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the direction of the Federal Board of Vocational Education. (Act June 27, 1918, chap. 107, sec.2, as amended Act July 11, 1919, chap. 12. Sec. 307872 b. U. S. Comp. Stats.)
Committees and boards for welfare of soldiers. In a number of states provision has been made for state committees to supervise the employment of soldiers and to look after their welfare generally in their readjustment to civil life. Typical provisions are found in the legislation of 1919 for California (p. 4); Washington (chap. 9); and Massachusetts (chap. 125).
The act establishing a soldier and sailors' commission in Massachusetts covers most of the subjects included in similar legislation for other states. It reads in art as follows:
"Section 1. There is hereby established the soldier and sailors' commission, whose object shall be to investigate the economic or other conditions which have resulted in the non-employment of many soldiers, sailors and marines who have been honorably discharged or have been released from the service of the United States; to procure employment for them; to take such measures as may be legal and proper to induce former employers of soldiers and sailors to reinstate them in the positions which they held before entering the service; to provide means of support for them and their dependents if they are unable to procure employment, or if they are unable to work on account of disability, or illness; and, in general, to befriend, protect and encourage those citizens of the commonwealth who have received or shall hereafter receive an honorable discharge or release from the military or naval service of the United States. “Section 2.
The commission shall serve without compensation, but shall be allowed such sums for its necessary expenses as may be approved by the governor and council, to be paid out of the appropriation or appropriations for aiding returning soldiers, sailors and marines, in finding employment.
“Section 3. The said commission shall investigate all cases of non-employment among men discharged or released from the military or naval service of the United States which are brought to its attention, shall ascertain, as far as possible, how many discharged soldiers or sailors are seeking employment, what kind of employment they are fitted for, and in what cities or towns they are resident. The commission shall ascertain from the municipal authorities of all cities in the commonwealth, and of the larger towns, what constructive public work in respect to buildings, roads, bridges or otherwise could advantageously be undertaken immediately, or in the near future, in their respective municipalities, what would be the cost of each undertaking, and whether it would be practicable, and of advantage to the public. Similar information as to possible constructive work, and the feasibility and estimated cost thereof shall be obtained by the commission from the various county commissioners and from the commission on mental diseases, the state board of charity, the state board of labor and
industries, the Massachusetts highway commission, the commission on waterways and public lands, the commissioner of agriculture, the state forester, the board of commissioners on fisheries and game, the Massachusetts commission for the blind, the board of education, the homestead commission, the metropolitan park commission, the metropolitan water and sewerage board, and the transit department of the city of Boston. And it is hereby made the duty of the mayors, or corresponding officers or boards of cities, of the selectmen of towns, and of the other officers, boards, commissions and departments aforesaid, to furnish the commission hereby established with all the information which they possess as to the matters above mentioned, or which they can procure by reasonable efforts. The said information shall be furnished to the commission, as speedily as possible, in pursuance of this act, and without any special request therefor. It shall be the duty of the said commission to report from time to time to the general court, with such suggestions for legislation or otherwise as it may deem necessary or proper; and if any such report shall become necessary after the present general court has been prorogued, it shall be made to the governor."
“Section 4. The commission shall appoint in such industrial centres and other cities and towns of the commonwealth as may seem to it expedient, local soldiers and sailors' committees, or may designate any existing local committee or agency to act as such a committee, and may delegate to said committees such powers and duties as in the judgment of the commission may be necessary effectively to carry out the provisions of this act in all parts of the commonwealth. Such local committees shall, under the supervision and direction of the commission, exercise the powers and duties delegated as aforesaid, and shall make such reports to the commission as it may require. The said commission is hereby authorized to request any persons, associations or corporations which have already established agencies or headquarters for the relief of discharged soldiers, sailors and marines, or shall hereafter establish the same, to cooperate with the said commission or to restrict, divert or cease their efforts, as the commission may deem best for the common good.
"Section 5. The soldiers and sailors' commission shall continue in existence until it is dissolved by proclamation made by the governor; and the governor is hereby authorized and requested to dissolve the commission whenever, in his judgment, the reasons for its existence have ceased.”
Conclusions. Soldiers' preferences in civil service laws have been expressly upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois. (People v. Brady, 262 111. 578, p. 594, 1914.) There would seem no doubt as to the validity of legislation giving certain privileges to soldiers in state institutions or providing for the physical rehabilitation of soldiers.
Tax exemptions of soldiers are clearly forbidden by the present constitution, which specifies what tax exemptions may be made.
There is no constitutional objection to legislation providing aid to soldiers in obtaining employment. The use of state lands for the settlement of soldiers is probably valid in most states without constitutional change, but little can be accomplished by such a plan in Illinois.
In some states plans have been adopted either (1) for the advancement of money to purchase property for soldiers, or (2) for the payment of tuition money to soldiers, or (3) for the direct payment of soldiers' bonuses. Clearly the state cannot now engage in any banking enterprise (Art. XI, Sec. 5). Loans or advances to soldiers may be forbidden by the provision that: “The state shall never pay, assume or become responsible for the debts or liabilities of, or in any manner give, loan or extend its credit to, or in aid of any public or other corporation, association or individual”. Article IV, section 19 of the constitution provides that: “The general assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered on a contract made, nor authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the state under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void: Provided, the general assembly may make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion.
The constitution seems to have intended to prevent the legislative grant of gratuities, and employes' pension schemes have been upheld on the ground that the pension is a deferred payment for services rendered. (People v. Abbott, 274 111. 380, 1916).
There is .of course no legal obligation upon the state to pay bonuses or other compensation to soldiers who were in the service of the United States, and the constitutional provision just referred to might be held to forbid such payments. The question may also present itself as to whether such payment would constitute a public purpose for which public money may be used. In Taylor v. Thompson, 42 III. 9 (1866), the state Supreme Court upheld legislation authorizing the payment of local bounties to volunteers.1
1 See a further discussion of such bounties in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, pp. 326-333.
VI. INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR CASES.
Outline of Illinois statute. The Illinois statute provides that the superior court of Cook County and the circuit courts in term time and any judge thereof in vacation shall have power to grant injunctions. No injunction is to be granted without previous notice to the defendants unless it appears from the bill or affidavit that the right of the complainant will be unduly prejudiced if the injunction is not issued immediately or without such notice. In all cases other than those enjoining a judgment the complainant is required to give bond before an injunction is issued, but the statute provides that bond need not be required when, for good cause shown, the court is of opinion that the injunction ought to be granted without bond. Where an injunction is dissolved the court may before finally disposing of the case hear evidence and assess damages to the party damnified by such injunction. An action upon the injunction bond, if one is required, will also lie.
Any person violating an injunction may be punished for contempt.
Operation of injunction procedure. The Illinois practice with respect to injunctions is similar to that in other states, and a summary should here be made of the manner in which injunctions operate in labor cases. Several points should be particularly noted:
(a) Where there are several judges who may issue an injunction, as there usually are in a populous community, the applicant for the injunction has a discretion as to the judge to whom he may apply.
(b) The Illinois statute does not require notice, and the giving of a bond by the applicant for the injunction lies within the discretion of the judge.
(c) The so-called "blanket" injunction has become common in this country in labor cases. Upon this matter the law is well summed up by Burdick's Law of Torts."
"In this country the practice has grown up of directing the injunction against all persons engaged in the illegal conduct complained of, although some may not be formally named as defendants in the suit, or served with process. This is done on the principle that if the persons are numerous, certain ones may be made parties defendants as representatives of the class."
1 Burdick's Law of Torts, Third Edition, p. 578.
(d) Appeals may be taken from the action of the court granting an injunction, but an appeal does not suspend the operation of the injunction, and the court issuing the injunction may punish violators of it for contempts committed during the pendency of the appeal, even though upon the appeal the injunction is dissolved.
From this it necessarily results that until an appeal is taken and an injunction issued by a lower court held improper, the determination of the lower court is controlling. Even though the determination of the lower court that an injunction should have issued is reversed on appeal, it is still true that the punishment for contempt will hold. That is, even though an injunction was illegally issued by a lower court, the violator of such an injunction is punishable for contempt so long as the injunction remains in force and the action of the lower court is not reversed.
What has just been stated is the law of this country with respect to contempts, and the doctrine of this matter has recently been stated in a very clear manner by the supreme court of Illinois in the case of Lyon & Healy v. The Piano, Organ and Musical Instrument Workers' International Union. In this case Chief Justice Dunn said:
"Where a court has before it a party complainant asking that an injunction issue on a bill, stating a case belonging to a class within the general equity jurisdiction of the court, and also the party against whom the injunction is asked, the court has jurisdiction to decide whether an injunction ought to issue and the character of the injunction, and should the court err in ordering an injunction to issue when one ought not to issue or in ordering an injunction broader in its terms than is justified by the bill, its decree will be reversed, but the error will be no defense to an attachment for contempt for violating the injunction. The error does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction and the decree is binding upon the defendant until vacated or set aside. A party may refuse to obey an order where the court had no jurisdiction to make it, but not on the ground that it was erroneously made. An order made in the exercise of jurisdiction, though erroneous, must be obeyed until modified or set aside by the court making it or reversed by an appellate court."
In this case Justices Carter and Stone specially concurred, saying:
“Under repeated decisions of this court on similar, if not identical questions raised here, we think the judgment of the lower court on this, a collateral attack, must be confirmed. We reach this conclusion with reluctance, because we are firmly convinced that the injunction order entered was entirely too sweeping in its provisions, particularly the provision enjoining appellants, or those associating with them. from interfering or attempting to hinder the appellee from carrying on its business in the usual and ordinary way.
Furthermore, we are disposed to think that the restraining order is too broad in its phraseology in reference to picketing appellee's place of business, but in view of our conclusion that these questions were not raised in a direct proceeding and cannot
2 289 Ill. 176 (1919).