4. From the statement which your Excellency made to me, it would almost seem as if the cessation of passive resistance was regarded by the French Government as equivalent to active co-operation of the German population in whatever measures, coercive or other, the French authorities may see fit to take or order. This would be an excessive and an impracticable demand, even if it were conceded that French action in the Ruhr was justified and authorised under the Treaty of Versailles. 5. If, on the other hand, the French Government were to be content with the revocation by the German Government of all measures enjoining the duty of passive resistance, is it to be understood that such revocation would be followed by the return of the evicted and imprisoned population to their homes and the restoration of their properties? 6. His Majesty's Government further note that whilst they are asked to call upon Germany to undertake that passive resistancewhatever interpretation be given to that term-shall cease, nothing is said as to the inducements to be held out to her to yield on the point. Apparently all she is to expect as the price for her submission is that the occupation will continue, her own people co-operating for this purpose. How long then is the occupation to continue? And in what form? Is it to remain a purely military occupation? Or will it, perhaps by stages, assume the character of a police protection? Or, again, is it proposed to submit the territory to actual exploitation by or on behalf of France and Belgium, as would seem to be implied by the suggestion that it will be for the Allies themselves to collect the revenues to be made over to them in the occupied territories? 7. All these are points on which His Majesty's Government desire to be perfectly clear before considering whether they can contemplate the possibility of approaching the German Government in some way on the subject of passive resistance. But clearness on this point is not enough; the French Government themselves have repeatedly declared that the occupation of the Ruhr, which it is now sought to stabilise by eliminating Germany's passive resistance, is only a means to an end. The end is the payment of reparations. If the position be viewed in this light, a definite plan for settling the whole reparation question in a manner that can be accepted as practical and equitable by all parties imposes itself as a first necessity so soon as the stage of the cessation of all resistance to the occupation has been reached. It would obviously be of the greatest advantage that the plan should be ready. The knowledge that it is available would offer the strongest inducement to the German Government to cease passive resistance. 8. Your Excellency's statement offers, it is true, some indications of the views of the French Government as regards some features. of such a plan. Unfortunately, these indications are neither very precise, nor do they cover more than a small part of the ground. His Majesty's Government would welcome further particulars and explanations. 9. The proposal that whatever happens, France's share of the value represented by the A and B Bonds shall remain intact, implying that any necessary adjustments consequent upon a revised estimate of Germany's capacity to pay shall be made at the expense of others, and the suggestion that France should be allowed to liquidate her inter-Allied debts by the surrender of her share of C Bonds, revive, in general outline, proposals which the British Government felt unable to accept in January last, and do not appear to them now to afford a practical economic basis of settlement. 10. Again, whilst the necessity of granting a moratorium to Germany is recognised, this recognition is coupled with conditions as to immediate and continued payments and deliveries, which, at first sight, seem to render the moratorium itself nugatory. Perhaps this impression can be corrected by fuller explanations which the French Government may be able to give as to the system contemplated for the operation by inter-Allied companies of the railways and mines in occupied territory; as to the nature and amount of the proposed deliveries in kind; as to the customs duties to be attached by the Allies, whether on the frontiers of the whole German Reich or merely on the frontiers of the occupied areas; and lastly, as to the proposed arrangements respecting foreign exchange representing the value of exported special products and the consequential adjustments concerning the 26 per cent. tax, the reference to which in your Excellency's note is not clearly understood. 11. In any case, an estimate of the actual amount which the French Government anticipate might be realised annually by the Allies from these various resources would facilitate a correct appreciation of the economic situation. 12. In asking your Excellency to invite your Government to favour His Majesty's Government with explanations to elucidate the several points to which I have had the honour to call attention, I desire to give expression to their earnest hope that, by entering into a full and frank discussion of the important questions at issue, our two Governments will pave the way to the early re-establishment of that complete harmony of views and of action which it is their most sincere wish to promote and to maintain. I have, &c. CURZON OF KEDLESTON. No. 3. Aide-mémoire communicated by the Belgian Ambassador, CONFORMÉMENT au désir que Lord Curzon avait bien voulu exprimer au Baron Moncheur, le Gouvernement belge a fait connaître ses vues sur les points (Translation.) IN compliance with the request which Lord Curzon was good enough to make of Baron Moncheur, the Belgian Government have expressed their views traités sous les numéros 3, 4, 5 et 6 de la note adressée, le 13 juin dernier, par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres. Ces vues sont les suivantes : 1. Pour que la résistance passive puisse être considérée comme terminée, il faut que le Gouvernement allemand et toutes les autorités qui lui sont subordonnées, ainsi que les autorités des Etats allemands intéressés, rétablissent le statu quo tel qu'il existait sur les deux rives du Rhin avant le 11 janvier 1923. Il faut donc qu'ils retirent toutes les ordonnances, décrets et instructions contraires à ce stutu quo. Le Gouvernement belge ne se refuserait pas à discuter le problème des réparations alors que des habitants, des groupements d'habitants de la Ruhr ou d'autres territoires occupés, continueraient à refuser de travailler pour les autorités occupantes ou continueraient à exprimer leur désapprobation de l'occupation et des mesures prises en conséquence de cette occupation. Mais il faudra, toutefois, pour cela qu'il ait la conviction que cette résistance n'est pas la conséquence d'ordres directs ou indirects du Gouvernement allemand. 2. Il ne faut pas considérer la cessation de la résistance passive comme l'équivalent d'une collaboration active des populations allemandes aux mesures prises par les autorités occupantes. Il sera suffisant que ces populations n'entravent pas ces mesures. 3. L'opinion du Gouvernement belge est que la fin de la. résistance aurait comme consé quence qu'un certain nombre de personnes imprisonnées ou expulsées pourraient recevoir leur grâce ou être autorisées à revenir, mais il faudrait pour chaque cas un examen individuel. Il ne pourrait pas non plus y avoir d'amnistie pour les actes de violence ou de sabotage pratiqués contre les occupants. con 4. La cessation de la résistance entendue dans le sens qui vient d'être indiqué aura inévitablement pour conséquence de modifier l'occupation. Si celleci a pris sa forme actuelle, c'est à cause du refus des autorités, fonctionnaires et agents du Gouvernement allemand de tinuer à exécuter les obligations dudit Gouvernement; c'est à cause aussi de l'attitude des populations menacées et excitées par le Gouvernement du Reich. Le Gouvernement belge serait même tout disposé en cas de cessation de la résistance à examiner avec le Gouvernement français les modifications qui pourraient donner à l'occupation un caractère moins militaire et à limiter graduellement celle-ci aux mesures qui étaient indiquées dans la notification faite au Gouvernement allemand le 11 janvier 1923. Le Gouvernement belge, ayant communiqué déjà au Gouvernement britannique les trois études belges pouvant servir de bases à la solution du problème des réparations, est prêt à entrer, entre Alliés, en conversation sur ces bases. Ambassade de Belgique, Londres, le 3 juillet 1923. sive resistance would be that a certain number of persons imprisoned or expelled might be released or authorised to return, but each case would require individual examination. Moreover, no amnesty could be granted for acts of violence or sabotage committed against the occupying authorities. 4. Cessation of passive resistance in the sense indicated above would inevitably entail a modification of the occupation. The latter has only assumed its present form because the authorities, officials and agents of the German Government have refused to continue to fulfil the the obligations of that Government; and because of the attitude of the population which is threatened and incited by the Government of the Reich. The Belgian Government would even be quite ready, in the event of the cessation of passive resistance, to consider, with the French Government, the modifications which might give a less military character to the occupation, and to restrict the latter gradually to the measures indicated in the communication made to the German Government on the 11th January, 1923. Having already communicated to the British Government the three Belgian memoranda which might serve as a basis for the solution of the reparation problem, the Belgian Government are ready to enter into conversations with the Allies on that basis. Belgian Embassy, London, No. 4. Note communicated by French Ambassador, July 6. LE Gouvernement français a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt de la lettre adressée, en date du 13 juin 1923, par son Excellence M. le le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères à l'Ambassadeur de la République à Londres. Il est extrêmement sensible à l'esprit amical dont est empreinte la communication de Lord Curzon et il est luimême animé du désir de poursuivre en pleine confiance avec le Gouvernement britannique la conversation commencée. Rien ne pourrait lui être plus agréable que de voir enfin les deux pays alliés s'entendre complètement sur cette grave question des réparations, qui est, pour la France, d'un intérêt vital. Avant de répondre, autant qu'il est pour le moment en mesure de le faire, aux différentes questions posées par le Gouvernement britannique, le Gouvernement français croit devoir, pour écarter toute possibilité de malentendu, préciser nettement sa position. La France a occupé la Ruhr après des constatations de manquements faits par la Commission des Réparations à la majorité de trois voix. Elle est donc convaincue d'avoir simple-t ment, en cette circonstance, usé du droit que lui conférait le Traité de Versailles. Le Gouvernement anglais s'est luimême associé, en d'autres occasions, à des projets d'occupations territoriales, soit lorsqu'ont été occupées Dusseldorf et trois (Translation.) THE French Government have examined with great interest the letter addressed on the 13th June, 1923, by his Excellency the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in London. The French Government deeply appreciate the friendly spirit which inspires Lord Curzon's communication, and they are themselves animated by the desire to continue in a spirit of complete loyalty the conversations which have been opened with the British Government. Nothing would afford them more pleasure than to see the two countries finally reaching a complete agreement on the grave question of reparations, which is of vital interest to France. Before replying, in so far as it is possible for them at present to do so, to the different questions put to them by the British Government, the French Government consider it necessary, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, to define exactly their position. France occupied the Ruhr as a consequence of declarations of default made by the Reparation 'Commission by a majority of three votes. She is therefore confident that she has in these circumstances simply availed herself of the right conferred upon her by the Treaty of Versailles. The British Government themselves on other occasions subscribed to plans for the occupation of territory, both at the time when Düsseldorf and three |