fore the passage of the act. A territorial legislature may create corporations, and prescribe the terms upon which they may do business or acquire property in the territory, subject to the control of congress. Williams v. Bank, 7 Wend. 539; Riddick v. Amelin, 1 Mo. 5; University v. State, 14 How. 268. The agreement between the complainant, Potter, and the defendant corporation was not made under the sanction of the laws of the territory of New Mexico, but in disregard of its laws. Section 218, Comp. Laws N. M., provides that "every company incorporated under the laws of any foreign state or kingdom, or of any state or territory of the United States beyond the limits of this territory, and now or hereafter doing business in this territory, shall file in the office of the secretary of this territory and in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county in which the principal place of business of such corporation shall be, a copy of its charter of incorporation; or in case such company, is incorporated under any general incorporation law, a copy of its articles of incorporation, and of such general incorporation law, all duly certified by the proper authority of such foreign state, kingdom, or territory. Such company shall also, before it is authorized or permitted to do business in this territory. make and file with the secretary of the territory and in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county in which its principal place of business shall be, a certificate, signed by the president and secretary of such company, duly acknowledged, designating the principal place where the business of such company shall be carried on in this territory, and an authorized agent or agents residing at such principal place of business, upon whom process may be served, and such corporations shall have the same powers, and shall be subject to all the liabilities and duties as corporations of a like character organized under the general laws of this territory. But they shall have no other or greater powers, and no foreign or domestic corporation established or maintained in any way for pecuniary profit of its stockholders or members shall purchase or hold real estate in this territory except as provided for in this act and the laws of the territory now existing. * * *" It is not averred in the bill of complaint or otherwise shown that the copies and certificates mentioned in the above section of the statute have been filed with the secretary of the territory and clerk of the proper county as prerequisites before the company was authorized or permitted to do business in the territory. This statute, in express terms, provides that foreign corporations shall have the same powers and be subject to all the liabilities and duties of corporations of a like charaċter organized under the general laws of the territory; but that they shall have no other or greater powers, and that no foreign or domestic corporation established or maintained in any way for the pecuniary profit of its stockholders or members shall purchase or hold real estate in this territory except as provided in this act and the laws of the territory now existing. But what are the purposes for which corporations may be organized under the laws of this territory, and what are their powers, liabilities, and duties? Section 192, Compiled Laws of the territory, specifies the different purposes for which corporations may be organized in the territory, some of them for pecuniary profit of the stockholders and members of the company, others for benevolent, charitable, and scientific purposes, and still others of a different kind. By the following section (section 193) provision is made for the organization of domestic corporations, requiring the parties to make, sign, acknowledge, and record, in the proper office, a statement in writing setting forth the full names of the persons; the corporate name of the company; the objects for which the company shall be formed; the amount of its capital stock; the time of its existence, not to exceed 50 years; the number of shares of which the stock shall consist; the number of directors and their names; the name of the city or town and county in which the principal place of business of the company is to be located. Section 195 of the statute defines the powers conferred on domestic corporations, and among other powers to have succession for the

period limited with power "to purchase, hold, sell, mortgage, and convey such real and personal estate as the purposes of the corporation shall require." There is no mistaking the purposes of the Rio Arriba Land & Cattle Company as being a corporation for the pecuniary profit of its stockholders or members, as shown by the bill of complaint. The court can have no legal evidence of the corporate character of the defendant company nor of its powers, duties, and liabilities, without having the copies of the certificates, charters, and statutes certified by the secretary of the territory, or the originals as required by section 220, Comp. Laws, N. M. The agreement between the parties recites that the complainant, Potter, shall sell, and the company shall purchase, the Rio Arriba ranches, estimated to contain about 270,000 acres of land, and the buildings thereon, and live-stock, horses, etc., and followed by an averment in the bill of complaint that the company had purchased a herd of cattle and placed the same on the land and premises known as the "Rio Arriba Ranches." for corporate enjoyment and purposes. Was not the purchase of the land and cattle a positive violation of the laws of the territory, inhibiting foreign corporations from doing business in the territory, and from acquiring or holding property in the territory without having first complied with the statutes? Will the court decree specific performance of the agreement, thereby compelling the defendant corporation to accept a deed of conveyance, when such decree and deed will violate the laws of the territory? The statute authorizing bodies politic to convey their real estate must be construed in connection with the statute authorizing corporations to acquire and hold real estate. Comp. Laws N. M. §§ 218, 2748. To say that the statute authorizing aliens to acquire, hold, and sell real estate in the territory includes alien corporations, without any restriction on their powers, would be to lose sight of all distinctions between natural persons and corporations. Comp. Laws N. M. §§ 218, 2746. Their charters and acts of incorporation must define their powers, and not the general provisions of statutes relating to real estate and conveyances. Under the general rules for the construction of statutes, ail on the same subject are construed together, and no one statute is to be rejected for the purpose of supporting another. Comp. Laws N. M. §§ 218, 1851, 2614. Evidently the purpose of the parties was that the defendant corporation should acquire property and do business in the territory of New Mexico by virtue of its foreign charter or act of incorporation, without regarding the laws of the territory. They stipulate that the agreement shall be filed with the registrar of joint-stock companies, pursuant to the company's act, 1867, alleging in the bill that the agreement had been so filed. The complainant, Potter, agrees to give such covenants and conveyances as shall be in compliance with the conveyancing and law of property act 1881. The purchase was to be completed, the money paid, and deeds executed in the city of London. The transcript contains an agreement between the parties that the cause and all matters in controversy therein should be heard and finally determined upon the bill of complaint, and answers filed in the cause as hereinbefore stated, and a further agreement to omit from the printed record the exhibit referred to in the pleadings, the tenor and purport of the same being set forth in the pleadings according to the agreement. The duties and liabilities of the corporation, and the legal evidence of its existence, are not matters of privilege that litigants may dispense with and waive by agreement. It is not giving the statute a retrospective operation to refuse a decree for specific performance of an executory contract. Specific performance cannot be claimed as a vested right or right of any kind, but depends on the circumstances of each particular case. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 742. The statutes of this territory make no discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations as respects the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of their property. These statutes have been in force more than 20 years. No objection can be made as to the treatment of alien or foreign corporations that will not apply to domestic corpora

tions. The legislation of the territory has always been liberal towards foreign corporations and foreign and alien persons in conferring the right to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of their property in the territory. In the case of the Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Hardin, 16 Pac. Rep. 605, decided at the present term of the court, section 218 of the Compiled Laws of the territory was upheld in most if not all of its provisions. In that case the court refers to and quotes from the case of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, as follows: "It affirms the right of a state or territory to name the conditions upon which a foreign corporation may enter the state and there exercise the corporate franchise and receive the recognition and protection of the local sovereignty," where the conditions do not constitute a transaction of commerce within the meaning of the constitution. This is further explained in the case of Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826. In that case the court said: “As to those subjects of commerce which are local or limited in their nature or sphere of operation, the state may prescribe regulations until congress assumes control of them." Clearly the regulations prescribed by the territorial statutes relate to subjects which are local and limited to the territory, and not inconsistent with the commercial clause of the constitution.

I find no authority to change by a decree of the court the status of the property as it existed at the time the alien act became a law by vesting a different title in the defendant company, an alien corporation and thereby conferring a right to acquire and hold real estate in this territory by a different tenure contrary to the act of congress and the laws of the territory. On these grounds I think the complainant's bill ought to be dismissed.

(20 Nev. 122)

STATE v. CAMPBELL.

(Supreme Court of Nevada. March 20, 1888.)

1. RAPE-EVIDENCE-CHARACTER OF PROSECUTRIX.

On a trial for rape, the court properly excluded evidence as to particular instances of unchastity on the part of the prosecutrix, not connected with the case on trial. 2. SAME STATEMENTS OF PROSECUTRIX.

On a trial for rape, it is error to admit evidence of the statements made by prosecutrix at the time of making complaint, her testimony not being attacked.

3. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF-SETTLEMENT AND SIGNING WHAT IS SUFFICIENT.

Where the record on appeal does not show a settlement of the bill of exceptions, such fact will be presumed from the signature of the trial judge thereto attached. 4. SAME--NECESSARY CONTENTS-EVIDENCE.

An objection, on appeal from a conviction for rape, that the verdict was against the evidence, cannot be considered where the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all of the evidence submitted.

Appeal from district court, Ormsby county; RICHARD RISING, Judge. Indictment for rape. Defendant, Campbell, was convicted, and appeals from the judgment, and from an order overruling his motion for a new trial. H. F. Bertine, T. D. Edwards, and J. R. Judge, for appellant. The Attorney General, for the State.

He appeals

BELKNAP, J. Defendant was convicted of the crime of rape. from the judgment and an order overruling a motion for a new trial. Before the argument upon the merits, the attorney general moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the bill of exceptions had not been settled by the district judge. The record contains no authentication of a settlement, unless the fact may be inferred from the signature of the judge attached to the bill of exceptions. The statute provides that "a bill containing the exceptions must be settled and signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk, within ten days after the trial of the cause, unless further time be granted by said judge, or by a judge of the supreme court." Gen. St. § 4303. The question presented is, must the settlement of the exceptions be proved as an independent

fact? The statute does not require such proof. Conceding a proper signification to the act of the judge in attaching his signature, which would otherwise be unmeaning, the legal intendment arises that he performed his duty, and settled the exceptions.

1. It is objected that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. This objection cannot be considered, because the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all of the evidence submitted to the jury. State v. Bonds, 2 Nev. 265; State v. Parsons, 7 Nev. 57.

2. Evidence tending to prove particular instances of unchastity, not connected with the matter before the court, was excluded. The decisions are conflicting as to the correctness of this ruling, but it is upheld by the weight of authority. Mr. Greenleaf says: "The character of the prosecutrix for chastity may also be impeached; but this must be done by general evidence of her reputation in that respect, and not by evidence of particular instances of unchastity. Nor can she be interrogated as to a criminal connection with any other person, except as to her previous intercourse with the prisoner himself; nor is such evidence of other instances admissible." 3 Greenl. Ev. § 214. The reason of the rule is thus stated in Pefferling v. State, 40 Tex. 491: "The inquiry is for the purpose of proving character, and it would operate a surprise if an inquiry as to particular instances of immorality or intercourse with particular persons was permitted to establish the character of the witness, who, as has been said, cannot be supposed to come prepared to defend her character, except against a general attack." See, also, People v. Jackson, 3 Parker, Crim. R. 391; Com. v. Regan, 105 Mass. 593; Com. v. Harris, 131 Mass. 336, and authorities cited by respondent. In this connection it must be understood that a witness testifying to the general reputation of the prosecutrix may, upon cross-examination, have his attention directed to particular acts of unchastity for the purpose of ascertaining the weight to be attached to his testimony.

3. The sheriff and his deputy were allowed to testify to the particular facts narrated to them by the prosecutrix at the time of making complaint of the injury. Such testimony is hearsay, and was inadmissible in evidence except in her cross-examination, or as confirmatory of her story if attacked. Her testimony was not attacked, and the testimony was erroneously received. This principle is too well settled to admit of discussion. It is thus stated by Mr. Greenleaf: "Though the prosecutrix may be asked whether she made complaint of the injury, and when and to whom, and the person to whom she complained is usually called to prove that fact, yet the particular facts which she stated are not admissible in evidence, except when elicited in cross-examination, or by way of confirming her testimony after it had been impeached. On the direct examination, the practice has been merely to ask whether she made complaint that such an outrage had been perpetrated upon her, and to receive only a simple Yes' or 'No.' Indeed, the complaint constitutes no part of the res gesta. It is only a fact corroborative of the testimony of the complainant; and, when she is not a witness in the case, it is wholly inadmissible." 3 Greenl. Ev. § 213.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

(16 Or. 113)

OREGON & W. M. SAV. BANK v. JORDAN, Sheriff, et al.

(Supreme Court of Oregon. February 29, 1888.)

1. TAXATION-ASSESSMENT-VERIFIED LIST OF TAXABLE PROPERTY. The verified list required, under Hill's Code, § 2769, to be furnished the assessor by a tax-payer, does not constitute an assessment when received by the assessor. It simply aids him in obtaining a true description of taxable property, and is evidence from which the assessment may be made.

2. SAME ASSESSMENT, WHAT CONSTITUTES.

Property is not assessed, though on a verified list, until it is set down in the assessment roll, as required by Hill's Code, § 2770.

3. SAME-BOARD OF EQUALIZATION-PROPERTY OMITTED-NOTICE.

The board of equalization, in making the proper corrections under section 2779, Hill's Code, may place on the assessment roll property of a tax-payer which had been omitted by the assessor, or not assessed; and this, without the three-days notice to such tax-payer. Notice is requisite only when the valuation of property already assessed is raised.

4. SAME RELIEF AGAINST COLLECTION-EQUITY JURISDICTION.

Before equity will interfere to enjoin the collection of a tax, the facts presented must disclose a case falling under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction; such as the preventing a multiplicity of suits, removing cloud from title, or the like, or, it seems, illegality of the tax.

5. SAME

ASSESSORS ACT JUDICIALLY.

Assessors act judicially in valuation of property; and their determinations are binding, in cases where they have jurisdiction, until reversed or set aside by some tribunal having authority to review their action.

6. SAME-RELIEF AGAINST ASSESSMENT-REMEDY OF TAX-PAYER.

The remedy of the tax payer, in all ordinary cases for errors in his assessment, is to go before the board of equalization; and, failing to obtain redress, to seek it by writ of review. Rhea v. Umatilla Co., 2 Or. 298, and Poppleton v. Yamhill Co., 8 Or. 338, approved.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county.

Action by the Oregon & Washington Mortgage Savings Bank against Thomas A. Jordan, sheriff of Multnomah county, and against the county, to enjoin the collection of a tax.

McDougall & Bower, for appellant. McGinn & Simon, for respondents.

STRAHAN, J. The object of this suit is to enjoin the collection of a tax. The material part of the complaint is, in substance, as follows: That on or before August 25, 1884, plaintiff furnished, and filed with the assessor of Multnomah county, a full statement of the property of the plaintiff, and duly sworn to, as required by law. That said statement contained all personal property, except shares of stock in Portland National Bank, which plaintiff believed were assessed to said Portland National Bank. That the assessor of Multnomah county returned a list of assessable property as required, and the board of equalization examined the same, and made the following assessments: Money, notes, and accounts, $118,210; real estate, $24,000; mortgages, $63,670; and allowed an indebtedness within the state of $145,280, and leaving total taxable property of $62,600. That on said sum of $62,600 there was levied a tax of $- —, and a warrant for its collection placed in the hands of Thomas A. Jordan. That, at the time said assessment was made, the plaintiff had no property in the county of Multnomah subject to assessment and taxation, the whole thereof being offset by deduction of indebtedness. That nearly all of plaintiff's property consists of notes secured by mortgage, and that the same are taxable in the counties where the lands securing the same lie, and that said assessment of $118,210 was arbitrarily made, and was erroneous as to all in excess of $50,000. That said assessment is erroneous, excessive, and unjust, and the taxes levied thereon are an apparent lien and cloud on the title of the plaintiff's aforementioned real estate. That thereafter said assessment roll, with the warrant of the county court attached, was placed in the hands of defendant Thomas A. Jordan, sheriff of Multnomah county, for collection. That he returned said tax as delinquent, and the county clerk has, as by law directed, issued a writ under his hand, and with the seal of the county court attached thereto, directed to said sheriff, commanding him to levy on the goods and chattels of the plaintiff, and, if none be found, then upon the real property of the plaintiff, and that said Jordan will unless restrained, etc., and that plaintiff has no plain or adequate remedy at law; and pray that defendant be re-restrained. Upon the filing of the complaint, a re