or sale in the present case permits the mortgagor to retain the possession until default be made in payment. It also provides that if the mortgaged property sball be levied on, etc., this, as well as a default in payment, shall entitle the mortgagees to take immediate possession without process of law, and the same shall become the absolute property of the mortgagees. These conditions had been broken at the time of the sale; at least the one in reference to a levy by an officer had been broken. The mortgagees were therefore entitled to the immediate possession. The constable knew of the existence of the mortgage and of its terms. He knew it, as the complaint avers, from actual information and notice, and the law conclusively presumes that he knew it from the record. By the terms of the mortgage the mortgagees had also become the holders of the legal title to the property. Lee v. Fox, 113 Ind. 98, 14 N. E. Rep. 889; Ross v. Monefee, 125 Ind. 432, 25 N. E. Rep. 545. In addition to these facts it is averred that the mortgagor and principal of the note is wholly insolvent, and unable to pay the debt. The liability of the relators to pay the debt for which they were sureties is therefore fully shown by the averments of the complaint, which the demurrer admits. Where this is the case the mortgagee need not wait before he can maintain his action until he has paid the debt or incurred actual loss. Walling v. Lewis, 119 Ind. 496, 21 N. E. Rep. 1108; Brandt, Sur. (2d Ed.) § 221. If this were an action, therefore, between the mortgagees and the mortgagor to foreclose the mortgage, there can be no doubt but that the right to foreclose would be fully established. The appellants insist, if we understand their counsel correctly, that the rules as between mortgagor and mortgagee of an indemnity mortgage cannot be applied in measuring the liability of an officer charged with the commission of a tort, and that as to such officer there can be no recovery on his official bond until it has been shown that the party complaining has been actually damnified. We cannot see, however, upon what principle the officer can be held as exempt. He was expressly forbidden by law, as we have seen, from delivering the property until the terms of the mortgage had been complied with. Syfers v. Bradley, supra; McDaniel v. State, supra. He must be held to know that a liability had accrued to the mortgagees by the terms of the mortgage. He must be held to know that the purchaser had acquired nothing by the sale except the mortgagor's equity of redemption, and that the relators had the primary right of possession, the legal title to the property, and the right to apply the same to the payment of the debt for which they were suretles, and that, if anything belonged to the purchaser, it was only what was left of the proceeds after the said debt had been paid, unless the purchaser himself would then and there pay said mortgage debt. His knowledge of these facts made it a breach of his official duty to allow the property to be removed beyond the reach of the mortgage. This breach of duty makes him liable on his bond. The fact

that the mortgagees have paid out nothing as yet is no defense to the action, any more than it would be a defense to the foreclosure of the mortgage. It is true that he has nothing to do with deciding upon the validity of the mortgage or passing upon the questions involved in its terms as between the parties, but he must hold the possession of the goods until those questions have been settled, and if he surrenders it sooner he does it at his peril. McDaniel v. State, supra. We think, therefore, that the facts pleaded disclose a valid cause of action, and the demurrer was properly overruled.

The remaining question arises upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial. It is urged that the amount of the finding is excessive. The court, as we have seen, adopted as the measure of damages the amount of the debt to secure which the mortgage was given. The value of the property was proved to be greater than the amount of such debt. The smallest value placed upon it by any witness was $375. Less than this the court could not have found it to be. Where the value of the property is found to be less than the amount of the debt, the measure of damages is such value of the property, while if the value of the property is more than the debt, the amount of the indebtedness furnishes the measure for the amount of the damages. Slifer v. State, 114 Ind. 291, 14 N. E. Rep. 595, and 16 N. E. Rep. 623. Tested by this rule, the court correctly placed the damages at $240.65, the principal and interest of the notes, for which the relators are liable. We find no error in the record. Judgment affirmed.

(4 Ind. App. 505)

LOCKWOOD v. BEARD.1 (Appellate Court of Indiana. Feb. 4, 1893.) MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-DEFENSE-APPEAL

RECORD.

1. In an action for damages resulting from an alleged malicious prosecution, it appeared that plaintiff had been discharged by defendant as superintendent of a factory, but that he continued to visit the factory and work therein, without direction. It was claimed by the managers of the factory that plaintiff intermeddled with the working of the men and the affairs of the company, and from this arose a criminal prosecution. Defendant offered to prove that plaintiff's temper and methods were such as to make him unfit for the position of superintendent. Held, that the fact sought to be shown was too remote.

2. Where instructions requested by defendant are not contained in the record on appeal, no questions arising on the refusal to give them will be considered.

Appeal from circuit court, Steuben county; A. A. CHAPIN, Judge.

Action by George M. Beard against Reuben Lock wood to recover damages for an Verdict alleged malicious prosecution. and judgment for plaintiff. From an order overruling his motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

W. L. Penfield and F. S. Blattner, for appellant. McBride & Baxter, for appellee.

CRUMPACKER, J. Beard sued Lock wood for damages resulting from the alleged ma 'Rehearing denied.

flclous prosecution of a criminal action against him by the latter. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant mallciously, and without probable cause, made and filed an affidavit before a justice of the peace, charging plaintiff with forcible entry and detainer, and caused his arrest thereon; that afterwards the prosecution was dismissed, and the plaintiff discharged. The cause was put at issue, and tried by a jury. There was a verdict in favor of plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered. The defendant appeals, and assigns for error the overruling of his motion for a new trial.

The first question argued by counsel for appellant relates to the giving of a certain instruction to the jury by the court, of its own motion, and the only point made against the instruction is that it was not applicable to the facts. We have carefully examined the evidence, and conclude that the instruction was fully warranted.

Counsel next complain of the action of the court in refusing two instructions requested by the appellant. All of the instructions given by the court of its own motion are brought into the record by bill of exceptions, but it appears that the court also gave a number of other instructions at the request of appellant, and none of these are in the hill of exceptions. What purport to be the instructions requested by appellant have been copied in the record by the clerk in making up the transcript, but the record does not show that they were filed. "In order that instructions may be made part of the record without a bill of exceptions, the record must affirmatively show that they were filed." Railway Co. v. Beyerle, 110 Ind. 100, 11 N. E. Rep. 6; Blount v. Rick, 107 Ind. 238, 5 N. E. Rep. 898, and 8 N. E. Rep. 108. So the instructions given by the court at appellant's request are not in the record. It is an inexorable rule of this court that, if all of the instructions given are not contained in the record, no questions arising upon the refusal of instructions will be considered, as it will be presumed that all of those refused, containing correct enunciations of the law, were fully covered by those given. Taylor v. Wootan, 1 Ind. App. 188, 27 N. E. Rep. 502; Bash v. Young, 2 Ind App. 297, 28 N E. Rep. 344.

The only other question discussed relates to the exclusion of certain evidence offered by appellant. The evidence showed that appellee was a stockholder and director in the Monitor Manufacturing Company, and had been superintendent of its factory. Appellant was also a stockholder and director in the company, and held the office of vice-president. At a meeting of the board of directors, appellant was instructed to discharge the appellee from the position of superintendent, which he did. Appellee continued thereafter to visit the factory, and worked therein without direction; and it was claimed by the managers that he intermeddled with the working of the men and the affairs of the company. His presence at the factory after his discharge was the basis of the criminal prosecution. Appellant offered to prove by a competent and qualified witness that appellee's temper and methods were such

that, in the opinion of the witness, he was unfit for the position of superintendent. This evidence was excluded, and we think there was no error in this ruling of the court. If the opinion of the witness was competent to prove the fact of appellee's unfitness, such fact was so remote that its exclusion cannot be held reversible error. It could only bear upon the question of malice; and it involves a collateral question, the investigation of which would tend to distract the minds of the jury from the real issue. The judgment is affirmed.

(5 Ind. App. 280) HAWTHORN, Sheriff, v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF RANDOLPH COUNTY.1 (Appellate Court of Indiana. Feb. 5, 1893.) SHERIFF'S FEES-LIABILITY OF COUNTY.

Act March 31, 1879, § 26, (Rev. St. 1881, $ 5873,) provides that the sheriffs of the several counties shall tax and charge certain fees and none other, and among the fees named therein are 20 cents for every person committed to the jail and 20 cents for every prisoner discharged. Held, that by implication from Act Feb. 28, 1883, supplemental to said Act March 31, 1879, and providing in section 1 that "it shall be unlawful for any officer in the state to tax any fee that is not legally allowable under the statute," and in section 7, that "it shall be unlawful for any board of commissioners to allow any county officer any sum of money out of the county treasury, except where the statute confers clear and unequivocal authority to do so," the sheriff of a county is entitled to be paid out of the county treasury the fees that he is authorized to tax and charge for committing and discharging persons to and from the county jail. Stiffler v. Board, 27 N. E. Rep. 641, 1 Ind. App. 368, distinguished.

Appeal from circuit court, Randolph county; L. J. MONKS, Judge.

Action by Benjamin Hawthorn, as sheriff of Randolph county, against the board of commissioners of said county, on a claim for fees for committing and discharging persons to and from the county jail. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

J. S. Engle, for appellant. Marsh & Thompson, for appellee.

NEW, J. The appellant filed and presented to the board of commissioners of Randolph county his claim in the form of a complaint, as sheriff of said county, accompanied by a bill of particulars, for $176.40, for committing and discharging from the county jail persons who had been committed thereto, from November 20, 1886, to August 31, 1889. No part of the claim was allowed, and the claimant appealed to the circuit court, where a demurrer was sustained to the complaint for want of facts. The appellant refusing to further plead, judgment was rendered in favor of the appellee upon the demurrer.

The only question presented for our decision relates to the sufficiency of the complaint. By section 26 of the act approved March 31, 1879, (Rev. St. 1881, § 5873,) it is provided that the sheriffs of the several Counties shall tax and charge certain fees and none other. Among the fees therein named that may be charged are 20 cents for every person committed to jail and 20

1 Rehearing denied, 31 N. E. 1124.

cents for each prisoner discharged from jail. An act approved February 28, 1883, supplemental to said act of March 31, 1879, and to acts amendatory thereof, provides in its first section (page 48, Acts 1883) "that it shall be unlawful for any officer in the state, under color of his office, to tax or permit to be taxed in his office any fee or sum of money that is not legally allowable under the statute or statutes of the state." It is also provided by section 7 of said act that "it shall be unlawful for any board of commissioners to allow any county, township, or other public officer any sum of money out of a county treasury, except where the statute confers the clear and unequivocal authori ty to do so," etc. Both before and since the enactment of the act of 1883 from which we have quoted, it has been held by the courts in this state that an officer cannot successfully claim compensation from the county unless there is a statute providing that he shall receive from the county the renumeration claimed. Raw. ley v. Board, etc., 2 Blackf. 355; Board, etc., v. Blake, 21 Ind. 32; Board, etc., v. Templer, 34 Ind. 322; Taylor v. Board, etc., 67 Ind. 383; Moon v. Board, etc., 97 Ind. 176; Wright v. Board, etc., 98 Ind. 88; Noble v. Board, etc., 101 Ind. 127; State v. Roach, 123 Ind. 167, 24 N. E. Rep. 106; Wood v. Board, etc., 125 Ind. 270, 25 N. E. Rep. 188; Stiffler v. Board, etc., 1 Ind. App. 368, 27 N. E. Rep. 641. In the construction of statutes, the prime object is to ascertain and carry out the purpose and intent of the legislature. Statutes should be so construed as to render every part of them not only consistent, but operative, if possible. They should be so construed as to give effect to every part, and to avoid absurd and unjust consequences, if capable of such construction. Storms v. Stevens, 104 Ind. 46, 3 N. E. Rep. 401; Stout v. Board, etc., 107 Ind. 343, 8 N. E. Rep. 222; City of Evansville v. Summers, 108 Ind. 189, 9 N. E. Rep. 81; Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466, 10 N. E. Rep. 411; Hunt v. Railway Co.. 112 Ind. 69, 13 N. E. Rep. 263: Green v. Cheek, 5 Ind. 105; Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; Wood v. Board, etc., 125 Ind. 270, 25 N. E. Rep. 188. A careful reading of the act of 1883, to which we have referred, will clearly disclose that its purpose was to prevent the charging, taxing up, and receiving of any fees or sums of money as compensation for any service, duty, or thing additional to what is allowable by the terms of the statutes to which it is supplemental. It is a declaration against and prohibition of the payment of fees which are not plainly named and allowed by law. It makes no attack upon, nor in any way modifies or repeals, statutes creating or allowing fees or compensation for particular services On the contrary, it clearly recognizes all such fees or compensation by providing that nothing additional thereto shall be allowed. It prohibits fees that can only be brought into being by implication or construction. The evil that this was intended to remedy is too well known to require special mention of in this opinion.

It is provided by law that there shall be established and kept in every county, by v.30N.E.no.1-2

authority of the board of county commissioners, and at the expense of the county, a prison for the safe-keeping of the prisoners. It is made the duty of the sheriff to keep the jail, and he is authorized to tax and charge 20 cents for every person committed thereto, and 20 cents for each prisoner discharged therefrom. Sections 6115, 6118, 5873, Rev. St. 1881. The sums or fees to which the sheriff is thus declared to be entitled are not creat. ed by construction or implication, but are expressly provided for him. It will not do to say that the fees sued for are to be taxed against the person or prisoner committed and discharged. Such is not, and, as we believe, has never been, the practice; and a knowledge of this fact, and acquiescence therein, so to speak, by the legislature, should not be overlooked. Besides, in many cases the committals are of persons awaiting action by the grand jury, such persons being often discharged without indictment, or, if tried, discharged, because found to be not guilty. The language of the statute is: "For every person committed to jail, twenty cents; for discharging each prisoner from jail, twenty cents. It is difficult to believe that it was the purpose of the legislature to require any part of these fees to be paid by a "person" whose committal may not have been on account of crime, either charged or proven, or who, if discharged as a prisoner, was released because of the failure of the state to further prosecute, or because of an acquittal upon trial. There is nowhere in the criminal procedure act, or any other statute, any. thing indicating any such theory or purpose in the legislative mind. In the same section of the statute which authorizes the sheriff to charge the fees sued for, we find that he is allowed for summoning a jury of 12 men, 75 cents, with mileage. He is allowed for each day's actual attendance upon court in person or by deputy $2. For holding an inquisition, drawing it up in form, and returning the same, he is entitled to 50 cents. In either of these instances, and in others we could cite, is it provided in so many words that his compensation shall come from the county treasury. The practice, however, has always been, as we believe, to pay for the services just attended to, out of the county treasury. The last sentence in section 5873, supra, reads as follows: "For each commitment or discharge of a prisoner under the authority of any city or incorporated town shall be paid by such city or town twenty cents." This provision tends strongly to show that in other committals and discharges the fees were to be paid by the county at large. The services for which the appellee sues were rendered for the county, and the statute by fair implication authorizes payment therefor out of the county treasury. The case of Wright v. Board, etc., 98 Ind. 88, recognizes the rule that, although a statute may not expressly provide for the compensation of an officer, it may do so by implication. Implication is an inference of something not directly declared, but arising from what is admitted or expressed. And. Law Dict. 527. A thing within the intention of the makers of a statute is as

much within the statute as if it were within the letter. What is clearly implied in a statute is as effectual as what is expressed. U. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black. 55; Pompton v. Cooper Union, 101 U. S. 202. The case of Board v. Gresham, 101 Ind. 53, (decided in April, 1885,) was an action by the sheriff against the county for keeping the county jail. We quote from the opinion the following: "The statute prescribes specifically the duties of the sheriff with respect to receiving and caring for prisoners confined in the county jail, and fixes the compensation which shall be paid him for receiving, discharging, and boarding them; and when the county, through its board of commissioners, has provided a suitable jail, and maintains in it suitable furniture and appliances for its proper keeping, and pays the jailer the compensation specifically prescribed by statute, it has discharged its municipal obligation, and exhausted its corporate power over the subject. In the same case it is further said by the court: "The prisoners and other persons committed to his custody, to whom attention was given, were not committed to the jail by nor for the county, nor was the county interested in them in any respect different from a city or town or other corporation within the county, except to discharge its statutory obligation of providing, furnishing, and maintaining the jail, and paying the sheriff the compensation provided by law for receiving, discharging, and boarding them while in his custody." Afterwards, in the case of Board v. Harman, 101 Ind. 551, which was a claim by the sheriff against the county for keeping the county jail, the court, citing Board v. Gresham, supra, said: "The compensation fixed by statute for boarding, receiving, and discharging prisoners covers and embraces the services of the sheriff in maintaining and caring for the jail and the prisoners." In the case cited the supreme court treat the services of the sheriff in receiving and discharging persons from the county jail as rendered for the county, and declare it to be the statutory duty of the county to pay therefor. If payment of the services sued for was a statutory obligation resting upon the county, then it was the duty of the county commissioners to allow the same, under section 5745, Rev. St. 1881, relating to the powers and duties of that body. The second subdivision of that section reads as follows: "To allow all accounts chargeable against such county, not otherwise provided by law, and to direct the raising of such sums as may be necessary to defray all county expenses." In our opinion, it is by the clearest implication, to say the least, provided by the statute to which we have referred, that the sheriff of a county is entitled to be paid out of the county treasury the fees which he is authorized by statute to tax and charge for committing and discharging persons to and from the county jail. Counsel for the appellee cite us to the case of Stiffler v. Board, etc., 1 Ind. App. 868, 27 N. E. Rep. 641. An examination of the statute will clearly show that it is by no means indicated that the services sued tor by the county auditor in that case were

to be paid for out of the county treasury. The demurrer to the complaint in the case at bar should have been overruled. The judgment is reversed, with costs. (4 Ind. App. 426) et al. Feb. 6, 1892.)

VICE et al. v. JONES (Appellate Court of Indiana. Appeal from circuit court, Boone county. C. S. Wesner and O. D. Wesner, for appellants. W. J. Darnell and T. W. Lockhart, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. This case is affirmed for failure to return record and papers, as required by order of January 25, 1892, issued to the attorney for the appellants, pursuant to rule 32 of this court. 27 N. E. Rep. vii.

(131 Ind. 489)

CURTIS V. CURTIS et al.1 (Supreme Court of Indiana. Feb. 5, 1892.)

COSTS-SECURITY-DEPOSITIONS.

1. A wife petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain from her husband, who resides in the state, the custody of their child, cannot be required, without proofs, to give bond as a nonresident, since her domicile is prima facie the same as her husband's.

2. Depositions taken in another state will not be suppressed because the notary failed to affix a seal to his certificate, when the clerk of the proper court certifies to the official character of the notary, under the seal of the court.

Appeal from superior court, Tippecanoe county; F. V. EVERETT, Judge.

Petition by Lucy A. Curtis for a writ of babeas corpus to recover the custody of her child from her husband, Erasmus K. D. Curtis, and others. Judgment for relatrix. Respondent Curtis appeals. Affirmed. R. P. Davidson, for appellant. Rice & Potter, for appellees.

OLDS, J. The appellant, Erasmus K. D. Curtis, and the relatrix, Lucy A. Curtis, husband and wife, had born to them one child, a daughter, Nellie D. Curtis, now about six years old. In October, 1888, and for about four years prior thereto, they lived in the city of Staunton, Va., with Adrian Ann Curtis, mother of the appellant. That in the month of October, 1888, at the request of the appellant, the relatrix was absent from the house, dining with a neighbor and friend, having been induced by appellant to go to the house of her friend without her child; and in her absence the appellant abandoned the relatrix, taking the child with him. Afterwards his mother joined him at La Fay. ette, Ind., where they have since been keeping house; appellant concealing the whereabouts of himself and child, so that the relatrix had no knowledge as to the whereabouts of either until immediately before the filing of her petition in this case. Immediately on ascertaining where the appellant and the child were, she filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the custody of the child. There was a final hearing before the superior court of Tippecanoe county, resulting in a judgment in favor of relatrix, giving to her the

'Rehearing denied.

custody of the child, and rendering a judgment against the appellant for costs.

The first alleged error discussed relates to the ruling of the court on appellant's motion to require the relatrix to give bond for costs. This question we will consider later on in the opinion.

It is next contended that the petition is insufficient. We cannot agree with counsel for appellant on this proposition. The petition is too long to set out a copy of it It avers the marriage of the appellant and the relatrix, the birth of the child, the strong attachment existing between her and the child; that she had in every way demeaned herself properly towards her husband, and had been a loving and dutiful wife; that she is now living with her father and mother; that her father is a man of ample means and a good home; that he is ready, willing, and anxious to furnish a permanent and comfortable home within his said house for both the relatrix and ber said child; that both her father and mother are high moral and upright and respectable people, kind-hearted, generous, and indulgent, and will afford relatrix every facility and assistance in properly bringing up and raising her said child; that the relatrix has in her own right real and personal property to the amount of $3,000. It further alleges the facts in regard to the cruel and unwarranted taking of the child from its mother, and secreting it, and not allowing her to know where it was. It alleges facts showing both the appellant and his mother to be unfit to take charge of and raise the child; that the appellant has no means with which to support the child, except as he earns it upon the railroad as a brakeman, or receives it from his mother, who has but limited means; that he is compelled to leave the child with his mother most of the time, and she feels very unkindly to. wards the relatrix, and will, if allowed to retain the custody of the child, teach it to dislike and hate the relatrix. There are many other allegations in the petition, showing the appellant to be an unfit person to have the custody of the child, and that the relatrix is a suitable and compe. tent person, well able to care for, and ought to have the custody of, the child, and that it is for the best interest of the child to give the custody of it to the mother. The petition is clearly sufficient.

It is contended that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress depositions of certain witnesses taken in Virginia, for the reason that they were not properly certified to by the notary public. The notary had no seal attached to his certificate, but the clerk of the court of Hastings certified as to the official character of the notary, and that his signature to the certificate was genuine. To the clerk's certificate is attached the seal of the court. Pape v. Wright, 116 Ind. 502, 19 N. E. Rep. 459. There was no error in overruling the motion to suppress. The affidavits and agreements in regard to the manner of taking the depositions do not show any valid reasons for sup pressing them. Numerous questions are presented on the rulings of the court in refusing to strike out parts of the deposi

tions. We have examined each of them, and find no error for which the judgment should be reversed.

We come now to the consideration of the question of the ruling of the court in refusing to require the relatrix to give bond for costs. Appellant made no proof as to the non-residence of the relatrix in support of the motion, but relied upon the averments of the complaint, and the court made no order requiring her to give bond for costs. In law, prima facie, the domi cile of the husband is the domicile of the wife. The husband being a resident of this state, the wife could not be required to give bond for costs in an action against her husband to recover the custody of her infant child. There is no error in the record for which the judgment should be reversed. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

(130 Ind. 300)

ОнIO & M. Ry. Co. v. BUCK. (Supreme Court of Indiana. Feb. 6, 1892.) RAILROAD COMPANIES ACCIDENT AT CROSSING

INSTRUCTIONS-EVIDENCE.

1. In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries at defend. ants' crossing, the court instructed the jury that it was defendant's duty to exercise "a high degree of care" in approaching the crossing. Held, the court having explained to the jury what amount of care was required, that they could not be misled by the instruction.

2. An instruction to the effect that the jury should give greater weight to a positive statement of one witness than to the negative statement of another witness was properly refused.

Appeal from circuit court, Knox county; GEORGE W. SHAW, Judge.

Action by Leander Buck against the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Ramsey, Maxwell & Ramsey and W. H. & E. H. De Wolf, for appellant. W. F. Townsend, W. A. Cullop, and C. B. Kessinge, for appellee.

OLDS, J. This is an action for personal injuries sustained at a railway crossing in the city of Vincennes, in Knox county, Ind. Issues were joined and a trial had, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee for $4,000. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled and exceptions reserved. Errors are assigned-First, that the court erred in overruling appellant's complaint; and, second, that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for new trial.

The question of appellant's negligence and of the appellee's contributory negligence is discussed in detail and at length. We have read the evidence, and have no doubt of the fact that there was evidence to support a finding that the appellant was negligent, and that the appellee was free from contributory negligence. That there may have been a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, or that the jury might, upon some basis of reasoning, have reached a different conclusion, can make no difference; for, if there is evidence fairly tending to support the verdict, it must stand.

There was evidence to show that at the