As regards game, the estimate is 18 stone of venison per 150250 acres, and one brace of grouse per 10 acres. The Commission of 1909, whoe programme was for 1 million acres of afforestation in 10 years, or 10 times the Acland Committee's rate of progress, estimated a displacement of home-produced food amounting to 4.8 per cent.* Judged by this comparison the existing scheme would make a negligible displacement, estimated by the Acland Committee at less than 1 per cent.

273. On the other hand, both these enquiries concluded, and it has been put before us in evidence, that afforestation can afford supplementary employment in sparsely populated districts which will enable small holders to exist who could not exist otherwise; and that therefore food supply is assisted, and not retarded, by afforestation. This is borne out by evidence from abroad. Apart from the supervisory staff, "there are no permanent forest workmen" in Germany; "the work in the German forests in the greater part of the country is done in winter, and they are the same men who cultivate the land, small holders. In a great part of Germany and France, the same men who do the work in the forests in the winter, work in the fields in the summer; they double the men working in the fields in the summer." On a large estate with 10,000 acres of woodland in Scotland, "the crofters say they could not keep their crofts if it were not for the work they get on the estate." The provision of shelter on afforested land is also a favourable influence on neighbouring crops and stock.

274. The question then becomes one of quantities; how much employment is furnished by afforestation per 100 acres? In answering this question, the different stages of the work must be distinguished. There is the actual process of planting, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the maintenance of established forests, when felling and replanting go on together.

275. As regards planting, or afforestation proper, the evidence of various authorities agrees that this provides employment for about 12 men per 100 acres during the planting season of six months. This is much greater-possibly ten times as great— as the labour displaced from sheep grazings or game preserves on the areas taken over. But it is evident that, even so, we are not dealing with very large numbers. Assuming that the existing scheme goes forward according to plan, the planting of 30,000 acres in the tenth year-1928-29-will afford employment for about 3,600 men. Subsidiary occupations might increase this to as much as 5,000. So far as this labour is drawn from existing agricultural sources, the effect will be to maintain, rather than to increase, the agricultural or rural population.

* Cd. 4460, para. 79.

† Ibid., para. 38.
‡ Ibid., para. 72 seq.

276. As the forestry operations develop, the amount of employment declines to about one man per 100 acres. This is nearly the figure for Germany, where in 1907 there were 380,000 foresters on about 34 million acres of forest; and it is the figure accepted by both the above enquiries. In Britain at the present time there are nearly 16,000 foresters, or one to 200 acres of forest, which indicates that much of the forest area as recorded is nominal and not effective. By the 80th year, the Acland Committee states, "the forest should be in full working order. It will then require about one man per 100 acres for felling, replanting, repairs to roads, and miscellaneous work, not including the conversion of the timber."* As their scheme provides for the ultimate afforestation of 1,770,000 acres, the amount of labour involved in maintaining the new forests will then (after 80 years) be 17,700 men, less about 2,000 displaced from sheep-farming; or about 16,000. Taking account of the processes of conversion of timber, and other auxiliary labour, they estimate that the whole difference would mean the settlement on the soil of not less than 25,000 families. While this is a not unimportant result, it is clear that a limit is soon set to the amount of labour which afforestation can absorb, and that much may have happened to the agricultural population from other causes during this long interval. It should be added also that, as forestry provides a seasonal occupation for persons otherwise occupied, the results will be obtained so far as the districts found suitable for afforestation are also suitable for small holders, or are in proximity to other available supplies of agricultural labour.

277. It is not therefore surprising that the main ground on which a forestry policy has been advocated is that of national safety or insurance of supplies, rather than of employment. A larger scheme than that at present in force would, of course, increase the results; the expansion would then be for the sake of employment, since the present scheme is thought sufficient for safety. But in the near future, and until a survey has been made, it is desirable not to exaggerate the possibilities of speeding up.

278. There is another aspect of the employment problem. Afforestation, especially in its planting stages, may be used to absorb temporary employment, as has been done in recent years. The Acland Committee thought that it was possible "to expand planting operations for a limited period without seriously affecting the general arrangement of the work." But they concluded that "if the forestry industry is to be conducted on a sound basis, the extent to which it can be called upon to find employment in periods of general trade depression is strictly limited."† The object (of national safety) could not be attained if afforestation came to be regarded merely as a reservoir capable of receiving

* Acland Report, Cd. 8881, p. 49.
† p. 49.

from time to time large masses of unemployed labour pending the readjustment of normal conditions." This is indeed evident from the estimates of 12 men per 100 acres employable in planting; and these must be selected men. If the 30,000 acres planned for 1928-29 could be put in hand next season, seasonal employment could be found for 3,600 men for six months. But this would not represent the whole effect. For so far as afforestation is a policy of maintaining or increasing settlement on the land. by strengthening the position of small holders, that effect will not be obtained if seasonal unemployed' labour from elsewhere deprives the small holder of this form of assistance.

279. In this connection, the Forestry Commissioners refer in their Third Report to the work specially undertaken in the winter of 1921-22. A sum of £250,000 was voted for relief work on afforestation, of which only £154,000 was spent. The planting programme was extended from 8,100 to 10,500 acres, and other arrangements were made for employment on preparatory work. The amount of employment provided was 45,000 man-weeks. The numbers of men rose from 1,160 in one week of December to 4,550 for one week in March, and declined to 1,600 at the end of June. The figures work out at the equivalent of full work for 440 men for six months. If the planting programme is trebled, so as to reach more quickly the amount of 30,000 acres at present prepared for 1928-29, the equivalent of full work for a possible 1,500 men for the season would be provided; but at the cost, as said above, of permanent settlement on the land.

280. The conclusions are as follows. The policy of afforestation is primarily one of security of timber supplies. It will not mean any appreciable reduction of home-produced food, and it may to some slight extent increase it. It is important not to exaggerate its influence on rural employment, and the influence which it can have on land settlement of a permanent kind is necessarily reduced if it is resorted to as an occasional relief policy.

281. The main difficulties of the present time are (1) uncertainty of public policy. The Commissioners should be enabled to proceed, with the assurance that the block grant under the Act of 1919 may be regarded as safe, and that the annual payments will be such as to enable a continuous normal development of the existing 10-year programme. (2) The absence of a survey. It is essential that the cost of providing this fundamental need should be specially earmarked and assured, so that the necessary staff may be got and kept together, and the work finished at the quickest rate which the Commissioners regard as compatible with efficiency. And (3) if the trained staff necessary for development is to be available, education in forestry must be maintained. As the trained staff becomes available, advisers in forestry, analogous to those in agriculture and horticulture, should be appointed in the districts concerned.

SUMMARY OF PART III.

282. The summary of this part is as follows:—

(1) Taking the areas under the same crops in the chief European countries before the war, the productivity of British land compared well with that of other countries. A comparison of livestock kept, in relation to the cultivated area, does not show a serious deficiency, especially when the amounts of labour are taken into account. Belgium was considerably in advance, but there is reason to think that in Belgium this advantage was obtained at a serious cost in the standard of living.

(2) A comparison of agricultural wages, taken in conjunction with the cost of living, is to the advantage of this country.

(3) The problem of maintaining employment in agriculture and the rural population has been serious in other industrial countries of Europe as well as in Britain. This is not the only country to show an absolute, as well as a relative, decline.

But because of various measures affecting fiscal policy, tenure, and succession to property in land, the chief European countries have still a much larger proportion of their people on the land than we have.

(4) In important aspects the problem of employment and food production on the home soil has been different in Britain from the same problem anywhere else in Europe, because of the special position of Britain as regards sea power, shipping, and Colonial possessions. For this reason comparisons of policy are subject to much qualification.

(5) The facts do not show that considerations of public health could now be in this country a primary motive for an agricultural policy involving large expenditure.

(6) It may, however, be the case that the interests of national defence require the maintenance of a due proportion of "food" production, and therefore of tillage, on the home soil. On this assumption some subsidy to tillage would be necessary. Consideration has therefore been given of cost in relation to results likely to be obtained, and especially in relation to the stability of this policy.

(7) If the aim is simply to increase settlement on the land, a small holdings policy is the most direct and economical method of obtaining this result.

(8) A national policy of afforestation will not appreciably lessen food production, and may slightly increase it. If developed on a settled plan, it will assist to maintain small holders in some districts.

PART IV.

CONCLUSIONS.

283. It remains now to indicate the general conclusions which may be drawn from the argument of the foregoing pages. The aim has been, in the first instance, to set in order the statistical facts; and, in the second instance, to show how the agricultural question in different countries is affected by variation of natural conditions, and of national policy and outlook. The argument has been made as concise as possible. And further summary can hardly do justice to the numerous considerations involved.

284. In the opening sections it was explained how the special requirements of agriculture are related to certain peculiar aspects of that industry. The discussion which has since been sustained has filled in, by reference to the practice of foreign countries, a certain content of historical fact. In the light of the results of that discussion, the fundamental ideas of policy may now be resumed.

285. The Tribunal was not appointed to report simply on the present depressed condition of the industry. That has affected agriculture throughout the world, and it has not affected agriculture alone. It was asked to take a long view of agricultural development and tendency; to consider what future the industry ought to have in this country, and by what means that can be secured.

286. Nor does our Reference imply merely an inquiry into measures for rendering farming more profitable. Farmers have, through their organisations, themselves repeatedly asserted that they can adjust their practice so as to make the industry pay. And the keen competition for farms, including arable farms, which has been maintained throughout the depression of the last two years, of which we have had evidence, shows that the industry remains attractive, and that farmers expect it to become profitable again.

287. The facts do not show that there is ground for depreciation of British agriculture as a whole. It pays wages that are high as compared with those in other European countries; the yield of the area which is under the chief crops compares favourably with that of the areas under the same crops abroad; while the actual decline of the agricultural population, as tested by male persons employed, has not over the whole length of our period of reference been so startling as is often supposed, or so rapid as that of other important European countries. Farmers are not responsible for the natural conditions or the national policies which have affected the form of cultivation that is most profitable; subject to the conditions, the cultivation of the land.