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more than this appeared, there was to be no exercise in invitum of governmental power. But the aim of the statute suggests a restraint upon its meaning. To know whether liability has been barred by limitation it will not do to refer to the flight of time alone. The limitation may have been postponed by force of a simple waiver, which must then be made in adherence to the statutory forms, or so we now assume. It may have been postponed by deliberate persuasion to withhold official action. We think it an unreasonable construction that would view the prohibition of the statute as overriding the doctrine of estoppel (Randon v. Toby, 11 How. 493, 519) and invalidating a credit made at the taxpayer's request. Here, at the time of the request, the liability was still alive, unaffected as yet by any statutory bar. The request in its fair meaning reached forward into the future and prayed for the postponement of collection till the audits for later years had been completed in the usual course. This having been done, the suspended collection might be effected by credit or by distraint or by other methods prescribed by law. Congress surely did not mean that a credit was to be void if made by the Government in response to such a prayer.

The applicable principle is fundamental and unquestioned. “He who prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the non-performance which he has himself occasioned, for the law says to him in effect 'this is your own act, and therefore you are not damnified.' Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N.Y. 489, 491; 44 N.E. 167; and Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 457; 127 N.E. 263; quoting West v. Blakeway, 2 Man. & G. 828, 839. Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. The label counts for little. Enough for present purposes that the disability has its roots in a principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, the principle that no one

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Opinion of the Court.

291 U.S.

shall be permitted to found any claim upon his own
inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. Imperator
Realty Co. v. Tull, supra. A suit may not be built on
an omission induced by him who sues. Swain v. Sea-
mens, 9 Wall. 254, 274; United States v. Peck, 102 U.S.
64; Thomson v. Poor, 147 N.Y. 402; 42 N.E. 13; New
Zealand Shipping Co. v. Société des Ateliers, [1919] A.C.
1, 6; Williston, Contracts, Vol. 2, $$ 689, 692.

2. If we assume in favor of the petitioner that the credit is a nullity in the absence of a written waiver, approved by the Commissioner, the record supports the inference that at the time of the set-off such approval had been given.

The statute provides that no suit or proceeding shall be begun for the collection of the tax after the expiration of five years succeeding the filing of the return "unless both the Commissioner and the taxpayer consent in writing to a later determination, assessment, and collection." Revenue Act of 1921; c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 265, $ 250 (d). In this case, consent by the taxpayer in due form is found and indeed conceded. The only question is whether there was consent by the Commissioner. But the statute does not say that the evidence of consent shall be embodied in a single paper. Cf. Eclipse Lawn Mower Co. v. United States, 1 F.Supp. 768. Its one requirement in respect of form is that the consent shall be in writing. Sabin v. United States, 70 Ct. Cls. 574; 44 F. (2d) 70. There is left a wide range of administrative discretion. Any writing, formal or informal, is sufficient if made for the purpose of recording the Commissioner's approval, and if approval may be gathered therefrom as a reasonable inference.

The burden was on the petitioner, seeking a refund of its tax, to prove its allegation that the overassessment for 1918 had been illegally credited upon the tax for 1917.

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At the outset it might have stood upon the fact that the credit had been made after the normal term of limitation, casting the burden on the Government of going forward with evidence in proof of an extension. When its own waiver had been proved, however, the case took on another aspect. At that stage the presumption of official regularity was sufficient to sustain the inference that the Commissioner on his side had done whatever was appropriate to give support to his own act and thus validate the credit. Acts done by a public officer “which presuppose the existence of other acts to make them legally operative, are presumptive proofs of the latter." Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 70; United States v. Royer, 268 U.S. 394, 398; Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U.S. 91, 97; Mandeville v. Reynolds, 68 N.Y. 528, 534; Demings v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 131 N.Y. 522, 527; 30 N.E. 572; Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, § 2524. No doubt the presumption of regularity is subject to be rebutted. It stands until dislodged.

Now, the petitioner has failed to show that the Commissioner did not approve in writing. On the contrary the evidence is persuasive that he did. A certificate of an additional assessment for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1917, was signed, as we have seen, on June 26, 1923; and on the assessment list attached thereto, opposite the entry of the assessment against the petitioner, the following appears: “7/31/17 Fisc. 1753361. O.L. 4/17/23; waiver." The Commissioner did not sign his name below the memorandum, but the memorandum was attached to a certificate which the Commissioner did sign, and his name subscribed to the certificate authenticates also the documents attached to it, if we assume in favor of the petitioner that signing is essential. The Court of Claims was of the opinion that the word "waiver” on this list had relation to

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the second of the two consents on file with the Commissioner. The context and the circumstances lend support to that conclusion. The fiscal year for the petitioner ended July 31. Probably through inadvertence, the first waiver refers to a tax for the calendar year ending December 31. This might have seemed to exclude the first six months of the year ending July 31, 1917, i. e., the period from July 31, 1916 to January 1 following. We do not say that the courts would uphold so literal a construction. Almost certainly the objection, if made, would be put aside as hypercritical. See 39 Stat., c. 463, p. 770, $ 13. Even so, the memorandum may well be allocated to the waiver that fits it precisely in preference to the one that fits it imperfectly. We turn, then, to the documents in order to relate them to one another. If we look only to its letter, the memorandum does not refer to a waiver for the calendar year ending December 31, 1917. It refers, on the contrary, to a waiver for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1917 (7/31/17). The only waiver corresponding to this description in form as well as in substance is the one filed with the Commissioner February 19, 1923, which covers the year ending July 31, 1917, as well as the year after.

The inference, therefore, is legitimate that the second of the two waivers is the one that the Commissioner had in view when he wrote this memorandum indicative of assent. At the very least the effect of the entry is to leave the purpose of the writer doubtful. Choice between two doubts should be made in such a way as to favor the presumption of official regularity.

3. The petitioner has failed to make out the existence of an account stated for its benefit, and its claim, even if otherwise valid, is barred by limitation.

Payment of the tax for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1918, was made by the petitioner, partly in 1918, and

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partly in 1919. Five years from the date of payment, a statute of limitations set up a bar to a suit for the recovery of the tax on the ground of illegal assessment or collection. R.S. § 3226; 26 U.S.C. § 156; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 258, 265. The petitioner, conceding this, maintains that in June, 1924, there was a statement of an account, giving rise to a new cause of action with a new term of limitation. Daube v. United States, 289 U.S. 367, 370; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, supra. This suit was not brought till May, 1930. In the absence of an account stated in its favor the petitioner must fail.

A recent judgment of this court recalls the essentials of an account stated as they were long ago defined. Daube v. United States, supra. A balance must have been struck in such circumstances as to import a promise of payment on the one side and acceptance on the other. But plainly no such promise is a just or reasonable inference from the certificate of overassessment delivered to this taxpayer, if the certificate is interpreted in the setting of the occasion. The taxpayer knew that the Commissioner had been requested, after determining the overassessment, to set it off against the tax for an earlier year. The taxpayer knew also that the set-off or credit would not appear on the face of the certificate of overassessment, but would require reference to another and later document, the schedule of refunds and credits. The diverse functions of these documents were pointed out by this court in United States v. Swift & Co., 282 U.S. 468, 475 and Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 163, 170. The taxpayer knew also that it had signed a formal waiver extending the term of collection until March, 1925, and it had no reason to believe that this waiver had not been signed by the Commissioner, if it be assumed for present purposes that such a signature was necessary.

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