one which has obtained a place in state constitutions of this country largely as a result of the copying of English parliamentary procedure. This requirement was first adopted to meet conditions which have long ceased to exist. The requirement in the main was first insisted upon as a basis for giving information to members of a legislative body upon a measure before they were to vote upon it, and reading was the method employed at a period when printing was either non-existent or difficult, and the ability to read was not general. At the present time every bill introduced into either house of the Illinois general assembly is at once printed and copies are placed upon the desks of members on the next legislative day. The need for three readings at large in order to inform members of the contents of bills has therefore disappeared.

As a matter of fact, neither in the Illinois general assembly nor in other legislative bodies where such a requirement exists, is it complied with. To have the reading of every bill in full upon three separate days in each house of the Illinois general assembly would occupy a great deal of time and would serve no useful purpose, because no one would listen to the reading. It would be much easier for each member to read the bill independently himself. As a matter of fact, therefore, in Illinois as well as in other states the practice has developed of entering upon the journal a statement that the bill has been read at large on three separate days, when in fact this has not been done. In either house of the Illinois general assembly, for a member to insist that a bill be read in full is to employ obstructive tactics in connection with the conduct of legislative business.

The requirement of consideration of a bill by each house on three separate days is desirable, as a means of obtaining deliberation and of preventing the enactment of legislation by surprise. However, the useful purpose of this constitutional provision may be accomplished without linking such purpose with a requirement which has long proven useless and which has probably been retained in the constitution largely because it has been possible to disregard it.

In one state at least the Supreme Court has taken the view that a requirement of reading on three different days means that the bill with all of the essential features finally placed in it must be read on three separate days, so that if a bill has inserted into it by amendment important additions or changes, it is necessary in that state to start the three readings all over again.'

Printing of bills. The constitution requires that "the bill and all amendments thereto shall be printed before the vote is taken on its final passage." The constitution does not expressly require a journal entry to the effect that such printing has taken

2 State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Base Ball Club, 127 Tenn. 292. People v. La Salle Street Trust and Savings Bank, 279 Ill. 518 (1915).

But see

place, but the court in the case of Neiberger v. McCullough, (253 Ill. 312) took the view that compliance with this requirement must affirmatively appear upon the journals. This view has been somewhat modified. As a matter of fact, printing is ordinarily had, but an effort is made to see that proper journal entries are made, for an act may otherwise be attacked for technical non-compliance with the requirement if there is no such entry even where there was printing, whereas the act cannot be so attacked if the journal entries are proper even though the requirement itself may have been disregarded.

Subject matter and title. The constitution provides that no act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title. This constitutional provision has been construed liberally. The court has always taken the view which permits related subject matters to be brought together under a proper title, and the rule as laid down by the court with respect to titles is not difficult to observe. Perhaps, however, attention should be called to the fact that occasionally the Supreme Court has been somewhat technical in these matters,' although a technical view has not been generally taken and the rules laid down are desirable in connection with the enactment of laws.

Amendment by reference. The constitution provides that "no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act." This provision was introduced into the constitution of Illinois for the purpose of preventing the amendment of previous laws by reference, in such a manner that by reading the later act it was impossible to tell what was sought to be accomplished thereby. For example, before 1870 acts were passed in substantially the following form "Be it enacted, etc., that Section 1 of an Act entitled, etc., is amended by inserting the words. 'county' before the word 'State.' In the case of such a bill, or of the act if it were passed, it was impossible to know what was being accomplished, and legislation of this type was often passed through the two houses of the general assembly without a knowledge of what was being done. Such an amendatory act was of course unintelligible unless compared with the section amended. The purpose of the constitutional provision was to require amending acts to set forth at length the section or sections amended.

From 1870 to 1900 the court applied the constitutional rules so laid down to acts which were expressly amendatory in form. Beginning with the case of People v. Knopf the court laid down

'Milne v. People. 224 Ill. 125 (1906).

People ex rel. Stuckart v. Knopf. 183 Ill. 410 (1900).

the rule that if an act independent in form amends or adds new provisions to the existing law, then such act is amendatory of previous legislation, and the provisions of the law so amended must be set forth in the new act. That is, before 1900 the Supreme Court took the view that the constitutional provision regarding amendment by reference laid down a definite rule as to an act which expressly amended an earlier act. Since 1900 the court has taken the view that a new act entirely independent in form may be held unconstitutional if in the view of the court the new act So alters previous legislation that the two acts must be read together in order to find the law upon the subject. Theoretically, the later rule is a desirable one in that it seems to require a close coordination of new legislation with old legislation. Actually, however, the new principle as laid down by the court merely results in leaving to the discretion of the court in each case the determination as to whether an act is sufficiently independent to be upheld as an independent act, and the court, in passing upon this question with respect to a large number of acts independent in form since 1900, has not laid down any definite rule as to when an act will be held not amendatory of previous legislation and when it will be so held. With the large mass of statutes in force at any given time, it is possible to hold that practically any new piece of legislation is amendatory of earlier legislation, and with no definite principles laid down for the guidance of the general assembly in its determination as to what acts shall be independent in form and what acts shall be amendatory in form, the present rule practically sets up a guessing contest between the general assembly and the Supreme Court, in which the Supreme Court has the last guess. This situation has been an inevitable one, after the step was once taken of applying the constitutional rule to statutes independent in form, and the only way out of the present situation is probably to change the constitution so as to limit the provision to what appears to have been its original intent and to the interpretation given it by the Supreme Court before 1900. The clause as now interpreted occasions difficulties which greatly outweigh its advantages. For a further discussion of this subject see a chapter in the pamphlet entitled "Constitutional Conventions in Illinois," and the note to this clause in the Annotate Constitution.

Time when laws take effect. One of the important problems to come before the constitutional convention is that as to the time when laws shall become effective. The constitution now provides that "no act of the general assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passage, unless, in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act), the general assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, otherwise direct". This provision was placed in the constitution upon the assumption that the general assembly would ordinarily

continue in session for only about three months, and that an interval of substantially three months would elapse after the adjournment of the general assembly before the laws come into effect."

For a number of years it has been customary for the regular session of the general assembly to sit until close to the first day of July. The ordinary practice is for the general assembly to take a recess at least ten days before the first of July so as to permit the governor to act upon bills, then returning to hear the governor's veto messages. With substantially all legislation passed at the end of the session, the bulk of legislation therefore comes into effect almost immediately after it is enacted. In view of the large mass of legislation passed at the end of the session it is impossible to issue promptly the official text of the laws, and a period of from two to three months always elapses between the time when laws come into operation and the time when the full official text of such laws is available to the public generally.

To some extent the Secretary of State meets this situation by the immediate issue in pamphlet form of some of the more important laws, and an effort to give public information at least as to what laws have been enacted is made by the Legislative Reference Bureau through the publication immediately upon the adjournment of the general assembly of a digest of laws enacted. However, the present situation is a thoroughly unsatisfactory one, and in order to meet it some constitutional provision is necessary.

It will probably be suggested that a plan be adopted under which all laws shall come into effect within a certain period (say sixty or ninety days) after the adjournment of the general assembly. If the present legislative practices continue, such a provision would be satisfactory from the standpoint of general legislation, although there is value in having a definite date for this purpose which does not shift each two years. However, appropriations for the conduct of the state government present a different problem. If all laws were made to come into effect within a certain period after adjournment, the appropriation period would be a variable one each two years, and such an arrangement would be highly undesirable from the standpoint of an appropriation policy. In any plan, therefore, as to the time when laws are to come into effect, the problems of appropriation may have to feceive separate consideration.

The present constitutional provision presents several difficulties in addition to the one bringing laws into effect when their texts cannot be known generally for a period of some three months. One of the difficulties presents itself with respect to special sessions. The constitution says that laws shall not take effect until the first day of July next after their passage, unless an emergency is declared and the vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house is obtained. In a special session called to meet a particular emergency, it may be that legislation is immediately necessary, and that a distinct majority will enact the legislation, but that a two-thirds vote to declare it in effect before the first day of the succeeding July will be impossible. Such a situation would be met by a constitutional provision bringing 5 Debates and Proceedings, Constitutional Convention, 1870, page 540.

laws into effect within a certain specified number of days after the adjournment of the session.

Another difficulty presented by the present situation is that as to the status of laws passed at the end of a regular legislative session, and either expressly approved by the governor or filed by him without objections after June 30. A situation of this character was presented to the Attorney General, and his opinion upon the matter will be found in the Attorney General's Report for 1917-18, page 573. The governor has ten days within which to act upon bills, and the ten days may often carry the consideration of bills beyond the first of July. If a bill should be approved on or after the first of July or if it should be filed with the Secretary of State after that date without objections, the question presents itself as to whether the bill must not wait until the first day of the succeeding July before coming into operation. The Attorney General has ruled that a bill passed by the two houses before July 1 but filed by the governor with the Secretary of State without objections after July 1, becomes effective upon the date upon which the Secretary of State makes his certificate of such filing. Under the ruling of the Attorney General, such an act was held to become effective on July 8, 1915, although as he suggests, this question will be a debatable one until it is finally decided by the Supreme Court.

Practical operation of Illinois legislative system. The procedure of legislative bodies is complex, and is largely based upon rules which have grown up through a number of centuries and which in the main are not and should not be embodied in constitutional provisions. Some of the matters bearing upon conduct of business in the two houses of the Illinois General Assembly should be commented upon in their bearing upon the operation of legislative institutions in Illinois. No effort will be made here to deal with the problems of legislative procedure in detail, but comment will be made upon some of the matters which have a more important bearing upon the subject.

Duplicate introduction of bills into the two houses. The practice has become almost the usual one in Illinois to have an identical bill introduced in the two houses at substantially the same time. It is supposed that some advantage results from having the same measure started upon its career in the two houses at the same time, and occasionally if a measure is popular, it will be passed by each of the two houses at substantially the same time. However, if a bill is introduced as, let us say, house bill No. 8 in the house, and senate bill No. 85 in the senate, it is, in fact, a separate and distinct measure in each house. If house bill No. 8 passes the house, and senate bill No. 85 passes the senate, the same subject matter has been acted upon by each house, but the same bill has not been acted upon by the two houses. What is done in such a case is that one of the bills, let us say the senate bill, will be