such as the civil service commission. Not only this, but in the view of the courts, the power to make appointments is not peculiarly a function of the executive department. "The constitution does not specifically confer the power to appoint officers on any department, and does not provide that the officers or employes of any department of the government can only be appointed by that department." In at least one case, however, the court has said that an appointment could properly be made only by the courts.* And another case took the view that the courts could not be vested with power over the appointment and removal of executive officers.5 Even though the power of appointment may constitutionally be regarded as not a purely executive function, the fact remains that it is a function primarily exercised by the executive department and that the Governor either acting alone or by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, controls the appointment to all places of importance in the state government that have been created by statute. With respect to the Governor's power in this matter therefore, the important questions. are: (1) that as to whether the appointing power shall be increased by reducing the number of elective state officers; and (2) that as to the continuance of Senate confirmation. Under the express provisions of the constitution, the power of removal is much more complicated than that of appointment. By article 5, section 12, the Governor has "power to remove any officer whom he may appoint, in case of incompetency, neglect of duty, or mal People v. Brady, 275 Ill. 261 (1916). 4 Witter v. Cook County Commissioners, 256 Ill. 616 (1912). City of Aurora v. Schoeberlein, 230 Ill. 496 (1907). feasance in office." This power of the Governor extends to all appointments made either by him alone or with the advice and consent of the senate, and in exercising the power the Governor need not hold hearings or assign reasons." In the case of People v. Nellis, the court held that it was proper for the General Assembly to vest in the Governor power to remove a sheriff under certain conditions, even though the sheriff is elected for a term fixed by the constitution, and the same principle would seem to apply to all other county officers created by the constitution. The process of impeachment applies to "the Governor and all other civil officers of the state" (article 5, section 15). By article 6, section 30, the General Assembly may "for cause entered on the journals, upon due notice and opportunity of defense, remove from office any judge upon concurrence of three-fourths of all the members elected, of each house." Inasmuch as judges are civil officers of the state, they are subject to removal either by impeachment or by action under article 6, section 30, although other civil officers of the state (except as covered by the second sentence of article 6, section 30), are apparently removable only on impeachment. The power of impeachment apparently does not apply to officers expressly designated by the constitution as county officers. The second sentence of article 6, section 30, provides that all officers other than judges mentioned in the judicial article "shall be removed from office on prosecution and final conviction, for misdemeanor in office." and this method of removal seems to be exclusive of any other methods. Officers other than judges mentioned in the judicial article include: boards of county commissioners (Article 6, section. 17); state's attorneys (article 6, section 22); the reporter of the Supreme Court (article 6, section 9); certain clerks of courts (article 6, sections 10, 18, 27); and apparently justices of the peace. The state's attorney who controls the machinery of prosecution is removable only on prosecution and conviction. Statutes vesting powers of appointment in officers other than the Governor may also vest a power of removal in such officers. Under the civil service law before 1917, the civil service commission had large control not only over the appointment but also over the removal of employes in the classified civil service. By amendment of 1917, however, power to remove subordinates vests in the head of an office, subject to review by the civil service commission if removal is alleged to be for political, racial or religious causes. Removal by impeachment and by three-fourths of the two houses. of the General Assembly have never been employed in this state and are unlikely to be employed, unless extraordinary conditions develop in a particular case. These methods may, therefore, be practically disregarded as elements to be considered. Although more easily capable of use, the same statement applies to a large extent to removal of cer • Wilcox v. People, 90 Ill., 186 (1878). 7249 Ill. 12 (1911). See, also, Donahue v. County of Will, 100 Ill. 94. But not the Cook county board. See People v. McCormick, 261 Ill., 413 (1914). Compare section 21 with section 28, and see Report and Opinions of the Attorney General, 1914, pages 161, 1200. tain officers upon conviction of misdemeanor in office. These three methods of removal are of small value as means of controlling the ordinary conduct of public officers. The power of the Governor under the constitution to remove officers whom he may appoint, and the statutory power of certain other officers to remove their subordinates, are the only effective powers of removal now existing in the state government, although the principle laid down in the Nellis case is capable of effective application. The important questions facing the constitutional convention with respect to this matter are: (1) whether the Governor should be given power to appoint some officers now elective, such wider appointing power carrying with it automatically a similar increase in power of removal. (2) Whether the Governor should be given some express power of removal over state and local officers who are to remain elective. (3) Whether some change should not be made with respect to removals upon conviction of misdemeanor in office. Enforcement of law by local officials. The control which the executive should be given over local officials is another problem for the framers of the constitution. Some such control is important in the enforcement of the laws. The executive departments exercise a slight control over local officials in the suppression of contagious diseases, assessments of property, distribution of the common school fund, appointment of county superintendents of highways and county mine. inspectors, inspection of hospitals, sanitariums and various local charitable institutions, the collection of vital statistics and a few other cases. The Governor has the power to remove the sheriff in case a prisoner is taken from his custody by a mob through his fault. Problem before convention. The constitutional convention is confronted with the problem of framing an executive article in a new constitution broad enough to form the basis for the operation of an efficient executive department. The functions of state government are constantly changing and increasing, and it is necessary to have broad costitutional provisions for the proper exercise of these functions. Details of executive organization in a constitution will occasion great practical difficulty, if the activities of the government of Illinois increase during the next fifty years in a manner at all comparable to their increase during the past half century. APPENDIX NO. 1. REFERENCES. Academy of Political Science. The revision of the state constitution. N. Y., 1914. (Proceedings, V. 5, No. 1, October, 1914.) Constitutional provision for a budget. By Frederick A. Cleveland, pp. 141-192. The civil service clause in the constitution. By Samuel H. Ordway, pp. 251-262. Alexander, Margaret C. The development of the power of the state executive with special reference to the state of New York, 1917. (Smith College Studies in History, V. 2, No. 3. April, 1917.) Beard, Chas. A., and Shultz, Birl E. Documents on the state-wide initiative, referendum, and recall. N. Y., 1912. VI Appendix. The proposed Oregon system, pp. 349-383. Buck, A. E. Administrative consolidation in state governments. Phila., 1919. (Supplement to the National Municipal Review, V. 8, No. 9, November, 1919.) Chicago. Bureau of Public Efficiency. The park governments of Chicago. An inquiry into their organization and methods of administration. Chicago, 1911. Fairlie, John A. The state governor, 1912. (Reprinted from Michigan Law Review, V. 10, Nos. 5 and 6.) Holcombe, Arthur N. State government in the United States. N. Y., 1916. Illinois. Directors of departments under civil administrative code. Illinois. Efficiency and economy committee. Report. Chicago, 1915. Supervision of corporations. By Maurice H. 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New York. Constitutional convention commission. The constitution and government of the state of New York. Albany, 1915. O'Neal, Emmet. Reorgnizing the state governments. 1918. (Constitutional Review, V. 2. No. 4, October, 1918.). U. S. Education Bureau. A manual of education legislation for the guidance of committees on education in the state legislatures. Wash., 1919. (Bul., 1919, No. 4.) U. S. Public health service. Public health administration in Illinois. By S. B. Grubbs. Wash., 1915. (Public health reports reprint, No. 275, May 21, 1915.) |