mittee on bills in the third reading shall examine and correct the bills which are referred to it for the purpose of avoiding repetition and unconstitutional provisions, insuring accuracy in the text and references, and consistency with the language of existing statutes; provided, that any change in the sense or legal effect, or any material change in construction, shall be reported to the house as an amendment." This committee has a trained secretary and seeks to do what is here suggested as desirable. With respect to the problem here under consideration, an organization such as that here commented upon could accomplish a good deal not only in improving the final form of bills but also in preventing duplication in the enactment of measures, and in co-ordinating all of the legislative work of a session. Bills before they come to final passage in either house quite frequently have amendments adopted to them which to some extent change the scope or character of the bills, and oftentimes such bills are passed and sent to the governor without any effort to co-ordinate the amendments with the somewhat different plan of the original bill. A problem which presents itself also in this connection is that of co-ordinating amendatory bills. It often happens, under the constitutional rule in this state with respect to amendments, that several bills are introduced, each seeking to amend the same section of a prior statute. To pass several bills, each amending the same section of a statute, would be futile, because the bill last passed would control, and none of the amendments to the section would be of any effect unless included in that bill. No machinery now exists for the puraction of a pose of co-ordinating all amendments to the same previous act.

End of the session rush. In every session of the Illinois General Assembly the bulk of the legislative work is done during the last few weeks, so far as the passage of legislation is concerned. The regular session of the Fiftieth General Assembly began January 3, and no action upon bills was taken after June 16, 1917. The number of actions on bills by the two houses from January 3 to June 4 was very little greater than the number of such actions taken by the two houses from June 4 to June 16, and in the enactment of legislation the amount of business from June 4 to June 16 was much greater than that previous to June 4. Of 271 house bills passed in the senate in the Fiftieth General Assembly (1917), 183 were passed in the senate on and after June 4; of 137 senate bills passed in the house in 1917, 103 were passed by the house on and after June 4. Of the 239 senate bills passed by the senate, 45 were passed on and after June 4, and of the 324 house bills passed in the house 130 were passed on and after June 4. The bulk of the legislation passed by both houses was enacted on and after June 4 in 1917. In the Fifty-first General Assembly (1919), of the 242 senate bills passed in the house 179 were passed on and

after June 4; of the 228 house bills passed in the senate, 194 were passed on and after June 4; of the 261 house bills passed in the house in 1919, 92 were passed on and after June 4, and of the 320 senate bills passed in the senate in 1919, 136 were passed on and after June 4. In comparing the figures for the sessions of 1917 and 1919, it should be borne in mind that the two houses took their final recess in 1917 on June 16, and in 1919 on June 20, so that there were four more legislative days after June 4 in 1919 than in 1917.

The last two weeks of a legislative session are converted into a succession of roll calls and the enactment of bills is a very rapid performance, in which undue haste is essential if the measures are to get through before adjournment. In Illinois there has not been in recent years the abuse of a so-called short roll call, in which bills are passed upon a roll call which consists of calling the first and last names upon the list of members, but bills passed as they are in the last few days of the session in Illinois cannot receive adequate attention.

The notion has developed among a great many members that it is easier to get a bill through in this rush at the end of the session than earlier, and for this reason many bills are definitely held up until near the end. Substantially the only effect of this rush is that measures receive insufficient attention and that many meritorius measures are defeated simply because of the lack of time for the presentation of their merits.

Moreover, measures enacted at the end of the session come to the governor in great numbers for action within ten days which he has for approval or veto, and executive action must therefore necessarily be much less careful than if the measures came to the governor in smaller numbers at regular intervals during the session. Although the present rules of the two houses have gradually developed, it would almost seem that they have been planned for the purpose of producing a great rush of business at the end of the session. Rules of the two houses which now contribute to this situation are the following:

(a) A committee may hold a bill without report as long as it sees fit and may report it toward the end of the session.

(b) After the committee has reported the bill (even if the committee reports promptly), the member introducing or in charge of it in either house may not urge it to second reading or to a third reading and vote, either because of lack of interest, or because of a fear of the result.

It is true that the daily calendars indicate an order of bills, but the order in which bills actually come up is different, and depends to a large extent upon unanimous consent. Of the 147 house bills on the house calendar for June 5, 1917, for second reading, the first twentytwo were not taken up at all. None of the remaining bills on the house calendar for that day were called up in the order in which they appeared on the calendar. In the senate on June 5, 1917, the bills were called up more in the order in which they appeared on the senate calen

dar. Both in the house and in the senate, the rules do not force a consideration or disposal of bills by committees, or by the two houses, in the order in which they are presented, and the degree of promptness with which a bill is urged for consideration depends to a very great extent upon the individual member who presented the bill or who is in charge of it. That is, upon this important matter, the order of business in the two houses is dependent not upon the calendar or upon the order in which business is presented, but is primarily dependent upon the will of the individual members with respect to when their matters shall receive consideration. The individual member is in command of the order in which steps shall be taken upon his bill.

A very large number of the bills in each house should properly be reported unfavorably by committees. If they were unfavorably reported and were so reported promptly, in only a few cases would such bills ever receive further consideration. Such a reporting would to a very great extent clear the records of the committees and of the house, and concentrate attention upon the more important measures which are likely to receive a real consideration. Upon all measures that receive favorable committee action, or that are likely to receive such action, there should be an opportunity for deliberation in the houses themselves; and this deliberation cannot take place unless there is a fairly prompt committee report, followed by a fairly prompt consideration in the house itself after the committee report has been made. The individual member who has introduced a measure should not be permitted, either because of fear or indifference, to keep that measure pending indefinitely upon the calendar so as to cumber the calendar and force over-hasty consideration of measures at the end of the session.

The necessarily lesser consideration of each bill by the house and senate in the rush at the end of the session and the difficulties presented to the governor in his passing upon bills have been suggested above. The difficulties with respect to enrolling and engrossing are also materially increased in the end of the session rush.

There is no rush at the end of the session in the Massachusetts general court, although in Massachusetts the number of bills introduced and passed at each session is larger than that in Illinois. The Massachusetts rules are devised largely for the purpose of obtaining a prompt consideration of legislative measures. Substantially all measures are introduced early in the session. Legislative rules require committees to report before the second Wednesday in March on all matters that have been referred to them before that date. This time may be extended for one month but when the date for report has expired, all measures still in the hands of any committee must be reported within three days. This rule does not apply to appropriation bills. After report and second reading, bills in Massachusetts go to the committee on third reading of bills and if not reported promptly from this committee a report may be forced. This committee ordinarily reports within two or three days and if it desires to hold a bill longer it reports this fact. When reported upon by the committee on third reading of bills, the bill is then voted upon in the house in which

it is presented. Through the rules and practice in the consideration of bills by the Massachusetts general court, each step upon a bill is substantially forced after the previous step has been taken. In Illinois there are no rules forcing prompt action in the taking of the various steps involved in the consideration of bills, and for this reason most bills remain until the end of the session for consideration.

Rules of procedure in constitutions. This discussion of the procedure in the two houses has been placed here for the purpose of indicating more clearly certain of the important legislative problems in this state. The most important single problem is of course that with respect to the rush of business at the end of the session. It is not, however, desirable that rules of legislative procedure should be placed in the constitution. Some states have details as to legislative procedure in their constitutions. And these details have either worked badly or means have been found for disregarding them. The constitution of 1870 contains a number of rules and certain of these rules now make difficulty, although the present constitution does not regulate matters of legislative procedure in detail. Constitutional provisions regarding such matters as titles and printing of bills are intended primarily to prevent the enactment of legislation without proper notice to the members of the two houses. It has for this reason been suggested that the constitution provide a date after which the constitutionality of laws should not be open to attack upon these grounds. Such a view finds some support in decisions by the Supreme Couri."

The subject of appropriation methods has not been treated here, but will be found fully discussed in Bulletin No. 4, dealing with state and local finance. One constitutional limitation upon legislative action is that with respect to the separation of appropriations for officers from other legislation. In Bulletin No. 4, attention has been especially directed to this constitutional provision. It is desirable that matters of general legislation should not be united with matters of appropriation, but there is little value in such a constitutional provision as that of Illinois which separates the appropriation for officers from appropriations for other purposes but does not necessarily separate appropriations from other types of legislation.

Richter v. Burdock. 257 Ill. 410 (1913). See also Greenberg v. City of Chicago, 256 Ill 213 (1912).

VIII. RELATIONS OF THE

LEGISLATIVE DEPART

MENT TO OTHER PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION.

Special sessions of the General Assembly. The constitution provides in Article V, section 8, that "the Governor may on extraordinary occasions convene the General Assembly by proclamation stating therein the purpose for which they are convened, and the General Assembly shall enter upon no business except that for which they were called together." Under this constitutional provision, if the governor convenes a special session of the General Assembly, and other matters arise after his proclamation for this purpose, the only method of obtaining consideration of such other matters is by convening another special session. Of course, it is possible to issue a proclamation convening another special session, even though the General Assembly is already in special session, but this is a cumbersome means of accomplishing the desired purpose. A much better plan is to provide that the governor may convene a special session, indicating in his proclamation the matters to which the special session is to be limited, but with authority to specify at a later time further matters that may be considered in such session.

In case of disagreement between the two houses with respect to the time of adjournment, the governor may on such disagreement being certified to him by the house first moving the adjournment "adjourn the General Assembly to such time as he thinks proper, not beyond the first day of the next regular session." This power in the governor to adjourn the two houses is one which will, of course, be used infrequently,' and it has not been employed since the adoption of the constitution of 1870.

Veto power. Under the first state constitutions in this country little or no power over legislation was vested in the governor. The distrust of the legislature which developed rather promptly after the framing of the first state constitutions led, however, to the conferring of a veto power upon the governor, and there has been a definite tendency toward an increase of this power. Under the constitution of 1818, a veto power was vested in a Council of Revision composed of the governor and the judges of the State Supreme Court, but their power was subject to be overcome by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses. The Council of Revision disappeared in 1848, and a 1 For Governor Yates' use of this authority in 1863. see the case of People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 (1863).