of the officer-the chief registrar, chief clerk or registrar -is usually acquiesced in without any appeal to the judge. A list of the debts thus admitted should be at once placed on the file of the proceedings, and when the time comes for declaring a dividend, the dividend list should be prepared from the file, taking care to exclude duplicate admissions and to correct any obvious errors. When the estate is realised by a trustee this list might be forwarded to him for the purpose of striking a dividend on it; but I think it would be more satisfactory for the trustee to lodge in Court the amount found to be in his hands on the audit of his account, and for the Court to proceed to strike the dividend. The question of an allowance to the bankrupt is one into which I need not enter in detail, but I think the granting of it should (like the granting of the discharge or certificate) be left in the hands of the Court. The feelings which the largest creditors entertain towards the bankrupt are less reliable than the sentiments of an impartial judge. Some rules, however, might be laid down for the judge's guidance.

So much for the bankrupt's estate. I need hardly say that when the bankrupt remains in this country it is usually necessary for him to file a statement of affairs and attend for examination on oath in order to ascertain what his assets are. But his not doing this ought not to interfere with his discharge or prejudice him in any way if he has not the means of attending the examinations, and such means are not provided for him either out of the estate or out of the public revenue; or, if the statement of affairs is in a form which he cannot fill up without professional assistance for which he cannot pay. The Court should have power in proper cases to dispense with the examination or examinations of the bankrupt, and to direct the official receiver or other officer if necessary to send the bankrupt a simpler form of statement

of affairs which an ordinary man could fill up unaided. The examination of the bankrupt, however, is often held for a different purpose, and belongs to a different branch of bankruptcy from the realisation and distribution of the estate. For the law of bankruptcy is concerned with the bankrupt as well as with his estate; and it deals with the bankrupt in the interest of the public, not that of the creditors-for which reason I think the cost of all such dealings should be defrayed by the State, and not paid out of the bankrupt's estate to the detriment of his creditors. Sometimes his examinations, and those of other witnesses whose evidence is of no use to the creditors, lead to a criminal prosecution, the costs of both prosecution and defence being (at least in part) borne by the estate. More frequently the faults thus brought to light lead only to refusing or delaying the bankrupt's discharge. This may sometimes be of use to the creditors, but more frequently it is only of use to the public by maintaining what is called "commercial morality." The law at present lays hold, or rather professes to lay hold, not only of the property which the bankrupt possesses at the date of adjudication, but also of all property which comes to him before he obtains his discharge (or in Ireland his certificate). The refusal to grant, or delay in granting, his discharge, is a just punishment on a man who has been dishonest or reckless, or has shown himself entirely unfit for trading; but it is a punishment which ought not to be inflicted for mere non-compliance with some of the Rules of Court due to want of funds. If the discharge were only refused or delayed for misconduct on the part of the bankrupt, the public would be the chief gainer, though the creditors might chance to gain something by the capture of after-acquired property. But this capture of after-acquired property is not the only ill-consequence of being an undischarged bankrupt. He incurs several disabilities, and commits a criminal offence

if he obtains credit for more than a certain sum without disclosing the fact that he is an undischarged bankrupt. These provisions are made in the interest of the public, not of the creditors of the particular estate. Indeed, if one of the bankrupt's creditors were afterwards to give him credit for the requisite sum, most of us would think that he had nobody to blame but himself, and had no claim for relief. It is for the benefit of persons who had no previous dealings with the undischarged bankrupt that these laws are made, and therefore I think his creditors should not bear the expense incurred in relation to the application for discharge. The interpretation given by the judges to the present statute, however, makes the withholding of the discharge of less use to the creditors than the framers of the statute probably intended. Take the simple case of a legacy left to a bankrupt. If the testator died before the bankruptcy, but the executor had not yet paid the legacy, he can be compelled to pay it to the official receiver, notwithstanding that he subsequently paid to the legatee and was not aware of the bankruptcy at the time when he paid it. But supposing that the testator died after the bankruptcy and the executor pays the bankrupt before the official receiver intervenes, an action will not lie against the executor; and, if I interpret the decisions rightly, he cannot be made responsible even if he knew of the bankruptcy before making the payment and intentionally kept back the contents of the will from the official receiver. If any of the money remains in the hands of the bankrupt when the official receiver learns the facts he can recover it, but the object of the statute as interpreted by the judges seems to be not so much to capture the after-acquired property for the benefit of the creditors, as to punish the bankrupt by taking from him any part of it that he has not already spent. No man's after-acquired property should, I think, be captured in cases where he failed

to obtain his discharge merely on account of poverty or of some other cause for which he was not to blame. But the present law might be made more stringent with respect to a bankrupt who failed to obtain his discharge owing to misconduct. Persons who knew him to be an undischarged bankrupt should be made responsible for paying him money without obtaining the assent of the official receiver, and it might be desirable to have a register of undischarged bankrupts which any person could consult if he wished to inform himself on the subject. Whether, however, the undischarged bankrupt's after-acquired property should be liable to capture during his whole life is, I think, doubtful. I would suggest a ten years' limit. At present, moreover, the capture of after-acquired property sometimes injures innocent persons. Though the bankrupt has after-acquired property he has also after-acquired liabilities—perhaps of greater amount. If this property is seized for the benefit of the old creditors, the new ones will be defrauded. If the latter were ignorant of the previous bankruptcy they should, I think, have the first claim on the new assets, and if this were done the unreasonableness of paying the costs relating to the application for discharge out of the bankrupt's estate would more clearly appear.

The administration of an estate by a Court of Justice is often needlessly expensive owing to the bringing in of solicitors and counsel when there is no need for them; and I need hardly say that in the administration of insolvent estates there are special reasons for keeping down the expenditure as far as this is consistent with efficiency. But one item of expenditure is worthy of special considerationthe Court fees. A good deal of the work, as I have pointed out, is done in the interest of the public and should be paid for by the State, not out of the bankrupt's assets to the detriment of his creditors. And the fees should not be on a scale calculated to realise a profit to the State by reducing

dividends that will be small enough in any event. At present the fees, generally speaking, exclude working men and most people of the poorer class from taking advantage of the law of bankruptcy. So far as the realisation and distribution of the estate is concerned, nothing would be gained by making bankrupts of people who are unable to pay the necessary fees; but unfortunately, under the present law, it is often a very great hardship to a debtor to be unable to become bankrupt. One of the principal objects of the original Bankruptcy laws was to save the debtor from imprisonment for not being able to pay his debts in full. This protection from imprisonment is now given to all who can pay the necessary fees, unless the bankrupt has been guilty of some crime or offence against the Court which is punishable by imprisonment. Besides escaping imprisonment, moreover, he is allowed to retain some of his goods which might be seized and sold if he were not a bankrupt, and he can effect a binding composition with his creditors, provided that a sufficient majority of them accept it. He is allowed a small sum out of the estate, and if he has obtained his discharge his after-acquired property is protected. But if a debtor is unable to pay the fees and cannot therefore become bankrupt, he has no way of getting free from any debt save by payment in full; he has no way of protecting his after-acquired property; his goods remain liable to seizure and sale, and he is liable to be imprisoned for a limited period after a most unsatisfactory trial and on most unsatisfactory evidence as to his ability to pay a particular debt. Thousands of men are thus imprisoned It seems clear that we ought to pursue every year. one of the following three courses, viz.: (1) To abolish imprisonment for debt altogether, which is, I think, the most reasonable and proper course; (2) To allow bankrupts to be imprisoned for debt in the same way as other debtors, e. g., if a bankrupt has had the means of paying a judgment