Under the constitution of 1848, it was also held that the state could commute state and local taxes for a percentage of earnings paid to the state treasury, and could commute taxes for an equivalent burden.12

It has also been held that the constitutional provision in reference to taxation has no application to fees exacted for a license.

"The constitution has not prohibited the general assembly from imposing or authorizing the imposition of the duty to procure a license to pursue any calling, nor has it limited the power or limited its exercise."13

More recently, it has been held that a state license tax, under the list of special objects of taxation in Section 1 of Article IX, was not valid, where it was provided that this should supersede taxes on personal property. But such special taxes are valid where imposed in addition to the general taxes on property.14

Exemptions. The enumeration (in section 3 of. Article IX) of certain classes of property which may be exempted from taxation is an exclusion of all other subjects of exemption and a limitation upon. the power of the General Assembly to exempt any other property.

"Under Section 1 of Article IX of the Constitution we think it is plain that the burdens of taxation were intended to be cast equally upon all the property of the State, of every description. Where revenue was needed a tax is required to be levied, on a valuation, so that every person and corporation shall be required to pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property. Uniformity of taxation on all property was the cardinal principle of that section of the Constitution, and had it not been for the adoption of Section 3 of Article IX, the Legislature would have had no power, in any case, to enact a law exempting any property from taxation".15

"If there is an exemption of property within the classes enumerated in the constitution, it must be by general law, but authority is denied to the legislature by the constitution to exempt any property except that which is enumerated, by any form of legislation, general or special. Any exemption from the rule of equality established by Section 1 of Article IX outside of the kinds of property enumerated in Section 3 of that article is absolutely prohibited".1o

Thus it has been held that the legislature cannot exempt property of religious or charitable institutions held for profit, nor the property of schools not used for school purposes, nor parsonages (which are

12 Ill. Central R. Co. v. McLean Co., 17 Ill. 291 (1855); Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146 (1863).

18 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 102 Ill. 560 (1882); see East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 II. 392 (1868); Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878); U. S. Distilling Co. v. Chicago. 112 Ill. 19 (1884).

14 Raymond v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 196 Ill. 329 (1902); Harder's Stor

age Co. v. Chicago, 235 Ill. 58 (1908).

15 People's Loan and H. Assn. v. Keith, 153 Ill. 609, 618 (1894).

16 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 Ill. 149, 153 (1908).

held not to be primarily used for religious purposes), nor the property of building and loan associations, or fraternal benefit societies, nor the capital stock of certain classes of corporations.1

An act of 1915 providing for the payment of high school tuition for pupils from districts not maintaining a high school, out of the state school fund, has been held to be unconstitutional, as conflicting with the rule of uniformity and with the provision of Section 6 of Article IX against the release or commutation of taxes.

"The effect of the act is to require the tax payers in a district maintaining a high school to indirectly contribute to the tuition of persons residing in districts maintaining no such school, and therefore to contribute to the local and corporate purpose of furnishing an education to the children of such district. The tax payers of the district maintaining a high school pay to make up the state school fund and then are deprived of a portion of it for the benefit of districts not maintaining any high school; and the same is true of any district not maintaining a high school which does not send any of its pupils to a high school in another district. The act violates the fundamental principle of uniformity and equality in taxation. . . .”

"The effect of the act is to exempt owners of property in districts. not providing four years of recognized high school work from paying taxes proportionate to the value of their taxable property as compared with the taxable property of other districts, to the extent that the state tax is appropriated to a local and corporate purpose. The result is to release the districts from the payment of taxes for such purpose."18

Inheritance Tax. The inheritance tax has been held not to conflict with the constitutional requirement of uniformity.

"A tax which affects the property within a specific class is uniform as to that class, and there is no provision of the constitution which precludes legislative action from assessing a tax on that particular class. By this act of the legislature six classes of property are created heretofore absolutely unknown. It is those classes of property depending upon the estate owned by one dying possessed thereof which the state may regulate as to its descent and the right to devise. The tax assessed on classes thus created is absolutely uniform on the classes upon which it operates, and under the provisions of the statute it is to be determined by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property inherited, and is not inconsistent with the principle of taxation fixed by the constitution. .. No want of uniformity with one living who owns property can be urged as a reason why the statute makes an inconsistent rule. No person inherits property or can take by devise

17 Northwestern Univ. v. People, 86 Ill. 141 (1877); Supreme Lodge v. Board of Review, 223 Ill. 54 (1906); People v. First Cong. Church, 232 Ill. 158 (1908); Consolidated Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 Ill. 149 (1908); People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 132 (1911).

18 Board of Education v. Haworth, 274 Ill. 538, 544 (1916).

except by the statute, and the state, having power to regulate this question, may create classes and provide for uniformity with reference to classes which were before unknown."19

Corporate Authorities. The provisions of Article IX relating to taxes and special assessments by municipal corporations have given rise to a number of questions before the courts. Under the constitution of 1848, it has held that Section 5 of Article IX, providing that the corporate authorities of "counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages" may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, limited the power of the legislature to authorize any other than corporate authorities to assess and collect local taxes; and that by "corporate authorities" must be understood municipal officers either directly elected by the people to be taxed, or appointed in some mode to which they have given their assent; but that it does not limit the legislature to any particular corporate authorities and that the commissioners of a park district established by popular vote, including several towns, are corporate authorities of the towns and may be vested with power to tax.20

But a subsequent act of the legislature changing the method of appointing park commissioners (by a circuit judge), and conferring this power on the governor, without the consent of the people of the district, was declared invalid.21.

So too, election commissioners appointed by the county judge under an optional law, adopted by the people of an incorporated city, are regarded as corporate authorities for incurring election expenses to be paid by the city.22

Local Improvements. On the other hand, under section 9, Article IX of the constitution of 1870, it was held that taxes and special assessments may not be authorized to be levied for drainage works and levees by commissioners and the county court without the consent of the community to be taxed; and it was further held that the constitutional provision relating to special assessments for local improvements applied only to "cities, towns and villages", and not to all municipal corporations.23

Following this decision section 31 of Article IV of the constitution was amended in 1878 so as to authorize the corporate authorities of drainage districts to be vested with power to construct and maintain. levees, drains and ditches, by special assessments on the property benefited.

19 Kochsperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122 (1897; See Magoun v. Illinois Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (1897); Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97 (1903).

20 People v. Chicago, 51 Ill. 1 (1869); People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37 (1869); Harward v. St. Clair Drain Co.. 51 Ill. 130 (1869).

21 Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372 (1883). Wetherell v. Devine, 116 Ill. 631 (1886).

23 Updike v. Wright, 81 Ill. 49 (1876).

In a later case, the rule that corporate authorities means those locally elected or appointed in some mode to which the district has given. assent, has been applied to hold invalid a provision in a drainage law providing for the appointment of commissioners without any provision for a local referendum on the law.24

So too, a provision in the Levee Act requiring towns to replace a bridge removed by commissioners of a drainage district was held unconstitutional, as the drainage commissioners are in no sense corporate authorities of the towns.2

25

At the same time, it has been held that park boards may be vested with power to make local improvements by special assessments, on the ground that such park districts are municipal corporations, although not named in the clause of Section 9, authorizing special assessments for "cities, towns and villages".26

The provision in section 9 of Article IX authorizing the use of special assessments or special taxation of contiguous property for local improvements has been held to authorize one or the other method, but not both in combination on the same improvement. General taxation may be combined with special assessments or with special taxation, but not special assessments and special taxation in the same proceeding.27

A local improvement has been defined as "a public improvement which, by reason of its being confined to a locality, enhances the value of adjacent property, as distinguished from the benefits diffused by it through the municipality." In connection with special assessments, they have been held necessarily to involve the idea of permanency in the improvement, since they are based on the idea of equivalent benefit to the property owner; and street sprinkling and the maintenance and repair of boulevards have been held not to be local improvements which could be paid for by special assessment.28

It has further been held that a "local improvement" must be wholly within the limits and under the control of one municipality.. A sewer from a point in a city to the city limits and thence through an incorporated town to an outlet, designed for use by both municipalities, is one continuous improvement and not a separate improvement as to each municipality.29

"Herschbach v. Kaskaskia Sanitary District, 265 I. 388 (1914); Funkhouser v. Randolph, 287 Ill. 94 (1919).

20 People v. Block, 276 Ill. 286 (1916).

20 Van Nada v. Goedde, 263 Ill. 105 (1914). "Kuehner v. Freeport, 143 Ill. 92 (1892).

Chicago v. Blair, 149 Ill. 310 (1894); Crane v. West Chicago Park Commissioners. 153 II. 348 (1894). Lincoln Park Commissioners, 67 Ill. 559 (1873); Loeffler v.

29 Hundly v. Chicago, 246 Ill. 43 (1910).

IV. CRITICISM OF PRESENT TAX SYSTEM

The long continued and widespread criticism of the present system of taxation in Illinois relates to defects in administration, failure to meet its own standards of uniformity and equality, the impossibility of its enforcement, and the injustice involved in a strict application of the principles on which the tax laws are based, as construed by the courts. More specifically, the objections urged are to the general undervaluation of property, the great inequalities in the assessments made, and the escape from taxation of large amounts of property.

Undervaluation. The most obvious factor is the universal undervaluation in the assessment of property for taxation. This practice has been definitely recognized in the law; by the provisions for assessment at a fractional part of the "full value". But it is clear that the "full value" as placed on the assessment books falls a good deal short of the actual true value. This situation is not only generally known; but has been officially recognized and its extent indicated to some extent in the reports of the United States census. In the table below a comparison is made of the census estimates of the true value of tangible, taxable property and the assessed valuation of property in Illinois at different census years from 1850 to 1912, and the assessed valuation for 1918.

Estimated true value and assessed valuation of taxable property in Illinois, 1850-1918.a

(a) From U. S. Census Reports on Wealth. Debt and Taxation,

(b) Auditor's reports show assessed valuation for 1860, $367,227,742; for 1870, $480,664,058; for 1890, $808,892,782.

(c) Currency Values.

(d) Assessor's "Full Value", 5 times the taxable value for 1900 and 1904; 3 times the taxable value for 1912 and 1918.

It will be noted that there was a steady decrease in the percentage of true value assessed from 1850 to 1890. With the legal recognition