In the American colonial legislatures, representation was also at first based primarily on local districts; and only gradually has population come to be accepted as the main consideration. The provisions of the United States constitution for the apportionment of members of the House of Representatives on the basis of population readjusted at definite intervals, was the first important application of this principle. At the same time, the composition of the United States Senate was and still is based on the older principle of equal representation of the states, without respect to population.

Representation based largely on population has come to be generally accepted as an underlying principle in the organization of American state legislatures. But it is still subject to many exceptions in a large number of states. On the one hand, a distinct preference is given in many states to small local districts, such as towns and counties. On the other hand, in a number of states there are limitations placed on the representation of large cities.

The most general variations from the rule of population are to be found in some of the New England states. Here representation in the larger house of the state legislature is based in the main on towns and cities. In Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont each town has at least one representative; and in New Hampshire each town with a population of 600 has a representative in each legislative session. In Connecticut no town has more than two representatives, and in Rhode Island, no town or city has more than one-fourth of the total number of members in the larger house.

These provisions limit closely the representation of such cities as Providence, R. I., and New Haven and Hartford, Connecticut, which are included within the towns. The four principal cities in Connecticut, which contain one-third of the population of the state, have only one in thirty-two of the members of the house of representatives. In Rhode Island, it was stated in 1907 that a majority of the house of representatives was elected by towns with 20 per cent of the population; and a majority of the senators, by little more than 8 per cent of the population In the case of Providence, there is a further and stricter limitation of representation in the state senate, as each town or city in Rhode Island has only one senator. Thus Providence, with half of the population of the state, has only one-fourth of the members of the house of representatives, and only 1 of 39 senators.

In most of the other states, the county is taken as the usual basis of representation. In about one-third of the states, each county is entitled to at least one member in the house of representatives. 2

But none of these states have such great variations in county population, or so many counties with a small population far below the average, as has Illinois.

In Florida and Georgia, no county is allowed more than three representatives. This limits the representation of the counties containing the larger cities. Thus Duval County, Florida, with a tenth of the population of the state in 1910, has only 2 out of 73 members of the

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wyoming.

house of representatives; and Fulton County, Georgia, with 7 per cent of the total population, has only 3 out of 184 members in the house. No county in Oklahoma may have more than 7 representatives.

In Maryland, Montana, New Jersey and South Carolina, each county has only one member of the state senate. Thus Hudson and Essex Counties, N. J. each with a fifth of the population of the state have each but one of 21 senators, as have six other counties with a population of over 100,000 each. These counties with 8 members have four-fifths of the total population; while the other 13 counties with one-fifth of the population (one of which, Cape May, has only 20,000 population) have 13 members of the state senate.

In Delaware, Newcastle County, with three-fifths of the total population in 1910, has only 15 out of 35 members of the house of representatives, and but 7 out of 17 members of the senate. The city of Wilmington, in Newcastle County, with two-fifths of the population of the state has but 5 members of the house and 2 members of the senate. In Missouri the constitution provides that representation in the senate shall be in proportion to population. In the house: "The ratio of representation shall be ascertained at each apportioning session of the general assembly, by dividing the whole number of inhabitants of the state, as ascertained by the last decennial census of the United States, by the number two hundred. Each county having one ratio or less, shall be entitled to one representative; each county having two and a half times said ratio shall be entitled to two representatives; each county having four times said ratio shall be entitled to three representatives; each county having six times said ratio shall be entitled to four representatives; and so on above that number, giving one additional member for every two and a half additional ratios."

Situations somewhat more analogous to those in Illinois are to be found in Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York City; and constitutional provisions with special reference to the representation of these cities may be noted more in detail.

In Maryland, representation in the house is based on counties, according to a schedule which approximates to population up to a maximum of 6 members for counties of over 55,000 population. Baltimore City is divided into 4 districts of equal population, each of which has 6 members, the same as the maximum for counties. This gives Baltimore, with two-fifths of the population of the state, a total representation of 24 out of 102 members in the house of representatives. Each county in Maryland has one senator; and each of the four representative districts in Baltimore City has one senator, giving Baltimore 4 of the 27 members of the state senate.

In Pennsylvania, representation in the larger house is based on population. But in the senate, no city or county is entitled to separate representation exceeding one-sixth of the total number of senators. This provision restricts the membership in the senate of the city and county of Philadelphia, which in 1910 had about one-fifth of the total population of the state. It may also before long restrict the senate representation of Allegheny County, including the city of Pittsburg, which in 1910 had one-seventh of the total population of the state.

In New York state, representation in the assembly, the larger house of the state legislature, is based on population, except that each county has at least one member. For the senate, provisions were adopted in the constitution of 1894 which may limit the representation of New York City to a slight extent. No county may have more than one-third of all the senators; and no two counties (or the territory thereof as organized in 1895) which are adjoining or are separated only by public waters, may have more than one-half of all the senators. The limitation of representation of any one county to one-third of the senators does not as yet operate to restrict the representation of any county. But it would operate if all the counties in New York City were combined into one; and is thus an obstacle to the consolidation of these counties. The limitation on the representation of two adjoining counties limits the membership of two of the three counties of New York, Bronx3 and Kings in the senate to not more than half of the senate. But as New York City now includes two other counties (Queens and Richmond), it is possible for New York City to elect more than half of the senators.

These provisions of the New York constitution were retained in the proposed constitution of 1915; and no steps were taken to restrict further the representation of New York City.

Equal representation of geographical districts with no regard to differences in population, as in some of the New England and several other states, is clearly out of harmony with present day ideas of democracy and popular government. But there are distinct advantages in basing representation on organized local districts having a distinct social and political life rather than on artificial districts based solely on population. The latter make easy gerrymanders in the interest of particular parties or individuals; while rapid changes in population (especially in large cities) soon cause wide departures from equality of population, on which such districts are supposed to be based.

If any limitation on Cook County representation from the population basis is considered advisable, it will presumably be based on the view that no one county should be able to control the state legislature, and there have been occasions, though they are not frequent, where members of the general assembly from Cook County have been aligned definitely against members from other parts of the state. At the same time, it may be said that if one county has a majority of the population of the state, the remainder of the state with a minority of the population should not be given control over the majority. It has been suggested that these views may be brought into some degree of harmony by basing representation in one house of the general assembly on population, and by applying a limitation to the representation of Cook County in the other house.

Reference has been made to the fact that Cook County representatation is now the same as in 1901 and to the further fact that a continued failure to reapportion will bring a progressive under-representation of Cook County upon the basis of the present constitutional rule.

'Bronx County was organized in 1915 out of part of New York County, and is therefore included under the provision of the constitution of 1894.

Mere inaction by the general assembly is therefore producing a proportional under-representation of Cook County.

It should also be clearly borne in mind that the problem of Cook County representation is likely to be considered in very close relationship with that of municipal home rule for Chicago and the other cities of the state. If Cook County and Chicago have a limited representation but continue under the necessity of getting authority from the general assembly to deal with local problems they are helpless, for legislative inaction denies them the things they need. If Chicago is governed largely from Springfield, reducing the representation of Chicago at Springfield is reducing the power of the city to govern itself.

Attention should be called again to the fact that the present constitutional rule with respect to representation in the general assembly is not precisely mathematical, but penalizes to some exent a county having more than two representatives. Had an apportionment been made in 1910 Cook County would, under the existing constitutional rule, have obtained one senatorial district less than that to which it would have been mathematically entitled.

The problem of representation for Chicago and Cook county bears a very direct relationship to the problems of cumulative voting, and of a single-chambered legislature. If some basis of representation is to be worked out by which Chicago and Cook County are to have in one house a representation in proportion to their population and in the other house a representation limited to less than one-half of the whole irrespective of population, this will create a distinction not now existing between the two houses and will give a basis for a relationship between the two somewhat similar to that between the house of representatives and the senate of the United States.

With respect to cumulative voting, if a different basis of representation is to be established for Chicago and Cook County, in the two houses of the general assembly, it will be difficult to retain the same districts for the election of members of both houses. Of course it is possible to create a separate series of districts for the election of members of the house of representatives, continuing to elect three members for each such district upon a cumulative basis, but under such a plan a good deal of the advantage of the present system will be lost because of the fact that it then becomes necessary to divide Cook County and Chicago into two series of somewhat unrelated legislative districts, and perhaps also necessary to do the same for the rest of the state.

In connection with the subject of Cook County representation in° the general assembly, attention should be called to the problem of apportionment for the election of judges to the Supreme Court. The seventh Supreme Court District (electing one judge) had in 1910 a population of 2,618,846, while the total population of the state was 5,638,591.

VII. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE.

A number of matters with respect to legislative procedure are dealt with by the constitution of Illinois. The constitution prescribes the quorum of the two houses, requires that the doors of each house shall be kept open, makes provision regarding the expulsion of members, and regarding the punishment of contempts. It also contains provisions regarding adjournments and a requirement that a journal be kept and published. The constitution also prescribes the enacting clause, and requires that on final passage of all bills "the vote shall be by yeas and nays upon each bill separately and shall be entered upon the journal, and no bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house.' The provisions here referred to, which are contained in Article IV, Sections 9 to 12, have made no difficulty.

Some comment should be made regarding the journals of the two houses. Constitutional provisions in certain cases expressly require that certain action be taken and that it be entered upon the journals of the two houses; and in such cases the Supreme Court has properly held that such entries are necessary to the validity of legislation. In other cases the constitution expressly requires that certain action be taken (as that bills and all amendments thereto shall be printed before final passage), but does not require that the journals indicate that such action was taken. The court in 1912 took the view that the journals must affirmatively show compliance with these latter requirements (even though the constitution does not expressly require this), but the court has to some extent modified this view, and said that "where the constitution does not expressly require a fact to be recorded on the journals, and it can be inferred from a recital in the journals that such fact existed or such step was taken, then the presumption will be indulged that such fact did exist or such step was taken".1

More important with respect to the procedure upon bills is Article IV, Section 13. This section makes a number of specific requirements with respect to the enactment of laws and these requirements need to be dealt with in greater detail.

Reading at large on three different days. The requirement that bills be read at large on three different days in each house is 1 Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 Ill. 312 (1912). Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co.. 269 Ill. 478 (1915).