Merger Oversight and H.R. 13131, Providing Premerger Notification and Stay Requirements: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session ...

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Page 234 - That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Page 228 - ... transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 10 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the United States Maritime Commission, or the Secretary of Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such Commission, Secretary, or Board.
Page 152 - A single physical location where business is conducted or where services or industrial operations are performed.
Page 237 - Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the Court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the Court may at any time...
Page 6 - Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
Page 237 - ... the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district court of the United States...
Page 56 - A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants
Page 226 - Commission, and to extend the coverage of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the CellerKefauver Act, so as to cover bank mergers accomplished by asset acquisitions.
Page 28 - Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements...
Page 242 - ... incontestible" trade-mark "That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States." We believe that this provision in its present form is unnecessary, ambiguous and fosters unfair competition without deterring antitrust violation. It is unnecessary because the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the field of trade-mark antitrust questions is fully preserved in the Act itself.159 It is ambiguous because on its face the...

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