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Opinion of the Court.

291 U.S.

going concern, and so as neither directly nor indirectly to retain any of the fruits of the acquisition of common stock of Hart & Hegeman; or, in the alternative, to divest itself of “ all the common stock of " Arrow in the same manner. It was further ordered " that such divestment of the common stock or assets” of Arrow or Hart & Hegeman, as the case might be, should not be made directly or indirectly to the petitioner or any stockholders, officers, employees, or agents of or under the control of the petitioner.

The findings with respect to the effect of the acquisition and ownership by the holding company of the shares of the two manufacturing corporations are attacked as unsupported in fact and unjustified in law. The record is said to disclose that competition was not in fact diminished but preserved. And it is further argued that if competition was or might be in some measure curtailed by the device of a holding company the result is unimportant and insignificant unless the public was injured, and not only is there a total absence of proof of injury to the public, but much affirmative evidence that consumers were benefited by reduction of prices consequent on manufacturing efficiency made possible by unified control.

It is unnecessary to discuss or to decide the questions thus raised, for we think the Commission lacked authority to issue any order against the petitioner.

Section 7 of the Clayton Act forbids any corporation to acquire the whole or any part of the share capital of two or more corporations, where the effect of the acquisition or the use of the stock by voting or otherwise may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations, restrain competition in interstate commerce or create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Section 11 3 specifies the remedy which the Commission may apply,

U.S.C., Title 15, $ 21.

587

Opinion of the Court.

namely, that it may, after hearing, order the violator to divest itself of the stock held contrary to the terms of the Act. The statute does not forbid the acquirement of property, or the merger of corporations pursuant to state laws, nor does it provide any machinery for compelling a divestiture of assets acquired by purchase or otherwise, or the distribution of physical property brought into a single ownership by merger.

If, instead of resorting to the holding company device, the shareholders of Arrow and Hart & Hegeman had caused a merger, this action would not have been a violation of the Act. And if, prior to complaint by the Commission, the holding company, in virtue of its status as sole stockholder of the two operating companies, had caused a conveyance of their assets to it, the Commission would have been without power to set aside the transfers or to compel a reconveyance. Thatcher Mfg.Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 272 U.S. 554, 560, 561.

Clearly, also, if the holding company had, before complaint filed, divested itself of the shares of either or both of the manufacturing companies, the Commission would have been without jurisdiction. And it might with impunity, prior to complaint, have distributed the shares it held pro rata amongst its stockholders. The fact that in such case the same group of stockholders would have owned shares in both companies, whereas theretofore some owned stock in one corporation only, and some held stock solely in the other, would not have operated to give the Commission jurisdiction. For if the holding corporation had effectually divested itself of the stock, the Commission could not deal with a condition thereafter developing although thought by it to threaten results contrary to the intent of the Act. Compare National Harness Mfrs. Assn. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 268 Fed. 705; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 Fed. 45.

Opinion of the Court.

291 U.S.

Moreover, the holding company could have ousted the Commission's jurisdiction after complaint filed, by divesting itself of the shares, for that was all the Commission could order. And if it had so divested itself the transferees of the shares could immediately have brought about a corporate merger without violating the Clayton Act. We think that is precisely the legal effect of what was done in the present case. The holding company divested itself of the shares, and thereafter the owners of these common shares united with the holders of the preferred shares to bring about a merger.

The Commission apparently was doubtful of its authority to promulgate the order which it entered. This is evidenced by the terms of the findings and the order. In its final conclusion the Commission refers to “ the acquisition by the said new respondent [the petitioner] through merger, of the common or voting stocks of the said Hart & Hegeman Manufacturing Company and Arrow Electric Company and denominates this a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. This, of course, is in the teeth of the obvious fact that the petitioner never acquired the stock of either Arrow or Hart & Hegeman. In its order the Commission directs that the petitioner cease and desist from violation of the provisions of § 7 of the Act, and “divest itself absolutely, in good faith, of all common stock of the Hart & Hegeman Manufacturing Company acquired by it as a result of the merger"; and then adds that it shall do this so as to include in such divestment the manufacturing plants and assets of Hart & Hegeman; and in the alternative the order applies to the stock and manufacturing plants of Arrow. This is a tacit admission that the Commission is without jurisdiction to act unless the alleged violator holds stocks of other corporations. The Commission's own findings show that the petitioner never held any stock of either company, but the

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order, nevertheless, requires that the petitioner divest itself of those stocks.

The argument on behalf of the Commission is that while it is true the petitioner never owned any stock of Arrow or Hart & Hegeman, the holding company, against whom the complaint was originally directed, did hold such stocks in violation of the statute when the proceeding was initiated; and, instead of parting with the shares in good faith, ineffectually attempted to alter the status by initiating and carrying through the merger, the dissolution of which is the aim of the Commission's order.

We think the Commission's premise with respect to the activities of the holding company in bringing about the merger is without support. When the Commission filed its complaint those who had previously been the common stockholders of Arrow and Hart & Hegeman, respectively, had become the owners of the shares of the holding company. While those shares represented at two removes the physical assets of the enterprise, they nevertheless evidenced the equity ownership of those assets. At that time Arrow and Hart & Hegeman were still separate corporate entities, and about 73% of their outstanding capital stock was preferred stock held by the public, in no wise affected by the creation of the holding company. After the holding company had conveyed the Arrow stock to a new holding company, and the Hart & Hegeman stock to another new holding company, the only persons who could bring about a merger and consequent consolidation of assets were the preferred and common stockholders of Arrow and Hart & Hegeman. Under the laws of Connecticut two-thirds of the outstanding stock of each class had to vote affirmatively to authorize a merger. While the holding company proposed the plan for accomplishing a merger, and sponsored the preliminary steps to that end, obviously that company had no power to consum

Opinion of the Court.

291 U.S.

mate it. That power resided in the equity owners of the assets, the preferred and common stockholders of Arrow and Hart & Hegeman. The common stockholders acted through the two holding companies, but the ultimate decision and action was theirs, through whatever instrumentality effected. Quite as vital to the accomplishment of the plan was the consent of preferred stockholders. It is true the consent was given through execution of proxies; but the shareholders were at liberty to give or to withhold their proxies, and it would be quite beyond reason to hold, as the Commission suggests, that all corporate entities and all stockholder relationship to the property should be disregarded and the original holding company be treated as the sole and efficient agent in the accomplishment of the merger. To do this would be to disregard the actualities, including the fact that the holding company had been effectually dissolved before the merger was voted upon by any of those having an equity interest in the assets.

But if we assume that the holding company against which the complaint was originally directed, brought about a change in legal status, so that before the Commission acted that company ceased to exist, as did the shares it formerly owned, and a corporation formed by merger held all the assets in direct ownership, the respondent's position is no better. The Commission is an administrative body possessing only such powers as are granted by statute. It may make only such orders as the Act authorizes; may order a practice to be discontinued and shares held in violation of the Act to be disposed of; but, that accomplished, has not the additional powers of a court of equity to grant other and further relief by ordering property of a different sort to be corveyed or distributed, on the theory that this is necessary to render effective the prescribed statutory remedy. Com

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