chusetts to 31.07 in Minnesota; while in Illinois with the party column ballot there were only 2.55 per cent of split ticket votes."

Recent city charters and laws in the United States have in many cases reduced the number of elective offices, and thus provided a short ballot for city elections. This has been one important feature of commission government for cities, where the elective city officers are only five (sometimes three) commissioners elected at large. But in many of these cities there are also other elective municipal officials, such as members of school boards, municipal judges and (in Illinois) town, park and other local officers.

Some recent mayor and council governments have provided for the election only of the mayor, one alderman at a time from each ward, and the school board and municipal judges. In Boston, Massachusetts, where all judges are appointed, the charter of 1909 provides for a mayor elected for four years, nine councilmen elected three each year, and a school board of five of which one or two are elected at a time— making only from four to six places to be filled at each annual city election.

Further, it may be noted that in the national government of the United States a short ballot system is established by the constitution. The only elective officers are the President, Vice President, and members of Congress; and the constitution further definitely provides that other offices shall be filled by appointment, and prevents any addition to the number of national officers to be chosen by popular election, and any appointment of officers by Congress.

It is true that in the formal process of electing the President and Vice President, as it has been worked out by the several states, the presidential electors are voted for directly; and that in many of the states these make a considerable addition to the length of the ballot. But it seems clear that in voting for presidential electors, the voters. cast a vote for the party lists because their intent is to vote for the candidates for President and Vice President, and very seldom distinguish between the candidates for electors on the same ticket. And any state may provide, as some have done, that the presidential electors on each party list may be voted for by a single mark. While the number of elective officers for any one class of offices may not be very large, the total of national, state and local officers elected at one election makes a long ballot.

The Ballot in Other Countries. No other country has anything like the number of elective offices as the United States; and the ballot in all these countries is much shorter and simpler than in this country. In practically all these countries, the only elective officials are the members of representative bodies; and all executive and judicial officers are appointed.

"P. I. Allen: Ballot Laws and Their Working. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 21, pp. 38, 48, (1906).

In Great Britain members of the House of Commons are for the most part now elected by single member districts. In a few cases there are two members from one constituency. Elections for the House of Commons take place at a different time from other elections: and the ballot usually contains only the names of two or perhaps three candidates for the single position. Even where there are two members to be elected, the ballot will seldom contain more than five or six names.

In local elections also, members of county, town and other local councils are also usually elected one at a time from each district; and each body is elected at a different time. In consequence, the ballots at each election usually have but two or three names.

"The mechanism by which the British voter controls his city government is a ballot about the size of a post card. There are two names, or three, on it; the voter selects one. To make up his mind on that simple choice is the whole work of the voter in the campaign and on election day."

So, too, in France, members of the Chamber of Deputies have been elected by single member districts; and even with a considerable number of parties presenting candidates, the ballot has seldom contained more than five or six names. In the smaller cities, however, members of the local councils are elected at large; and in these cases the ballots are longer. For the chamber of deputies the recent introduction of proportional representation in France will make some change.

In some European countries where systems of proportional representation have been introduced, several members of representative bodies are elected by each district; and in these cases, the ballot is somewhat longer, especially where there are candidates from a number of political parties. But even in such cases, the ballot is smaller and less complex than in most American elections. Even with five or six members to be elected from a district and with candidates from as many as half a dozen parties, there is not likely to be more than a dozen candidates.

SR. S. Childs; Short Ballot Principles p. 94.

IV. CRITICISM OF THE LONG BALLOT.

Many criticisms have been made of the great number of elective offices and the length and complexity of the ballot in the United States. Even at the time when the prevailing tendency was strongly in favor of popular election of all public officials, some voices were raised in opposition. In the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846, Mr. Simmons said:

"There seems to be a wonderful charm in adding names to the ticket. The complaint in his county was that there were so many elective officers-because it imposed on the people so much labor. He heard a gentleman from Clinton County say-and he lived among a very intelligent population too-that there were so many names on the town ticket now, that he would pledge $100 that he could get his horse elected supervisor, and nobody would know of it.”

In the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1870, Mr. Hanna of the Tenth District (Wayne and Hamilton Counties), in discussing the system of township organization said:

"There ought to be just as few officers as the people can get along with. This state is as badly cursed with too many officers as by any other curse attached to it. In the county I have the honor of representing this system of township organization has made about 165 new offices. The result is that nobody cares about the business he is expected to perform.”10

About the same time the following criticism appeared in the North American Review:

"The folly of obliging the people to decide at the polls upon the fitness for office of a great number of persons is at the bottom of almost all the misgovernment from which we suffer, not only in the cities but in the states. It is a darling device of the political jobbers and a most. successful one; for, under the hollow pretence that thus the people have greater power, they are able to crush public spirit, to disgust decent and conscientious citizens with politics, to arrange their "slates", to mix the rascals judiciously with a few honest men wherever public sentiment imperatively demands that much, and to force their stacked cards upon the people."11

A few years later (in 1879) Albert Stickney expounded the doctrine of the short ballot in his True Republic; and similar views have been presented, among others, by F. W. Dallinger (now Chair

Croswell & Sutton's Debates of the New York Constitutional Convention of 1846, p. 390.

10 Debates and Proceedings, p. 876.

"Charles Nordhoff, No. Ameri. Rev. Vol. 113, p. 327 (1870)

man of the Elections Committee in the House of Representatives). in his book on Nominations for Public Office, and by Charles E. Merriam, in his work on Primary Elections.

The extension of the system of popular election was made as part of the democratizing movement, in the belief that it would increase and strengthen the popular control of the government. But it has been urged that it has in fact the contrary effect; and that to the extent now used it is one of the most serious obstacles to popular control of the government.

It is pointed out that with the long list of elective officers and the longer list of candidates an impossible task is placed on the voter. This is not due merely to the limitations of ignorant and uneducated voters; but even the most intelligent and educated voter finds it impossible to learn for himself the qualifications and merits of the numerous candidates, unless by giving more time to such questions than can be expected of any but those who make a business of politics. To examine even briefly the relative merits of two or three sets of candidats for 40 or 50 offices to be voted for at the same time, at the rate of half an hour for each, would require the working time of one or two weeks before each election.

As a result, it is claimed that for the great majority of voters, the act of voting has become unintelligent and mechanical; and that the real control over election results is exercised by political organizations of various kinds. The party column and other devices by which the physical labor of voting for a party ticket is reduced to a minimum enables a large number of voters to decide on the basis of their general preference as between parties; but such straight ticket voters in effect abandon to the party the political privilege which the law has given them.

Even voters who endeavor to discriminate between different candidates can make no careful study of all the candidates, and are likely to be guided in large part by the recommendations of voter's leagues, or temporary organizations supporting particular candidates.

Under these conditions, it is said that public officers are not infrequently elected who fail to represent public opinion; and that officers so elected are in no effective way responsible for the conduct of their offices.

"The task of the voter to obtain sufficient information about candidates long ago passed beyond what even the very intelligent citizen could fulfill, and still maintain his place in competitive industry. The result is that the voter, though extremely intelligent in general, comes to the polls in utter ignorance of candidates and their qualifications for office. * * *

"The elector, by being required to vote too much, has been compelled to surrender to a large extent his right to vote at all, and to permit others to cast his vote as they see fit. Formerly people were disfranchised when they were given no opportunity to vote. Today they are disfranchised by being required to vote too much".12

13 A. M. Kales: Unpopular Government, Pt. I, Ch. 2.

The difficulties and objections arising from the large blanket ballot in Illinois are more serious in Chicago and Cook County than in other parts of Illinois, on account of the greater complexity of local government and the larger number of elective offices in the metropolitan community. But even in other parts of the state, the problem of intelligent voting at the November elections is puzzling for the ablest voter. Outside of Chicago, the difficulties caused by the number of separate local elections are greater than in Chicago, where some local elections have been abolished or consolidated with others.

It has been further pointed out that even with the large number or elective offices, there is now a larger number of appointive positions; that many of the appointive offices are of equal or greater importance than some of the elective offices; and that there is no sufficient reason for electing the latter rather than the former, especially as the work of the appointive officers is at least as well done, and often better, than that of the elective officers. The work of the National Government, where only the President, Vice President and members of Congress are elected, is recognized to be more efficiently done and to be more under popular control, than are the state and local governments with numerous elective officers. And in recent years, the betterment of municipal government has been closely connected with the use of the short ballot and the introduction of more responsible systems of organization.