(m) AS DENYING THE RIGHT OF APPEAL. In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120: The provision of the Idaho constitution that the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals does not confer an unqualified right of appeal from an order of the probate court sitting as a juvenile court, but leaves it discretionary with the legislature to confer or withhold an appeal. Marlow v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106: The Kentucky juvenile court act is not invalid in that it does not provide for an appeal from orders of the court, the right of appeal not being guaranteed by the constitution of Kentucky, but wisely left to legislative discretion. III. A law authorizing the judge of the juvenile court, upon any hearing, to exclude from the courtroom all except those who are directly interested in the case does not violate the constitutional guaranty of a public trial. Even in trials for criminal offenses a court may, in its discretion, exclude disinterested spectators. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488, 490: In this case, heard on writ of error by the United States Court of Appeals, the error principally relied upon was that the lower court, at the beginning of the trial, directed that the spectators should leave the courtroom. The court said: The constitutional provision for a public trial should be construed in a reasonable sense, and in view of the object thereby intended to be subserved. The mere denial of the literal right should not be held ground for reversing a judgment, unless it can be perceived that the defendant has been deprived of some benefit or advantage thereby. * * * The trial was not, by the order of the court, rendered a secret trial. In a sense it was still a public trial. In addition to the court and jury, there were present in the courtroom the officers of the court, the witnesses for the government and for the defendant, and the counsel for the respective parties, and no members of the bar were excluded. These constituted a sufficient number of the public to see that the plaintiff in error was fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. State v. Nyhus, 19 N. Dakota, 326: The Supreme Court of North Dakota here held that an order excluding all persons from the court room, except jurors, officers of the court, litigants, attorneys, witnesses, and any other persons whom the parties requested to remain, does not deprive the defendant of a public trial within the statutory and constitutional provisions giving persons accused of crime the right to a speedy and public trial. Of those provisions the court said: They were enacted to make it forever impossible for the public prosecutors or courts to continue the evils of secret trials as they formerly existed. *** These provisions are held to be subject to a reasonable construction, and circumstances may arise where certain portions of the public may be excluded without impairing the defendant's rights under these provisions. For instance, it is conceded by text-writers and courts generally that persons of immature years may be excluded from the courtroom during the trial, where the evidence relates to scandalous, indecent, or immoral matters. Furthermore, the courtroom may be cleared to prevent interference with or obstruction of the due administration of justice. In Robertson v. State, 64 Fla., 437, it was said: The third assignment of error challenges the action of the court below in ordering the doors of the courthouse to be closed and the general public to be excluded during the trial, excepting the court officers, the jury, witnesses, attorneys representing the parties, and all persons directly interested in the case. HD-63-3-vol 104-37 In the case of People v. Swafford, 65 Cal. 223, 3 Pac. Rep. 809, it was held that the word public, as used in the constitution guaranteeing to all persons accused of crime a public trial, is there used in opposition to secret, and that the constitutional requirements is fairly observed, if without partiality or favorites, a reasonable portion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence would be of no service to the accused, and who would only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity are excluded altogether. Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 379. In Abbott's Trial Brief (Crim. Causes) Sec. 157, the rule is tersely, and as we think, correctly stated, as follows: "The exclusion by the court of all persons other than those interested in the case, where, from the character of the charge and nature of the evidence, public morality would be injuriously affected, does not violate the constitutional right to a public trial." People v. Hall, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. Supp. 433; Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36, 2 S. W. Rep. 631. The Supreme Court of New York, appellate division, said in People v. Hall, 64 N. Y. Supp. 433, 435, in which spectators having no direct interest in the proceedings were excluded from the courtroom: That the protection of a public trial must be given to every defendant charged with crime is obvious. No court in this nation has ever held otherwise, so far as I am able to ascertain. That principle must be upheld unimpaired, but its retention does not entirely wrest from the trial judge the discretion to conduct the trial consonant with good morals, common decency, and in an orderly manner. Carter v. State, 54 Southern (Miss. 1911) 734: It was here held that the discretion vested in the court by section 26 of the Mississippi constitution, upon the trial of certain criminal cases, to clear the court room of all persons except court officials, jurors, parties, witnesses, etc., is in the interest of public morals, and whether it is exercised or not is a matter with which the accused has no concern. To the same effect are: Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126. State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542. Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36. Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 63. IV. A court of chancery has original inherent jurisdiction as the representative of the State in its capacity of parens patriæ to assume control and jurisdiction over the persons and property of all minors. This power is held to be but an exercise of the police power and the public welfare demands that the State through some appropriate agent should assume such control. Wellesly v. Wellesly, 2 Bligh, N. R. 142. In this decision of the House of Lords, Lord Redesdale said: We find that now, for 150 years the Court of Chancery has assumed an authority with respect to the care of infants; * * * Now upon what does Lord Somers, upon what does Lord Nottingham, upon what does Lord Hardwicke, upon what ground does every chancellor who has been sitting on the bench, in the court of chancery, since that time place the jurisdiction? They all say that it is a right which devolved to the Crown as parens patræ and that it is the duty of the Crown to see that the child is properly taken care of. * * * I think there can be no doubt, therefore, that the law of this See also: De Mannville v. de Mannville, 10 Vesey, 52. Any matter affecting a child may become a subject of chancery jurisdiction, and it is immaterial whether it is brought to the attention of the court by bill, petition, or application for the writ of habeas corpus. Petition of Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367: This case arose under an act which provided for the commitment of delinquent girls to industrial schools. On the subject of jurisdiction, the court said: The power conferred under the act in question upon the county court is but of the same character of the jurisdiction exercised by the court of chancery over the persons and property of infants, having foundation in the prerogative of the crown, flowing from its general power and duty as parens patriae to protect those who have no other lawful protector. See also: State v. Grisby, 38 Ark. 406. Witter v. Cook County, 256 Ill. 616: Courts of Chancery have always appointed guardians ad litem for minors who are parties to suits and controlled them by compelling performance of their duties. The probation officer (of the juvenile court) is practically a guardian ad litem for each child brought into court and has enlarged duties under the statute. See also: Board of Children's Guardians v. Shutter, 139 Ind. 268. Cullin v. Williams, 156 Ky. 57. Home of the Friendless v. Berry, 79 Mo. App. 566. |