lease the attached property by a bond. They can move to vacate the attachments. They can defend on the ground that the court issuing the attachments has no jurisdiction. If such creditors sue in the wrong court, it is not the province of a court of equity to bring them in as parties to answer an allegation to that effect and to have their suit arrested. (Fielding agt. Lucas et al., ante, 134.)

3. It matters not what a person believes or disbelieves, the applicant for an attachment under subdivision 2 of section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must show by proof of facts known to the witnesses who testify to them, that the belief in the intent to defraud by a disposition of the property is well founded. In other words the intent so to defraud must be a fair and logical sequence from facts proved. (Ellison agt. Bernstein, ante, 145.)

4. It is not enough that a witness is willing to testify to a fact positively; he will not be allowed to so testify, when it is plain that he can have no actual knowledge on the subject. The sources of information must be given, so that the tribunal called upon to act can see that the facts sought to be proved are established by legiti mate testimony. (Id.)

5. The facts (even if true), that the defendant was insolvent when he made the purchases, that he bought more goods than he needed, and that he failed to disclose his insolvency in the absence of any false statements, are not sufficient to show any intent to defraud. (Id.)

6. Nor is it any evidence of intent to defraud, that the defendant refused to secure the plaintiffs; so long as the law allows preferences to creditors by a failing debtor, it cannot be proof of intent to defraud, that the defendant in

9. Where the motion to vacate the attachment is made upon the papers on which the warrant is granted, the plaintiff cannot put in additional affidavits in support of the attachment. (Id.)

10. Where an application is made

to vacate an attachment founded only upon the papers upon which the warrant was granted, an order denying such application is appealable to the general term. Achelis et al. agt. Kalman, ante, 491.)

11. On such appeal the general term must exercise the same supervision over the motion that the judge to whom it was originally made could have done. The general term must consider as to whether there is sufficient in the papers to jus tify the issuing of the attachment, not whether there was jurisdiction. (Id.)

12. Where the facts set forth in the affidavits, upon which the attachment was granted, were that the defendant purchased the goods in question August 6, 1880, on a credit of thirty days from September 15, 1880; that the goods was obtained by false and fraudu

lent representations; stating the negotiations which entered into the sale, the representations alleged to have been made, and that . such statements were false; shows in what respect it is claimed they were false, and points out the indebtedness existing at the time; then makes a general allegation that "the defendant has assigned and disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors; that after purchasing said goods, the defendant shipped about onehalf of them to auction houses in other cities, and sold the same at auction. After this allegation follows a general charge that the defendant, on October 12, 1880, made a general assignment with preferences:

Held, that there was sufficient in the papers to justify an order of arrest, admitting the facts in the affidavits to be true, but there was not sufficient to justify the attachment. (Id.)

13. Where the party made an assignment in October, the goods being bought in August, and there being preferences to creditors whom he owed, the court cannot assume from that fact that there was a fraudulent disposition of his property:

Held, further, that the attachment must be reversed, for the reason that there was no connection between the previous acts and the assignment to prove the assignment to have been made with a fraudulent intent, or to warrant that conclusion. (Id.)

14. Where, in an action brought against a firm, consisting of two members, an attachment is issued, and thereafter one of the partners is personally served with the summons, but the other is not, nor are proceedings to serve him therewith by publication commenced within the thirty days required by the statute, the attachment ceases to be a lien upon

the firm property. (Donnell agt. Williams, 21 Hun, 216.)

15. The failure to state, in an affidavit upon which an application for an attachment is made, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum specified therein, over and above all counter-claims known to him, as required by section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, renders the attachment void ab initio. (Id.)

16. The complaint in this action alleged that the plaintiff and the defendant Walter were co-partners, and that the firm had become insolvent; that the other defendants had, by collusion with the defendant Walter, commenced actions against the firm in the marine court of the city of New York, in which attachments had been issued, under which property of the firm had been seized; that such attachments were void, for the reason that the firm had a place of business in the city of New York, though both of the members thereof resided in Kings county. The relief sought was the dissolution of the firm, the appointing of a receiver, the vacating of the attachment, and also that the said defendants might be restrained from further prosecuting their actions in the marine court:

Held, that as to the attaching creditor, the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that it should be dismissed. (Fielding agt. Lucas, 22 Hun, 22.)

17. An attachment which has become

invalid by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to serve the summons, either personally or by publication, within thirty days from the time it was issued, is not revived and rendered valid by the subsequent appearance of the defendant in the action. (Blossom agt. Estes, 22 Hun, 472.)

18. Upon the return of an attachment against defendant for an alleged contempt in disobeying the provision contained in a judgment of divorce herein, which required him to pay alimony and to give security for the payment thereof; and upon motion to vacate the attachment the court adjudged him to be in contempt, and ordered him to pay a fine, to give security in a specified amount for future alimony, and to stand committed until compliance with the order:

Held, that the whole matter was before the court and it had jurisdiction to grant such relief. (Park agt. Park, 80 N. Y., 156.)

19. The attachment was issued upon proof of service of copy of the judgment, with demand of payment of the alimony in arrear, with the costs, and the giving security as required by the judgment, and proof of defendant's failure to comply therewith:

Held, that the papers served were sufficient to authorize the issuing of the writ (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 14); that the judgment contained all that was necessary to advise defendant of the nature of the claim made against him. (Id.)

20. Defendant claimed that the attachment should have been vacated, because based on his refusal to pay costs:

Held, untenable as it was issued for 'disobedience to the lawful mandate of a court" (Code Civil Procedure, sec. 14, sub. 3); and that the provision of the statute of 1847 (sec. 2, chap. 390, Laws of 1847), prohibiting imprisonment for contempt in not paying costs, had no application. (Id.)

21. The action was commenced by the service of a summons; defendant did not appear; it was objected that the court had no jurisdiction to decree alimony, because

no complaint demanding it was served:

Held, untenable; that if the judgment was erroneous in this respect it should have been corrected on motion to vacate or modify. (Id.).

22. Also, held, that plaintiff was not estopped from enforcing, in this manner, payment of alimony, by the fact that the judgment authorized an execution to be issued. (Id.)

23. It was objected that no competent order was made for the is suing of the attachment; this objection was not raised at special term. Upon the attachment was an indorsement signed by the clerk of the court stating that it was issued by special order of the court:

Held, that the presumption was that such an order had been made; but in any event, as the objection was not raised below, it was not available here. (Id.)

desire the papers in the possession of their attorney they must first discharge his lien. If this relief is not insisted upon the order for substitution must provide that the taxable costs in the action to the present time (if collected upon a favorable termination of the action) be paid to the present attorney of the defendants, to whom they equitably belong. (Id.)

4. The amendment to section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, passed in 1879, gives to the attorney of record, from the commencement of an action or the service of an answer containing a counter-claim, a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof, in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after the judgment. (McCabe agt. Fogg, ante, 488.)

5. But no new remedy is provided for the enforcement of the lien, and, in order to make it available in the case of a settlement before judgment, the attorney, while he need no longer prove fraud or collusion, must still go on with the litigation until judgment, which is to be perfected for cost only. (Id.)

3. Semble, that under section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1879, the attorney for a defendant, in whose favor a judgment for costs has been entered upon the dismissal of the complaint, acquires a lien thereon for his compensation, which is superior to the right of the plaintiff to set off a prior judgment in his favor, whether he seek to enforce such right upon a motion or by an action. (Ennis agt. Curry, 22 Hun, 584.)

7. Where a party has been brought

8.

9.

into court on attachment, in proceedings to punish for contempt, he may be represented by attorney in the subsequent proceedings. (Watrous agt. Kearney, 79 N. Y., 496.)

An order punishing defendants for contempt was granted by default. On motion to vacate the order, it was alleged, in the moving papers that the attorneys who appeared for the defendants in the proceedings had no authority. The attorney who appeared on return of the attachment made affidavit that he was authorized; · the defendants were also personally present; the same attorney appeared before the referee, to whom it was referred, to take proofs. Notice of motion for final order was served on, and service admitted by, attorneys who had appeared for defendants in the action, and who had also admitted service of the referee's report:

Held, that as the attorneys thus undertook to represent defendants, the mere allegation of want of authority so to do did not invalidate the order. (Id.)

As to how far the right of lien of an attorney for costs will stand in the way of a set-off of a judg ment, sought in an equitable action, quære. (Davidson agt. Alfaro, 80 N. Y., 660.)

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. One Foster, the owner of a lot upon which was a mortgage for $1,000, owned by one Root, and one for $500, owned by one Crosby, entered into negotiations with the defendant Wright, for the sale of the lot to him, subject to the Root mortgage, upon the agreement that he should pay the Crosby mortgage. While the negotiations were pending, Foster, Crosby and Root each called upon one Howe, an attorney, and requested him to draw such papers