later, it was in effect being stored and handled by the plaintiffs on the Government's account, during that period, and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover the amounts expended for storage and handling after October 16. Id.
XXV. Where the United States, by the War Shipping Ad- ministration, pursuant to Section 902 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended (53 Stat. 1255), on March 25, 1943, requisitioned the excursion steamship State of Delaware, and made certain payments to the owner on the basis of valua- tions fixed by the defendant for the vessel, together with all appurtenances, equipment, and consumable stores aboard the vessel at the time; it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Wilson Line, Inc., 764.
XXVI. In fixing a valuation which represents just compensa- tion to the owner of a vessel requisitioned by the Government, as a general proposition it is not a matter of formulas but there must be a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts. In the instant case the court has taken into consideration cost of reproduction, cost of construction, acquisition costs so far as relevant, improvements, replacement costs, depre- ciation, earnings, physical condition, appraisals for insurance and other purposes, and other facts. Due to war conditions the use of excursion boats was so popular and their operation so profitable that there were no sales which might serve as an indication of market value. Id.
XXVII. The Court of Claims, as well as other Federal courts
and authorities, is in accord with the rule that reproduction cost less depreciation is one of the principal gauges of value when market price is absent. Id.
XXVIII. In the instant case there is altogether lacking any evidence to show that at the time of its taking the vessel in suit might be requisitioned as a part of any program of the Government then in contem- plation (Cors v. United States, 110 C. Cls. 66). Further, any enhancement in reproduction value, as disclosed by the record, resulted from the in- creased cost of labor and materials due to the war conditions, both of which factors were at the time under the controls imposed by the Government. Id.
EMINENT DOMAIN-Continued
XXIX. Where it is found, on the evidence adduced, that the fair value of the vessel at the time of taking, repre- senting the cost of replacement plus capital im- provements, was $880,000; and where it is found, further, that the vessel by reason of its careful preservation and use had a total useful life of 45 years, of which 25 years remained, and that depre- ciation should be calculated at the rate of 2% percent on a diminishing balance; it is concluded that 55 percent of the fair valuation at the time of taking was $488,400, which amount the plaintiff is entitled to recover, to which is to be added the value of consumable stores and expendable equipment, amounting to $5,534.57, making a total of $493,- 934.57; against which the defendant is entitled to credit for the sums of $119,702.25 paid on October 28, 1943, and $86,547.75 on June 21, 1945; to which is to be added compensation measured by interest at 4 percent for delay in payment of the several amounts. Id.
ERRONEOUS CONVICTION
I. Where the United States District Court, pursuant to the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing the conviction of plaintiff, entered an order containing recitals and findings that the conduct of the defendant (plaintiff in the instant case) did not constitute an offense against the United States or the State in which he had been convicted and that he had not contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction; it is held that the Court of Claims must accept such findings as ground for recovery for erroneous conviction under the Act of May 24, 1938, and the Court of Claims could not go behind such findings nor inquire into the record of the District Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals to determine that reversal of the trial court was on grounds not relating to plaintiff's guilt or innocence. Andolschek, 567.
II. Where the District Court, on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction to modify its final order, two years after entering that order refused to modify such order by striking out recitals that plaintiff's con- duct did not constitute an offense and that he had not contributed to his own arrest and conviction; it is held that the fact that the District Court then considered such recitals erroneous did not affect plaintiff's right to sue the United States for erro- neous conviction under the statute. Id.
ERRONEOUS CONVICTION-Continued
III. The evidence adduced establishes that plaintiff, because of his conviction and imprisonment, sustained damages in excess of $5,000, and he is entitled to recover the statutory maximum of $5,000. Id.
ERRONEOUS INVENTORIES.
See Taxes IV, V, VI.
ESTOPPEL.
See Federal Judge, Rights of, IV. EVIDENCE.
See Contracts XLIV.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 8832.
See Eminent Domain XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV.
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 9301.
See Contracts L, LI, LII, LIII.
EXTENSION OF TIME.
See Contracts LVII, LVIII.
FAILURE TO DELIVER.
See Contracts LIV, LV, LVI.
FEDERAL JUDGE.
I. The right of a Federal Judge under Section 260 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 250) providing for the resignation of a judge under certain circumstances and the payment of his salary for the balance of his life, is a contractual right and the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of a suit for salary under said section. Johnson, 750.
II. While Section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution, forbidding the passage of laws impairing the obliga- tions of contracts, applies to the States alone and not to the Federal Congress, it nevertheless states the general policy of the United States on the matter of the impairment of the obligations of contracts by legislative action. Id.
III. The right of a judge who resigned under the provisions of the Act of April 10, 1869 (Section 260 of the Judicial Code), is a property right and comes within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Id. IV. In the instant case plaintiff, then a Federal District Judge, who was eligible for retirement, was under investigation by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House for alleged official misconduct and was threatened with impeachment. On June 29, 1945, he submitted to the President his resignation. On July 14, 1945, he addressed to the Judiciary Com- mittee a letter reciting that he had resigned and
stating that he now further renounced and relin- quished any right, including financial benefits, which he might have under the retirement provision of Section 260. Whereupon the Judiciary Com- mittee, in a report to the House, stated that in view of plaintiff's renunciation of his retirement rights, it was withholding a recommendation for the impeachment of plaintiff. The court concludes that since plaintiff offered his resignation and renounced all further rights to his office, including financial benefits, in order to induce the committee not to recommend impeachment, and further that his resignation and renunciation caused the com- mittee to decide not to recommend impeachment, plaintiff is estopped in equity and good conscience to assert any claim to those benefits which he renounced in order to prevent impeachment, provided, however, that plaintiff was not mentally incapacitated at the time. Id.
V. The court holds that it is immaterial whether or not the House Judiciary Committee had the power to accept plaintiff's renunciation of his rights under Section 260 of the Judicial Code, since the letter of renunciation was written to induce that committee to take the desired action in a matter over which it did have jurisdiction and because of the letter the committee acted in the way plaintiff sought; and the letter of renunciation, having accomplished its purpose, plaintiff was then without power to revoke it, as he later attempted to do. Id. VI. The court does not decide what, if anything, the Act of June 24, 1946 (60 Stat. 304) adds to the case. Id.
VII. Where the plaintiff in his petition avers that at the time his letter of renunciation was written he was mentally incapacitated; and where the Govern- ment admits that his allegation of mental inca- pacity, if true, is sufficient to vitiate his renuncia- tion; the defendant's demurrer is overruled and the case is referred to a commissioner to take testimony on the question of mental incapacity and on such other questions as may appear to be relevant to plaintiff's right to recover. Id.
FIFTH AMENDMENT.
See Rental of Space II.
FRIANT DAM.
See Eminent Domain VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.
IMMIGRATION.
See Citizenship I, II, III.
IRRIGATION CANAL.
See Contracts XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLII, XLIII, XLIV, XLV, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX.
I. The Court of Claims has held that an employee of the Government cannot be legally discharged from his position and deprived of the emoluments thereof unless the procedure prescribed by the Act of August 24, 1912, has been complied with, but on the other hand the Court of Claims and the Su- preme Court have held that if the procedural re- quirements are complied with, the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to review the cause of removal. Gadsden, 487.
II. The determination of whether or not a person's dis- charge would promote the efficiency of the Gov- ernment service is vested by the statute in the administrative officer, and if his action is taken in good faith no court has the power to review his action. But if the employee's discharge was moti- vated by malice or prejudice or other ulterior motives, then, in that case, the employee's dis- charge was wrongful and illegal, and he would be entitled to sue for whatever loss he might have suffered thereby, and the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction. Id.
See also Citizenship III; Federal Judge, Rights of, I; Patents IV, V, VI, VII.
I. In a suit to recover just compensation for the taking of water rights which plaintiffs claim they had as the owners of land riparian to the San Joaquin River or one of its sloughs, where such rights were taken by the construction of the Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River upstream from plaintiffs' lands, for the purpose of diversion of the waters of the San Joaquin River; and where it is shown that when the project is completed the lands of plaintiffs will be wholly deprived of the water of the river which they now enjoy to a limited extent; and where it is shown by the proof that the purpose of the project was to irrigate certain nonriparian lands and was not in aid of navigation; it is held the defendant is not immune, by reason of the river's navigability, from liability for property taken in carrying out the project and plaintiffs in cases Nos. 46009, 46245,
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