land, was established as a town by the name of the "Town of Lake View," and by an act approved February 15, 1865, said town was, under the same name, organized as a municipal corporation; that on the 5th day of April, 1887, the town of Lake View was organized, under the general act of 1872, as a city, under the name of the "City of Lake View," and that on the 29th day of June, 1889, the city of Lake View was annexed to the city of Chicago, and is now a part of that city. The bill further alleges that the city of Chicago claims and insists that Hundley, by making, acknowledging, and recording the plat of said subdivision, or in some other way, dedicated the strip of land lying between said blocks 12, 7, and 6 and the lake as a public street or highway, and that such dedication was at some time accepted by the proper corporate authorities of the town of Lake View, the city of Lake View, or the city of Chicago; but complainant denies such claim in every particular, and denies that said strip of land, or any part of it, is or ever was a public street or highway, or was ever dedicated to such purpose by Hundley or any other person, or that it was ever accepted by the authorities of either of said municipal corporations; that said strip of land has never been managed, controlled, graded, ditched, drained, worked, or improved in any way as a public street or highway by any of said corporate authorities, and has never been used by the public as a public street or highway, and the public have never acquired any easement upon or over it; that, owing to the action of the waters of the lake, said strip of land has at different times been of different widths at the same points, the waters of the lake having at some times so far encroached upon it as to endanger and even to wash away portions of said block 12, and that the owner of said block, in order to prevent it from being washed away, has been compelled to and has driven piles and constructed piers east of said block and in the strip of land in question, and, had he not done so, said block 12, as well as the strip of land between said block and the lake, would have been washed away; that said strip of land is and always has been in its natural state, and is a rough, uneven, broken, and sandy shore, marked by numerous depressions and elevations consisting of heaps of sand, and has always been and is wholly unfit for travel, and large portions of it have been inclosed by fences for more than 30 years. It is further alleged that in the year 1884 the town of Lake View brought an action of ejectment in the superior court of Cook county against Parker R. Mason, Peter Kohlsaat, Henry Kohlsaat, and Oliver Ditson, to recover possession of the strip of land lying between said lots 6, 7, and 12 and the lake; that said town filed its declaration in said suit July 30, 1884, and that said defendants filed thereto pleas of not guilty, and no other pleas; that afterwards, at the May term, 1885, of said court, a trial of said suit was had before a jury, and that at such trial the jury rendered its verdict, finding the defendants therein not guilty, and that at the June term, 1885, of

said court, a motion by said town for a new trial having been overruled, said court rendered final judgment on said verdict in favor of said defendants and against said plaintiff, and that said judgment is now in full force; that Oliver Ditson, one of the defendants in said suit, in whose favor said judgment was rendered, was and is a grantor in the complainant's chain of title to the strip of land east of said block 12; that by reason of said judgment. the city of Chicago, as the successor of the town and city of Lake View, is barred and estopped from setting up or insisting that said strip of land is a public highway. It is further alleged that the city of Chicago, claiming said strip of land between said block 12 and the lake as a public highway, threatens to remove the fences which the complainant has erected, inclosing the same, and to forcibly take possession of said strip of land. The bill prays that said strip of land be declared free from any public use, easement, or servitude, and not to be a public street or highway, and that the city of Chicago, its officers, servants, etc., be perpetually enjoined from claiming the same as a public street or highway, and from interfering in any way with the complainant in the possession or enjoyment thereof, and also a general prayer for relief.

The city of Chicago answered, insisting that all the land lying between said blocks 6, 7, and 12 and Lake Michigan is a public street or highway of said city, and that said Hundley's subdivision of said lots 3 to 21 and 33 to 37, inclusive, and the acknowledgment of said plat, operated as a dedication of said strip of land above mentioned as a public street or highway, and that such dedication had been accepted by the town of Lake View, or the city of Lake View, or by its successor, the city of Chicago; that, at the time said subdivision was made, said Hundley was the owner of the lots so subdivided. The answer admits the substantial accuracy of the plat of Hundley's subdivision appended to the bill, and of which a copy is given above, and also admits that none of the streets, highways, or public grounds laid out on said plat were desig nated thereon by any specific name, but alleges that said Hundley intended by said plat to designate as streets or public grounds, and to dedicate to public uses as public streets, the several streets shown on said plat, extending in a northwesterly and southeasterly direction, and that all of said streets are sufficiently noted and indicated as such by their position in re lation to the lots laid out and numbered as building lots in said plat, and that the same became streets by virtue of such dedication, and have ever since been used as streets, and have since received names as streets; that Hundley, from the time said plat was made and recorded to the time of his death, a period of 20 years, always declared and represented said strip of land, in its entire length and breadth, to be a public highway, and from the time of recording said plat wholly abandoned all claim of ownership therein, and that he also acknowledged said strip of land to be a public highway by selling lots in

said blocks 6, 7, and 12, fronting on the same, to sundry purchasers; that, shortly after recording said plat, Hundley built fences on the easterly lines of said blocks 6, 7, and 12, thereby indicating that said lines were the easterly boundary of said blocks; that not only was the dedication of the streets, highways, and public grounds on said plat accepted by the pub. lic authorities, but the streets so laid out were from time to time improved, as the public necessities required or the resources of the municipal authorities made possible; that the east and west streets indicated on said plat have since been designated by certain names, and have been used and traveled to their easterly termination at said lake, and that use of said strip of land on the lake shore always has been and is now necessary to the complete use and enjoyment of said other streets, and that the acceptance by said public authorities of said east and west streets operated as a constructive acceptance by them of the strip of land in question as a street; and that said strip of land has never been abandoned by said authorities. The answer admits the institution and prosecution of the ejectment suit alleged in the bill, and the proceedings and judgment therein, as alleged, except that it avers that Ditson, one of the defendants to said suit, was not served with process, and did not appear therein, either in person or by attorney, and that said court had therefore no jurisdiction over his person; that in said suit the plaintiff in its declaration claimed title to said strip of land in fee, and on the trial, the plaintiff's counsel having declared that he expected to prove only a common-law dedication of said strip of land, the court held that such dedication did not convey to said plaintiff the fee, and thereupon instructed the jury to find the defendants not guilty; that for these reasons said judgment in ejectment did not determine the rights and interests of the town of Lake View or of its successor, the city of Chicago, to the use of said strip of land as a public street; and that such rights were not determined or adjudicated in said suit, especially as against said Ditson.

At the hearing, which was had on pleadings and proofs, a decree was rendered, finding and holding that said plat of Hundley's subdivision was not made in conformity to the statute in that behalf, and did not operate as a conveyance to the public or to any municipal corporation of the strip of land in question, and that Hundley never dedicated or intended to dedicate the same for a public highway or to any public use, and that said strip of land has never been managed, worked, or improved as a public highway by any municipal authorities, and that said municipal authorities have never formally accepted said supposed dedication of said strip of land, except that the city counsel of the city of Lake View, on the 9th day of November, 1888, passed a resolution purporting to accept such supposed dedication, but that in the year 1871, and long prior to the passage of said resolution, said Hundley had conveyed all his title and interest in said strip of land to Nixon, a re

mote grantor of the complainant; that the public have never in any way acquired a right to use said strip of land as a public highway. The city of Chicago was therefore perpetually enjoined from interfering with said strip of land, and from taking possession of or in any way interfering with it as a public highway. From this decree the city of Chicago has appealed to this court. Further facts will be found sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

J. S. Miller and H. H. Anderson, for appellant. Munro & Geer, for appellee.

BAILEY, J., (after stating the facts.) It seems to us to be very clear that Hundley's subdivision of lots 3 to 21 and 33 to 37, inclusive, in Pine Grove, was not in conformity with the statute, and therefore did not operate as a statutory dedication or conveyance to any municipal corporation or to the public of any portion of the lands subdivided, for the purposes of public streets or highways. The plat of said subdivision was made, acknowledged, and recorded October 24, 1855, and while the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1845 in relation to plats of subdivisions of land, and their legal effect, were in force. Said statutes provided that when any person wished to lay out a town, or an addition or subdivision of outlots, he should cause the same to be surveyed, and a plat or map thereof made by the county surveyor, which plat or map shall particularly describe and set forth all the streets, alleys, commons, or public grounds, and all in and out lots or fractional lots within, adjoining, or adja. cent to said town, giving the names, widths, corners, bondaries, and extent of all such streets and alleys." Such plat or map was required to be certified, acknowledged, and recorded, and it was then provided that, when that was done, said plat or map should be deemed in law and in equity a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee simple of the streets, alleys, ways, etc., indicated thereon, in the corporate authorities of the town or city in trust for the uses and purposes therein set forth and expressed or intended. Rev. St. 1845, c. 25, div. 1, §§ 17-21. In one very material respect, at least, Hundley's subdivision failed to comply with these statutory requirements. No names were given of any streets, alleys, or public grounds, nor was any portion of the lands depicted on said plat even designated as streets. Particularly is it true that no name or designation whatever was given to the strip of land lying between the easterly lines of blocks 6, 7, and 12 and the lake. The statute having expressly required that plats of subdivisions of land shall give the names of streets, it must be assumed that the giving of such names was intended by the legislature as one of the essential and necessary evidences of an intention to grant lands to the public for street purposes; and where such requirement is not complied with, either literally or in substance, the plat cannot have the force of a statutory conveyance. In Vil. lage of Auburn v. Goodwin, 128 Ill. 57, 21 N. E. Rep. 212, a case arising under the

provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1845, we held that a plat not made out, certified, and acknowledged substantially as required by said statutes afforded no evidence of title in the municipal corporation to the streets and alleys. In Village of Princeville v. Auten, 77 Ill. 325, the proprietors of land, in laying out and platting a village thereon, left a square blank, without any designation of its purpose, except that it was not divided into lots; and, although it appeared from extrinsic evidence that the makers of the plat intended the square for public use, it was held that the plat did not constitute, under the statute, a conveyance of said square to the municipal corporation, or a statutory dedication of it to the public. In Village of Winnetka v. Prouty, 107 III. 218, it was held that the failure to indicate upon a plat the names of the spaces claimed to have been intended for streets, or even to call them streets, and also the failure to indicate the length and width of such spaces, was fatal to the operation of the plat as a statutory dedication or conveyance of the fee to the public. See, also, Town of Lake View v. Le Bahn, 120 Ill. 100, 9 N. E. Rep. 269.

We are also of the opinion that the city of Chicago is precluded from claiming the fee in the strip of land in controversy, the title to which would be vested if said plat could be held to operate as a statutory dedication, by the judgment in the ejectment suit set up in the bill. The city of Chicago, the defendant here, is the suc cessor and therefore in privity with the town of Lake View, the plaintiff in that suit; and Anthony J. Drexel, the complainant here, is the remote grantee, and therefore in privity with Oliver Ditson, one of the defendants to that suit, and said judgment is binding upon the present parties by virtue of such privity. The judgment in that suit was conclusive on the parties thereto that at the time said suit was instituted the town of Lake View was not vested with the fee to said strip of land, and it has the same conclusiveness here as between the present parties.

But it is claimed that Oliver Ditson, though named as a party defendant to said ejectment suit, was not served with process, and did not appear, and that he was therefore no party to said judgment, and that neither he nor his privies can take advantage of it. The conclusive answer to this contention is that prior to the hearing of the present bill a stipulation was entered into between the complainant and the defendant, by which various admissions as to the facts at issue were made, and particularly that Mason, the two Kohlsaats, and the said Ditson were the defendants to said ejectment suit; that said defendants pleaded not guilty, and that upon the trial a verdict was rendered, finding the said defendants not guilty; and that judgment was there. upon rendered on said verdict in favor of said defendants. A solemn stipulation by a party as to the facts, so long as it stands, is conclusive between them, and cannot be met by evidence tending to show that the facts are otherwise. If a stipulation has been entered into inadvisedly or

through misinformation, the party injured should seek, by some direct proceeding, to have it set aside and canceled; but such party will not be permitted to dispute by evidence a fact solemnly admitted by such stipulation, the stipulation still being in force. Evidence was offered tend. ing to show that Ditson was not in fact served with process and did not appear in the ejectment suit, but in view of the stipulation by the city to the contrary the court below was justified in disregarding such evidence.

There being an entire failure to show a statutory dedication of the strip of land in question for the purposes of a street, the question remains whether the evidence is sufficient to establish a common-law dedication. To prove such dedication, both an intention on the part of the owner of the land to make it and an acceptance of such dedication by the proper public authorities must be shown, and the proof as to these facts must be clear and unequivocal. As said in Grube v. Nichols, 36 Ill. 92: "To make a sufficient dedication the owner of the soil must devote the right of way to public use, and it must be accepted and appropriated by the public to that use by travel, and a recognition as a public highway by the proper authorities, by repairs or otherwise. But when a dedication is relied upon to establish the right, the acts of both the donor and the public authorities should be unequivocal and satisfactory of the design to dedicate on the one hand, and to accept and appropriate to public use on the other." See, also, Trustees v. Walsh, 57 Ill. 363; Kyle v. Town of Logan, 87 Ill. 64. It must, of course, be conceded that where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it, and makes, acknowledges, and records a plat of his subdivision, designating thereon certain strips of land as streets or highways, such plat, though not made in accordance with statutory requirements, will be evidence of an intention, as well as of an offer, to dedicate to the public a right of way over the strips of land thus designated, as at common law. Trustees v. Walsh, supra; Gould v. Howe, 131 Ill. 490, 23 N. E. Rep. 602. The plat in this case, however, fails to designate any strips of land as public streets or highways, all that appears on it being certain blocks of designated dimensions and numbers, part of which are subdivided into lots consecutively numbered, with strips of land of certain designated widths lying between the blocks. Nothing appears, apart from their form, location, and dimensions, indicating the purpose for which said strips of land are laid out, or to which it was the intention of the maker of the plat to devote them. Now while it may be true that, notwithstanding all this, the plat, when considered in connection with other evidence in the case, may furnish some evidence of an intention to dedicate said strips of land to the public for the purposes of the streets or highways, its force, when considered alone, is very greatly weakened by the fact above noted, that no parts of the land subdivided are designated as streets or highways. There is no rule of law which forbids the subdivision of land by