pointing out the specific objects to be noted have been a traditional accompaniment of a view for about two centuries, if not longer. The Fourteenth Amendment has not displaced the procedure of the ages. Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218; Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94; Twining v. New Jersey, supra, at pp. 100, 101. As early as 1747 there is the record of a precedent that exhibits the remedy in action. The practice then was to place the jury in the charge of "showers," who were sworn to lead them to the view. The defendant in a civil action complained that the plaintiff's shower had misbehaved himself in his comments to the jury. "The court discharged the rule, being of opinion the showers may show marks, boundaries, etc., to enlighten the viewers, and may say to them, 'These are the places which on the trial we shall adapt our evidence to.'" Goodtitle v. Clark, Barnes, 457. At that time views were not taken in criminal cases without the consent of both the parties, the Crown as well as the defendant, except, it seems, upon indictments for maintaining a nuisance. Rex v. Redman, 1756, 1 Kenyon 384; s. c. Sayer's Rep. 303; Commonwealth v. Handren, 261 Mass. 294, 297; 158 N.E. 894; but see Anonymous, 1815, 2 Chitty 422. Cf. 1 Burr. Rep. 252. In 1825, however, a statute applicable to England and Wales supplied the defect of power, if defect there formerly had been. 6 George IV, c. 50, s. 23. Thereafter, in any case, either civil or criminal," a view might be ordered in the discretion of the court. The form of oath administered to the showers appears in the reports. Thus, in Regina v. Whalley, 1847, 2 Cox Crim. Rep. 231, the oath administered was this: "You swear you will attend this jury and well and truly point out to them the place in which the offense for which the prisoner T. W. stands charged is alleged to have been committed; you shall not speak to them touching the supposed offence whereof the said T. W. is so charged, only so far as relates to describ ing the place aforesaid." See also Queen v. Martin, L.R., 1 Crown Cases Reserved 378; Tidd's Practice, vol. 2, pp. 797, 798; Gude's Crown Practice, London, 1828, vol. 2, pp. 655, 656; cf. Wigmore, Evidence, vol. 3, §§ 1802, 1803, and cases cited. So also in our own country, the power to order a view in criminal cases has been made certain by statutes enacted in nearly all the states (see the statutes collated in Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 2, § 1163), though there are instances in which the power has been treated as inherent. State v. Perry, 121 N.C. 533; 27 S.E. 997; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496, 515. The statutes, when enacted, conform very generally to the practice in the English courts, provision being made for the presence of the judge, or, in his discretion, for the appointment of showers sworn in the ancient form. Cf. the statutes and decisions in Wigmore, Evidence, vol. 3, §§ 1802, 1803, and vol. 2, § 1163; and see Brooklyn v. Patchen, 8 Wend. 47, 65; State v. Perry, supra, at p. 536. When the scene is explained by showers who are not the counsel for the parties, a defendant gains nothing by being present at a view any more than he gains where there is only a bare inspection without an explanatory word. He has no privilege in such circumstances, and certainly no constitutional privilege, to speak to the showers and give suggestions or advice. "We do not see what good the presence of the prisoner would do, as he could neither ask nor answer questions, nor in any way interfere with the acts, observations or conclusions of the jury." People v. Bonney, 19 Cal. 426, 446. If they fail to point out anything material, he may prove the fact upon the trial and ask for another view. He had the same privilege here, for there was a stenographic transcript of all that was said and done. Never, at any stage of the proceeding, has there been a suggestion by the de fendant or his counsel that there was need of something more. The situation is not changed to his prejudice because the showers in this instance were the counsel for the parties. The choice of counsel for that purpose has its roots in ancient practice. Tidd's Practice, vol. 2, pp. 797, 798; Wigmore, Evidence, vol. 3, § 1803: cf. 1 Burr. 252. Far from being harmful, it supplies an additional assurance that nothing helpful to either side will be overlooked upon the view. True, indeed, it is that when counsel are the showers, the defendant may be able, if he is present, to give suggestion or advice, or so at least we may assume. Constitutional immunities and privileges do not depend upon these accidents. The Fourteenth Amendment does not say that showers are at liberty in the absence of the defendant to point out the things to be viewed if the showers are not counsel, but are not at liberty to do so if they happen to be counsel. The least a defendant must do, if he would annul the practice upon a view which the Commonwealth has approved by the judgment of its courts, is to show that in the particular case in which the practice is exposed to challenge, there is a reasonable possibility that injustice has been done. Cf. Rutherford v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 639; Howard v. Kentucky, supra. No one can read what was said at this view in the light of the uncontroverted facts established at the trial, and have even a passing thought that the presence of Snyder would have been an aid to his defense. There is an approach to the subject from the viewpoint of history that clarifies the prospect. We may assume that the knowledge derived from an inspection of the scene may be characterized as evidence. Even if this be so, a view is not a "trial" nor any part of a trial in the sense in which a trial was understood at common law. This is seen from two circumstances. In the first place 46305-34– -8 Opinion of the Court. 291 U.S. the judge is not required to be present at a view, though he may go there if he will. In the second place, the practice for many years was to have a committee of the jurors, the usual number being six, attend at the view to represent the whole body. See the rules laid down by Lord Mansfield in 1 Burr. Rep. 252: also the provisions of the Act of 6 George IV, c. 50, §§ 23, 24 [1825], by which the practice was made uniform in criminal and civil cases: and compare Wigmore, Evidence, vol. 2, § 1165, and the cases cited. We have no thought to suggest that a view by a part of a jury is permissible today. That question is not before us. There is significance, none the less, in the fact that it was permissible in England, the home of the principle that a defendant charged with felony has the privilege of confronting his accusers and of being present at his trial. Certain it is that in the land where these maxims had their genesis and from which they were carried to our shores, the proceeding known as a trial was thought of as something very different from the proceeding known as a view. To transfer to a view the constitutional privileges applicable to a trial is to be forgetful of our history. A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels. Out of the vague precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment a court frames a rule which is general in form, though it has been wrought under the pressure of particular situations. Forthwith another situation is placed under the rule because it is fitted to the words, though related faintly, if at all, to the reasons that brought the rule into existence. A defendant in a criminal case must be present at a trial when evidence is offered, for the opportunity must be his to advise with his counsel (Powell v. Alabama, supra), and cross-examine his accusers. Dowdell v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Slavski, supra. Cf. Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123. Let the words "evidence" and "trial" be extended but a little, and the privilege will apply to stages of the cause at which the function of counsel is mechanical or formal and at which a scene and not a witness is to deliver up its message. In such circumstances the solution of the problem is not to be found in dictionary definitions of evidence or trials. It is not to be found in judgments of the courts that at other times or in other circumstances the presence of a defendant is a postulate of justice. There can be no sound solution without an answer to the question whether in the particular conditions exhibited by the record the enforced absence of the defendant is so flagrantly unjust that the Constitution of the United States steps in to forbid it. What we are subjecting to revision is not the action of a legislature excluding a defendant from a view at all times or in all conditions. What is here for revision is the action of the judicial department of a state excluding the defendant in a particular set of circumstances, and the justice or injustice of that exclusion must be determined in the light of the whole record. Cf. Howard v. Kentucky, supra; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234, 235. Discretion has not been abdicated. To the contrary, the record makes it clear that discretion has been exercised. Much is made of a supposed analogy between a view and a photograph, but the analogy, whatever its superficial force, is partial and misleading. The photograph to be admissible should be verified by the oath of the photographer, who must be subject to cross-examination as to the manner of its taking. It is common knowledge that a camera can be so placed, and lights and shadows so adjusted, as to give a distorted picture of reality. Nor is there need for us to hold that conditions can never arise in which justice will be outraged if there is a view in the defendant's absence. Enough for present purposes that they have not arisen here. "A statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied |