sign of their admittance to the Bar, in the left buttonhole. If the number of advocates in the Circuit is not less than twenty they may elect a Council, which consists of from five to fifteen members, including President and Vicepresident. The list of members of the Council must be handed to the Procureur and published for the general information.

The Council is elected every year at a general meeting of the advocates of the Circuit, which is convoked by the President of the Council. If in any town in the Circuit the number of advocates amounts to ten they, with permission of the Circuit, may elect a branch of the Council.

The Council considers the applications of aspirants to the Bar; nominates the advocates in rotation to conduct unremunerated cases (of poor persons); defines the amount of remuneration of an advocate in cases of misunderstanding with clients; and exercises disciplinary powers over the members of the Order to uphold among them ideas of honour and dignity worthy of their profession.

The Council can inflict punishment upon erring members of the Order—namely, warning, reprimand, interdiction from practising for a year (at most), and expulsion from the Bar. No one of these punishments can be inflicted by the Council without giving opportunity for some explanation from the advocate in fault.

The intention of the Legislature in giving such large disciplinary powers to the Council, a body, be it remembered, elected by the advocates from among themselves, was excellent, and is wisely expressed in the Preamble thus-"While not depriving the advocates of the independence necessary for the defence of their clients, the supervision of the Councils should at the same time assist the prompt and active protection of the interests of the public, and should serve as a means of establishing and upholding among the advocates themselves the sentiments of justice, honour, and

consciousness of moral responsibility towards the Government and Society." Unfortunately its wisdom and generosity were entirely marred by a further provision in the Statutes by which the right was given to the Procureur to bring in the High Court a protest against every decision of the Councils in matters of discipline, and in addition to this the person affected could bring an appeal to the High Court in all cases except those of "warning" and "reprimand." Thus even the refusal of the Council to admit an applicant to the Bar may be the subject of an appeal, but should the cause of his rejection be a purely informal one (such as a question of character) the High Court cannot pronounce upon it. This control of the High Court over the Councils had as we shall see, unfortunate consequences.

The decisions of the Council must be carried by a majority of two-thirds of the members present in questions of prohibition from practice or expulsion from the Order, a quorum of half the Council being necessary. The President of the Council is primus inter pares and has no special rights except the casting-vote.

In Circuits with no Council the rights and duties of a Council are exercised by the local District Court.

The qualifications for admission to the Order are the possession of a University degree in law and the fulfilment of five years of "stage" (studentship). The statutes of Alexander II assumed that the Bar would be recruited chiefly from the Bench and the ranks of law court officials, and regarded five years' service in the Courts as equivalent to the required "stage." They also recognised as 'stage" five years' practical study of law under the guidance of a barrister (Patron) in the capacity of his assistant.

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As a matter of fact the Bar is composed mainly of the latter.

Persons under twenty-five, foreign subjects, bankrupts,

members of the civil and military services (except in honorary posts), persons deprived by sentence of civil rights, priests expelled from their benefices, persons expelled from civil or military service, from the nobility, or from communities, cannot be admitted to the Bar.

The admission being accomplished, the novice takes the oath before the general assembly of judges of the High Court in the following formula :-" To keep fidelity to the Tsar; to obey exactly and conscientiously the laws of the Empire; neither to write nor speak before the tribunals anything which has a tendency to enfeeble the Church, State, community, family or high morality. Honestly and in good faith to perform the dnties of the Profession, not to fail in respect to the Courts and Authorities, and to safeguard the interests of clients."

Russian law does not recognise the division into barristers and solicitors as known in England, Russian advocates conducting their cases entirely themselves from beginning to end, including the execution of the judgment.

It was the intention of the judicial statutes to establish a monopoly of the Order, and they contain provisions that litigants may give instructions to conduct their cases only. to members of the Bar in towns where a sufficient number of them exist. Not only, however, was no town recognised by the Ministry of Justice as being sufficiently supplied with members of the Bar, but, in 1874, a supplementary body called "private attorneys" was even created, of which more will be said later.1

1 In 1910 the Russian Bar consisted of 4,814 members, and 3,740 assistants (stagiares). The largest Bar is that of Moscow, which has 871 barristers and 974 assistants. This number is, of course, small compared with the number of cases tried in the Courts of the Moscow Circuit. According to the official report of 1908, the total number of cases dealt with in the whole of the Courts of First Instance in that circuit was 58,518, besides 9,024 left over for the next year. In the High Court 3,636 civil cases were dealt with, and 6,376 were left unfinished. In the Court of Commerce 5,799 cases were decided. The justices of the peace in the city of Moscow in the same year dealt with 87,905 civil cases and 102,673 criminal.

Litigants have a right to conduct their cases in the Courts themselves, or to instruct, besides members of the Bar and private attorneys, also their near relatives (parents, spouses, and children), and the managers of their enterprises or estates. An accused person may apply to the President of the Court to nominate him a gratuitous defender. In such cases the President nominates members of the Bar in rotation, and they cannot refuse to serve. Accused persons may conduct their own defence or appoint anyone, who is not limited in his rights by law, to act for them. Advocates enjoy freedom of speech in audience, but may not allow themselves to use expressions "disrespectful to religion, to law, or to the authorities, nor offensive to any one."

The remuneration of advocates is defined by agreement with their clients, the law fixing no special limit to the conditions of such agreements. If there is no agreement the fee is regulated by a certain fixed scale applicable only to civil cases, and based on a certain proportion to the amount of the action. Fees can be recovered by an action at law.

The client may at any time dismiss his advocate, and the latter may leave his client, but must give sufficient notice.

For neglect of his duty an advocate, besides undergoing disciplinary punishment, is liable for damages, and in case of wilful injury to his client he is subject to trial in a criminal court. It is forbidden to advocates to buy or in any way acquire the actions of their clients. They cannot conduct cases against their own parents or wife, children, brother or sister, uncle or cousin; cannot advise both parties to a case, and must keep the secrets of their clients. They cannot appear as witnesses in the matter of confessions by clients.

III.

Before the promulgation of the Judicial Statutes of November 20th, 1864, the "Fundamental Principles" of

the forthcoming reform, sanctioned by Alexander II on September 29th, 1862, were published in the "Collection of Enactments and Decrees" in order to rouse public interest and discussion. It created an extraordinary commotion, and raised the liveliest hopes in the liberal portion of Russian society.

But, unfortunately, progressive tendencies in those who govern Russia are shortlived. Almost immediately after the publication of the "Fundamental Principles" doubt and hesitation manifested themselves. Liberal ardour gave place to disappointment and covert anxiety. This change. of mind could not but reflect on the work of the reformers. When two years later the Statutes were promulgated, details were found to be introduced which spoiled the purity of the principles upon which they were based, and gave rise to grave fears for the future.1

The progressive magazines insistently pointed out that although judicial reform had been contemplated on a larger scale than other reforms, yet even here only such rights as did not touch the prerogatives of the Government were guaranteed.

The opening even of the "New Courts" as they were called in Russia in contradistinction to the pre-reform "Old Courts," was continually postponed and did not take place till April 17th, 1866, eighteen months after the promulgation of the Statutes.

It is impossible to describe the delight with which this event was at last hailed by Russian society. "The opening of the New Courts," says the Address presented to Alexander II by the Municipality of St. Petersburg, “fills the hearts of all your faithful subjects with a joy which Russia has never felt except in the most glorious moments

1 We have already seen how the independence of the Councils of the Bar was almost annihilated by the granting of the right of protest and appeal from their decisions, which to a considerable degree placed the Councils under the control of the High Courts.