where expressly directed, makes it plain that the district court could be delegated powers other than those expressly mentioned by article 6, section 6, of the constitution. Gay v. District Court, 41 Nev. 330, 342 (171 P. 156). as The water law, Stats. 1913, 192, amended by Stats. 1915, 378, providing that, subject to existing rights, the water of all sources of supply belongs to the public, providing for the appointment of a state engineer to whom application may be made to appropriate any unappropriated water in a public stream, etc., and providing that the state engineer, on his own initiative, or on application of any one or more users of water of any stream, may make an order for the determination of the relative rights of the water users, there being provision for notice, is not violative of this section. Vineyard Land and Stock Co. v. District Court, 42 Nev. 2, 27, 28, 42, 62(171 P. 173, 177, 180). Vacancies, how filled. Under this section it was held that provisions for hearing and determination by the state engineer are not in violation of the state constitution, as conferring judicial power on an administrative officer since his determination has none of the finality of a judgment, but is merely a preliminary step in the proceeding which culminates in a final decree of the district court. Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 885, 896. 263. Cited, Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 240 (174 P. 709). 266. Under sec. 2, Stats. 1913, 169, creating a board of directors for the state for certain expositions, whose duty it shall be to employ superintendents, clerks and other persons, the position occupied by a superintendent so employed was not an "office" within this section. State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 38 Nev. 215. 218, 237, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245 (148 P. 551). 270. SEC. 12. In case of the death or resignation of any member of the legislature, either senator or assemblyman, the county commissioners of the county from which such member was elected shall appoint a person of the same political party as the party which elected such senator or assemblyman to fill such vacancy; provided, that this section shall apply only in cases where no general election takes place between the time of such death or resignation and the next succeeding session of the legislature. [Proposed and passed at the Twenty-ninth Session of the Legislature, Statutes of 1919, page 478.] 275. Rev. Laws, 3457, 3458, making it unlawful to keep a house of ill-fame within 800 yards of a schoolhouse, etc., is not unconstitutional under this section, as embracing matter not covered by the title, "An act concerning public schools and repealing certain acts relating thereto." Ex Parte Ah Pah, 34 Nev. 283-285 (119 P. 770). Cited, State ex rel. Pacific Reclamation Co. v. Ducker, 35 Nev. 221 (127 P. 990). Stats. 1911, 183, the public school act, section 135 of which provided for a tax for the support of the public schools, was not void for embracing a subject not included in the title, contrary to this section. State ex rel. Eggers v. Esser, 35 Nev. 429, 435 (129 P. 557). Provisions in a general appropriation act for the support of the state government, providing for repeals or amendments, of the existing general laws of the state, would be unconstitutional and void as contrary to the provisions of this section. State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 372, 375 (136 P. 100). The title of an act entitled "An act relating to marriage and divorce" is sufficient within this section to justify provisions in the body of the act prescribing the length of residence required before parties may apply for divorce. Notwithstanding this section, a statute may contain several provisions, provided they relate to the subject expressed in the title or are properly connected therewith. Worthington v. Dis trict Court, 37 Nev. 212, 218-221 (142 P. 230, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097, L. R. A. 1916A, 696). Under this section, Rev. Laws, 1513, was constitutional. McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, 60, 61 (146 P. 756). Rev. Laws, 3831, 3832, authorizing county commissioners, in case of great necessity or emergency to make a temporary loan, etc., does not, in violation of this section, relate to a subject not embraced in its title. First National Bank of San Francisco v. Nye County, 38 Nev. 123, 134 (145 P. 932, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1195). By the direct provision of this section the legislature cannot amend an act by reference to its title only, but must reenact and publish at length the act revised or amended. State ex rel. Freudenberger v. Cole, 38 Nev. 488, 491 (151 P. 944). Rev. Laws, 4530, provides that the commission shall have authority to employ an expert engineer at a salary of $3,600 per annum and traveling expenses. Relator was so employed, but after the enactment of Stats. 1913, 404, entitled "An act regulating the salaries of certain state officers" and providing that the annual salary of the chief engineer of the public service commission shall be $2,500, the state controller refused to draw his warrant in relator's favor at the rate of $3,600 a year, but only at the rate of $2,500. Relator sought mandamus, contending that the act of 1913, as act amending the public service act,. violated this section. an Held, that the act of 1913 was valid, it not purporting to be an amendatory act, but clearly an independent act complete in itself, which was not embraced in the constitutional requirement, and might alter the prior statute without referring to it. Id. Stats. 1915, 453, entitled "An act regulating the nomination of candidates by political parties," etc., does not contravene the provisions of this section. Turner v. Fogg, 39 Nev. 406, 410 (159 P. 56). Stats. 1913, 137 entitled "An act relating to compensation of injured workmen," etc., sufficiently embraces within its title the purpose expressed by section 1, subd. b, thereof, making counties and other municipal corporations subject to the act, and therefore does not offend this section. Nevada Industrial Commission v. Washoe County, 41 Nev. 437, 442, 449 (171 P. 511). · The provision of this section, that no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only, does not render invalid the provision of Stats. 1917, 385, that electors in the military service of the United States may vote in accordance with Stats. 1899, 108, which was repealed by Stats. 1913, 568; revival by title not being prohibited; for an "amendment" is an alteration effecting a change in the draft, or form, or substance of a law already enacted, or of a bill proposed for enactment, but, when the legislative body attempts to revise, it thereby presumes to make additions or changes or corrections to alter or reform something then in force and effect, and "revision" in a legislative sense applies only to a measure, bill, or law then having existing life and force, and cannot, in the nature of things, apply to a nullified or repealed act; and the term "revive," as applied to legislative proceedings, signifies the reconference of valid Legislative powers restricted. ity, force, and effect, at least the reconference of validity, force, and effect as the revived measure, law, or bill formerly possessed. Maclean v. Brodigan, 41 Nev. 468, 473 (172 P. 375). Cited, State ex rel. Esser v. District Court, 42 Nev. 222 (174 P. 1024). Stats. 1919, 75, organizing the county of Pershing out of a portion of Humboldt County, and certain of its provisions, held not unconstitutional on the ground that such provisions are not embraced by the title, the disputed provisions being incident to the complete organization of the county. and germane to the main object of the act. Pershing County v. District Court, 43 Nev., (181 P. 961-963). Unless the validity of a whole statute depends on the constitutionality of one or more provisions not germane to the title, or are so blended with the scope and purpose of the act as a whole as to affect its validity or any other of its provisions, the invalidity of one or more of such provisions does not defeat the general scope and purpose of the act. Id. 276. Cited, Ex Parte Ming, 42 Nev. 493 (181 P. 319). 277. Cited, Mighels v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 371 (136 P. 104). Cited, State ex rel. Beebe v. McMillan, 36 Nev. 383, 385 (136 P. 108). Under this section it was held that Rev. Laws, 3251, was sufficient to make appropriation for claims arising under it, and that, as the legislature made no appropriation in 1917, respondent's deputy superintendent of public instruction could recover under said section for expenses for the year 1917. McCracken v. State, 41 Nev. 49, 54 (167 P. 1001). 278. SEC. 20. The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases-that is to say: Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace and of constables, and fixing their compensation; For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors; Regulating the practice of courts of justice; Providing for changing the venue in civil and criminal cases; Granting divorces; Changing the names of persons; Vacating roads, town plots, streets, alleys and public squares; Summoning and empaneling grand and petit juries, and providing for their compensation; Regulating county and township business; Regulating the election of county and township officers; For the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, and township purposes; Providing for opening and conducting elections of state, county, or township officers, and designating the places of voting; Providing for the sale of real estate belonging to minors or other persons laboring under legal disabilities; Giving effect to invalid deeds, wills, or other instruments; Refunding money paid into the state treasury, or into the treasury of Releasing the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation, association, or person to the state, or to any county, town or city of this state; but nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the power of the legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and fees of county officers, to establish and regulate the rates of freight, pas- sage, toll, and charges of railroads, toll-roads, ditch, flume and tunnel companies incorporated under the laws of this state or doing business Stats. 1907, 355, authorizing a particular county to issue bonds to build a courthouse Cited, State ex rel. White v. Dickerson, Cited, Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 19, Cited, State ex rel. Beebe v. McMillan, Cited, State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank The provision in the act of February 20, 1913 (Stats. 1913, 10). amending section 22 of the marriage and divorce act of 1861 (Stats. 1861, 94), as amended in 1875 (Stats. 1875, 63), by declaring that when, at the time of the accrual of a cause for divorce, the parties shall not both be bona- fide residents of the state, no court shall grant divorce, unless either party shall have been a bona-fide resident for not less than one year next preceding the commencement of the action, is of general uniform opera- tion throughout the state, and applies the same in every part of the state, and to all persons under similar circumstances, and is not a local or special law within this sec- tion. Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 213, 218, 225 (142 P. 230. Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1097, L. R. A. 1916A, 696). Reasonable classifications in a legislative act are not prohibited by this construction. Cited, Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 361 (142 P. 803). Under this section, Rev. Laws, 1513, which is section 13 of an act entitled "An act to create a board of county commission- ers in the several counties of the state and to define their duties and powers" and establishing the duties of boards of county commissioners as election officers, was con- stitutional. McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. Rev. Laws, 3831, 3832, authorizing the county commissioners, in case of great neces- loan, and requiring them at the next tax levy to make a levy for its payment, does not, 279. Cited, Worthington V. District Cited, Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Stats. 1913, 240, authorizing Elko County Rev. Laws, 1513, providing for recount of votes by the board of county commis- sioners, was not repealed by Stats. 1913, 493; since a general statute will not repeal particular provisions of a former act unless the two conflict irreconcilably. McBride v. Griswold, 38 Nev. 56, 59 (146 P. 756). 283. Cited, Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 284. Cited, Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 285. Cited, McComb v. District Court, 36 Nev. 432, 434, 435 (136 P. 563). Under this section, women, being "quali- fied electors," may serve on the grand jury. Parus v. District Court 42 Nev. 229, 233, 238, 252, 253 (174 P. 707, 708, 713). 286. Cited, State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole, 288. Rev. Laws, 2142, passed pursuant to this section, provides that a homestead exempt from forced sale, and that the selection shall be made by the recordation of a declaration of intent. Const. art. 4, sec. 31, declares that all property of the wife owned before marriage shall be her separate property. The act of 1873, passed pursuant to the constitution, provides in section 1 (Rev. Laws, 2155) that all property of the wife owned before marriage and acquired thereafter by gift, devise, or 2614 property similarly acquired by the husband V. Rev. Laws, 4142, provides that a selected' homestead shall be exempt from forced sale, and that the selection shall be made by Amendarecording intention in writing. tory act, Stats. 1897, 24, provides that no deed or mortgage of a homestead, whether a declaration has been filed or not, shall be valid, unless both the husband and the wife executed and acknowledged the same. Held, that although a homestead was not registered as required by law, the husband's sole conveyance or incumbrance of it does not affect the wife's right in the homestead, which could not be alienated unless the instrument was executed and given by both. First National Bank of Ely v. Meyers, 40 Nev. 287-297 (150 P. 308, 161 P. 929). 289. Cited, In Re Cook's Estate, 34 Nev. 237 (117 P. 27). V. See First National Bank of Ely Meyers, 39 Nev. 235, 40 Nev. 284, under section 288. The use of the expression "goes to" the wife in Rev. Laws, 2165, different from the expression "belongs to" the husband in section 2164, does not show an intenttion of the legislature that the interest of the wife in the community should vest only after the husband's death, in view of this section, requiring laws to be passed defining the right of the wife to property held in common with her husband, since "held" does not convey the idea of mere expectancy, but imports ownership. In Re Williams, 40 Nev. 241, 258 (161 P. 741, L. R. A. 1917C, 602). The power of the court given by Rev. Laws, 5841, to make such disposition of the property of the parties as shall appear just and equitable in granting a decree of divorce is limited by this section, Stats. 1864-65, 239, and Stats. 1873, 193, determining the property rights of husband and wife. Walker v. Walker, 41 Nev. 4, 8 (164 P. 653). Under this section and the statutes above cited, fixing the property rights of husband and wife, the dissolution of the marriage does not of itself operate to change the property rights. Id. In consideration of this section, Stats. 1864-65, 239, sec. 12 (Rev. Laws, 2166, 2188, 5841, and 5843), it was held in view of another section of the same act appearing as Rev. Laws, 5843, as declaring that when the marriage shall be dissolved by the husband being sentenced to imprisonment, and when a divorce shall be ordered for the cause of adultery committed by the husband, the wife shall be entitled to the same portion of his lands and property as if he were dead; but in other cases the court shall set apart such portion for her support and the support of their children that shall be deemed just, and as the act of 1861 was passed before the creation of community property, effect cannot be given to it, particularly in view of the construction by the California courts of the later statutes, which must be deemed to have been adopted when the statutes were adopted from that state; hence the decree of divorce in favor of the husband for desertion does not, though there was no adjudication as to property rights, deprive the wife of her rights in the community property. Johnson v. Garner, 233 F. 756, 762. 290. Cited Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 266-268 (156 P. 439). 296. Cited, Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 240 (174 P. 709). 307. Cited, Ex Parte Melosevich, 36 Nev. 72 (133 P. 57). 312. Cited, Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 240 (174 P. 709). 313. Ample provision is thus made for the preserving of joint resolutions which might be adopted in the identical language in which adopted. Ex Parte Ming, 42 Nev. 493 (181 P. 324). 314. Rev. Laws, 4486-4494, creating the said bureau, and the office of commissioner of industry, agriculture and irrigation, and defining its objects and purposes, does not, by section 7 appropriating $25,000 to carry out "the purposes of this act," and providing that all disbursements from it shall be on certificate of the commissioner, approved by the state board of examiners, indicate that such appropriation includes the salary of the commissioner, which section 6 fixes and declares payable in equal monthly installments by the state treasurer on warrants drawn by the state controller; this section, expressly excluding salaries "of officers" fixed by law from the claims against the state which the board of examiners shall pass on, and "purposes" indicating something to be accomplished rather than an existing fact, so that the bureau and office of commissioner were but means for the subsequent accomplishment of the purposes Eggers, of the act. State ex rel. Norcross v. 35 Nev. 250, 257 (128 P. 986). Cited, State ex rel. Mighels v. Eggers. 36 Nev. 366 (136 P. 104). Cited. State ex rel. Abel v. Eggers, 36 Nev. 281 (136 P. 100). Under this section it was held that the moneys of the industrial insurance commission which were in the state treasury was a special fund given to the treasurer in trust, as distinguished from general taxes and revenues of the state, and that the requirements for presentation of claims to the board of examiners and the issuance of warrants by the controller did not apply to claims against the industrial commission. State ex rel. Beebe v. McMillan, 36 Nev. 383, 385 (136 P. 108). 315. See State ex rel. Beebe v. McMillan, 36 Ney. 383, under section 314. 316. Cited, State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 34 Nev. 116 (116 P. 595). Jurisdiction of supreme court. Sections 18 to 51, inclusive, of the water law of 1913, are unconstitutional and void in that they attempt to invest the state engineer with powers to affect or destroy the property rights of water appropriators or users in violation of the due-process-of-law provisions of the federal and state constitutions, and because they attempt to invest the state engineer with judicial powers reposed in the courts, in violation of art 3, sec. 1, this section, and art. 6, sec. 6. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 316, 142 P. 803 (McCarran, J., dissenting opinion). Cited, Vineyard Land and Stock Company v. District Court, 42 Nev. 2, 3, 17, 27, 28, 42 (171 P. 169, 173, 177). Cited, Bergman v. Kearney, 241 F. 896, 897, 904. 319. SEC. 4. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also in all cases at law in which is involved the title, or the right of possession to, or the possession of, real estate or mining claims, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine, or in which the demand (exclusive of interest) or the value of the property in controversy, exceeds three hundred dollars; also in all other civil cases not included in the general subdivisions of law and equity, and also on questions of law alone in all criminal cases in which the offense charged is within the original jurisdiction of the district courts. The court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus and also all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of the state, upon petition by, or on behalf of, any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs returnable, before himself or the supreme court, or before any district court in the state or before any judge of said courts. In case of the disability or disqualification, for any cause, of the chief justice or either of the associate justices of the supreme court, or any two of them, the governor is authorized and empowered to designate any district judge or judges to sit in the place or places of such disqualified or disabled justice or justices, and said judge or judges so designated shall receive their actual expense of travel and otherwise while sitting in said supreme court. [Proposed and passed at the Twenty-eighth Session of the Legislature, Statutes of 1917, page 491. Proposed and passed at the Twenty-ninth Session of the Legislature, Statutes of 1919, pages 485, 486. Subject to ratification by the people at the general election of 1920.] Amendment to this section proposed and passed at the Twenty-eighth Session of the Legislature, March 27, 1917, Statutes of 1917, page 491. Said amendment reading as follows: Jurisdiction and powers of supreme court. SEC. 4. The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in equity; also in all cases at law in which is involved the title, or the right of possession to, or the possession of, real estate or mining claims, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine, or in which the demand (exclusive of interest) or the value of the property in controversy, exceeds three hundred dollars; also in all other civil cases not included in the general subdivisions of law and equity, and also on questions of law alone in all criminal cases in which the offense charged is within the original jurisdiction of the district courts. The court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus and also all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Each of the justices shall have |